The US is only a few weeks from its presidential election. In Taiwan campaigning has begun in earnest for the election of the next Legislative Yuan in December, and China's leadership is completing the consolidation of its new generation of leaders. Decisions on objectives for the next four or five years may well be put off until January. But other activities important to the relationship between the three countries, and pertinent to these objectives, are taking place now.
Three of these activities are: that China now seems to be coordinating its efforts to damage Taiwan's security capabilities with opposition efforts in Taiwan to block needed resources for defense; Congress in Washington is unusually quiet about the Taiwan issue, and Singapore seems much more active in recapturing its former status as a go-between with China and the West.
Discussing these activities in reverse, commentaries written in the main English-language newspaper in Singapore are again being seen frequently in well-established secondary sources worldwide. They are evidently, for the most part, based on news from China, or from China's perspectives. Comments by Singapore's prime minister and its foreign minister seem to indicate the government may be supporting this expanded media activity.
For many years, during the reign of Lee Kuan Yew (李光耀), his visits with major world leaders always received public attention. During Taiwan's pre-democratic period, he was seen in the West as a neutral advisor to these leaders based on his being ethnic Chinese, and an elected -- somewhat -- leader of a recognized predominantly ethnic Chinese state. It also was a time when Singapore's political system, compared to either China or Taiwan, was as close to a democratic system as one could find in so-called "Greater China."
That notion went down the tubes after Taiwan established its popular democracy.
In western democracies -- and especially in the US -- after many years of calling Chiang Kai-shek's (
Though Singapore's security relies heavily on US arms and contracts, its apparent resurrection of go-between activities now tends to bolster China's objectives in cross-strait relations -- such as its foreign minister's statement in the UN.
This may be seen by Singapore as a balanced strategy, but it may also be at Taiwan's expense. In Taiwan this may have some influence on the new generation of voters. How many among them recognize the difference between Singapore's "Asian values," and Taiwan's "popular democracy" is not clear.
At the same time, the US Congress in Washington recently seems rather quiet about Taiwan issues, even at a time when bilateral tensions between Taiwan and the US are unusually high.
For Taiwan this might be a concern of an entirely different kind. It is based more on confusion about where Taiwan's politics are going than any change of heart in the Congress' usual support for Taiwan. The government-to-government tensions between the US and Taiwan have subsided somewhat, but there is still a lot of confusion generated by the overseas Taiwanese community -- but seldom in the broad public media. Add to this the mushrooming number of new Americans coming from China -- which would be of concern even to a unified Taiwanese community -- there is a deep emotional split between the "pan-green" and "pan-blue" supporters.
For Congress, and for the general American public, this problem is seen as a domestic problem for Taiwan, not for the US. Being lobbied by supporters of an opposition party is not in itself unusual or opposed, but being asked to support the overthrow of a friendly democratic government that has been legitimately elected is another matter.
If the legitimacy is itself being challenged, then in most democracies the judicial institutions in that country decide the matter.
Ironically, in this particular case, there is a problem between lobby groups of American citizens who have a greater fervor for their cause than many of their comrades in Taiwan. While Congress tries to avoid getting involved, the growing number of Americans from China must be enjoying the spectacle as Taiwan's important support in Congress erodes.
As for arms sales to Taiwan, China may well be reaching an objective it has sought for over a half-century. Since 1979, the US has refused China's requests to halt arms sales to Taiwan, sometimes at a very considerable cost to the important US-China relationship. The present challenge within Taiwan to change this dependency on US arms sales is both complicated and dangerous. There are anti-war organizations in almost all democracies, which seek to stop spending money on weapons and use it for "more important" objectives.
As in Taiwan, these associations are often supported by distinguished academics who believe in these moral objectives, though they are not always expert in security matters. They are honest advocates of an ideal they believe in, but they do not always weigh the dangers to their country and their people in facing an adversary that doesn't share their priorities.
In Taiwan, however, these groups are joined by partisan groups who know about security matters, know the risks and danger to the country, but see the objective of destroying their political adversary -- and their country if necessary -- as justified. Joining the two -- academics and politicians -- into a united group with some common goal is misleading to the general public, who hold influence over their representatives in the Legislative Yuan.
Then, of course, there is the role of China. To what degree is it providing resources to these groups is unknown. But China's more recent and stronger public demands to the US to stop making arms available to Taiwan are well timed to add to the anti-arms sale efforts being made domestically in Taiwan.
It is difficult to judge how these three activities will impact on the future plans of Taiwan, China and the US.
To what extent Singapore's departure from a more neutral stance influences other countries to do the same is not clear.
Should the efforts of Taiwanese opposition groups in the US continue, once the results are presented by the Judicial Yuan on the legitimacy of the last election, it will make a difference in Congress' views of Taiwan. And the results of the Legislative Yuan vote on the special funds for the purchase of the needed arms will make a sharp difference in the planning of both China and the US.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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