Terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia have led many to question not only the ruling House of Saud's prospects for survival, but also whether the kingdom is fundamentally dysfunctional and destructive. Somehow, it seems, Saudi society has produced a stream of violent fanaticism that draws its inspiration from extreme religious orthodoxy.
The fact that 15 of the 19 hijackers in the September 11, 2001, US attacks were Saudis crystallized a long-held view of the kingdom as a bastion of authoritarianism and intolerance. In some respects, this perception is accurate, but it cannot be applied to the broad Saudi public. On the contrary, it would be a grave mistake to assume that fanatical Islamism fully defines Saudi attitudes toward religion.
Between 2001 and 2003, I was part of a team that undertook an extensive survey of values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and Jordan. Our results provide a surprisingly nuanced picture of Saudi attitudes. Compared to respondents in the other Middle Eastern countries, Saudis were less religious overall, and their attitudes toward democracy and arranged marriage also indicate a moderate undercurrent.
To be sure, in all four countries, religiosity is widespread, with more than 90% of respondents collectively reporting that they believe in God, in life after death, and in heaven and hell. But the Saudis appear to be less religious than their fellow Muslims. Sixty-two percent of Saudis described themselves as religious, compared with 82 percent of Iranians, 85 percent of Jordanians, and 98 percent of Egyptians. Americans also appear to be far more religious than Saudis, with 81 percent describing themselves that way.
Some of this variation may be explained by cross-national differences regarding what it means to be religious. For example, Americans may define religiosity differently than Middle Easterners, with perhaps a weaker attachment to religious beliefs than is true in Islamic countries. This might also account in part for the differences between Muslim countries.
But the gap in self-defined religiosity between Saudis, on the one hand, and Iranians, Jordanians and Egyptians, on the other, is so great that it challenges the prevalent perception of Saudi Arabia as a highly conservative and religious society. Indeed, actions speak louder than words: only 28 percent of Saudis said that they participate in weekly religious services, compared to 27 percent of Iranians, 44 percent of Jordanians, 42 percent of Egyptians, and 45 percent of Americans.
These findings, while running contrary to popular perceptions of Saudi culture, are less startling than they appear. Sociologists of religion have long argued that in a monolithic religious environment, or when religious institutions are closely tied to the state, the overall religiosity of the public declines.
It makes sense to think that when state authorities enforce strict codes of behavior, people tend to rebel and move away from officially sanctioned religious institutions. Little wonder, then, that Egyptians and Jordanians, who live in countries where the state does not enforce piety, are more religious than Iranians or Saudis, who must cope with local "virtue" police backed by the state.
Even on marriage, many Saudis expressed surprisingly liberal views. Respondents were nearly evenly split on the question of arranged marriages, with half supporting the idea that marriage should be based on parental consent, while 48 percent preferred love as the basis of matrimony. Given entrenched gender segregation and paternal dominance, this finding appears to reveal a strong desire for greater individual choice in what has traditionally been a family-driven decision.
Finally, the Saudis turn out to be strong supporters of democracy, once again contradicting a popular image of Saudi conservatism. Of the Saudis polled, 58 percent considered democracy the best form of government, 23 percent disagreed, and 18 percent did not express an opinion.
Majority support for democracy in a country with no prior secular or nationalist history seems counter-intuitive. In fact, support for democracy corresponds with a number of other liberal attitudes that we found in Saudi Arabia. Supporters of democracy tend to be less religious, more secular, more tolerant of others, more critical of public-sector performance, and more concerned with Western cultural invasion.
Beyond the survey data, history has shown that liberal ideas become more popular when a despotic monarch governs people in alliance with a religious establishment. A strong current of liberalism appeared in the late nineteenth century in Ottoman Syria in response to the religious despotism of Sultan Abdulhamid. At the same time, an anti-clerical secular movement on behalf of constitutionalism appeared in Iran -- a reaction to the absolutist alliance between the Quajar Shahs and the religious establishment.
In view of the similarities between those historical precedents and current conditions in Saudi Arabia, we ought not to rule out the possibility of reform. Now survey data suggest that Saudis may well begin demanding a more transparent politics and a less interventionist religion.
Mansoor Moaddel is a sociology professor at Eastern Michigan University and author of Islamic Modernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism. Copyright: Project Syndicate
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