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'Offensive' weapons are needed

Taiwan recently submitted a letter of request for price and availability data to the US Department of Defense for the AGM-88C High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) and the GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) for Taiwan's existing inventory of bombs. Such weapons are often characterized as offensive and many believe that this might be a violation of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which restricts the type of weapons sold to Taiwan by the US.

According to a US defense source, the US provision of price and availability data to Taiwan implies approval to release such a weapons system to Taiwan. Fearful of Beijing's reaction, the US National Security Council staff and State Department are expected to oppose the release of these systems. Opponents will argue that the TRA calls for release of weapons of a defensive character, so Taiwan has to argue that JDAM and HARM are inherently defensive.

Despite potential opposition to the sale, the US has sold Taiwan offensive weapons in the past. With the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan in the 1990s the US also sold GBU-12 500-lb Paveway and 2000-lb GBU-10 bombs to Taiwan. In 1999 the US released the AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missile to Taiwan. Furthermore, the US government released the software and hardware necessary to convert Taiwan's existing inventory of Harpoons into land-attack cruise missiles. This capability, called Coastal Target Suppression, puts precision GPS receivers onto each missile, allowing it to go after targets in southeast China.

There are three basic reasons why HARM would fit into Taiwan's defense needs. First, it would enable suppression of China's ship-based radar systems and provide Taiwan's future P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft more freedom to operate. Without the ability to suppress China's navy air defenses, including the naval version of the HQ-9 missile, Taiwan's P-3s would operate in a very dangerous threat environment.

Second, HARM would enable suppression of Chinese radars that are supporting air strikes against Taiwan. China's air force and navy air operations are highly centralized and dependent upon positive air control for coordination and direction of complex strike missions. This air control relies upon radar data for situational awareness. By disrupting the air controllers' source of information, one disrupts China's ability to conduct strikes against Taiwan.

Third, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) would be necessary to enable Taiwan to conduct strike missions against key nodes of China's conventional ballistic missile forces with minimal losses. Key nodes would include command and control centers, logistical hubs -- going after launchers is not a feasible or cost effective option since there are too many of them. Looking at Second Artillery missile operations as a system, one seeks to neutralize nodes -- assuming one is able to identify them -- that would have a systemic effect. The idea is to go after that node in the most cost effective way possible. HARM would enable suppression of surface-to-air missile systems operating along China's southeast coast.

For example, during the annual military exercise, Hankuang 18, the Taiwan air force, after surviving simulated Chinese air and missile strikes, attempted to conduct a major air campaign against key targets in China, applying about 90 percent of its F-16 fleet. They lost 70 percent of their F-16s to Chinese air defenses. The main reason is the lack of a SEAD capability, including HARM, land attack cruise missiles, airborne Signal Intelligence platforms that could provide operating parameters of radars operating along the coast, airborne jammers, attack helicopters and special operations forces.

For Taiwan, there are two advantages to JDAM. First, Taiwan would reduce the risk of collateral damage by using precision-guided bombs versus dumb bombs. JDAM kits would enable the bombs to hit their targets and not some neighboring village or children's hospital. Secondly, using smart bombs means that Taiwan's pilots, assuming they are able to solve the SEAD problem, would only have to make one pass over a specific target.

A Taiwan government source said that the purchase plan will not affect the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology's Tien Chien (Sky Sword) 2A anti-radiation missile program, because if it successfully develops it the US will be forced to think about lowering the HARM's price. Procedure for the HARM's budget will be passed during the next legislative session after the year-end legislative elections.

Those in the US government who argue these systems are offensive do not understand Taiwan's defense requirements. Taiwan cannot properly defend itself without these types of munitions. In short, satisfying Taiwan's request for HARM and JDAM is necessary for Taiwan's defense and would not represent a break in US export policy toward Taiwan.

Wendell Minnick is the Taiwan correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly.
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