Even though Australia remains a staunch US ally, a section of its political and intellectual establishment is keen on closer ties with China. And they are keen to promote them.
The appointment of a new Chinese ambassador to Canberra provides one such example. Paul Sheehan, a columnist with the Sydney Morning Herald, gave her top billing describing her as a "diplomatic heavy hitter," having been the director-general of the department of Asian affairs in China's foreign office. And he quoted her approvingly on the state and potential of Australia-China relations.
According to Fu Ying (
Elaborating, she said, "China has a comfortable feeling about Australia. Very friendly. There is no serious scar in our history. Australia can help China to understand the world better, and help the world understand China."
Talking about economic ties, she held out the prospect of a preferential trade pact between the two countries, describing their general economic structures as "complimentary." Highlighting the vastness of China's market, she said, "Most of the things China needs now can be found here [in Australia]. And Chinese companies are also ready to invest overseas. Many of them are coming here to look for opportunities."
But there is a caveat. As the ambassador put it, "I think it depends on how much Australia is ready to expand your production [of minerals China needs] to avail yourself of this opportunity ... Will you be ready to have more joint ventures with China?"
And to emphasize her point, she said, "Australians need to think hard. And China also needs to think hard. Because depending on Australia for key materials means becoming dependent on you to some extent."
The excerpts above help us to understand China's view of Australia in its scheme of things. A few points stand out.
First, Beijing is keen to enlist Canberra's help as a sympathetic interpreter with Washington by virtue of its alliance with US. However, this has its limitations. Canberra's special relationship with the US is by virtue of its being a loyal ally. That means substantial political and strategic convergence between the two countries. In other words, Australia must, by and large, follow the US lead on important matters like the state of the Sino-US relationship. For instance, Australia will find it very difficult to be neutral on Taiwan in the event of US involvement to defend the nation.
Indeed, as part of the US' new global strategic vision of creating more agile and flexible defense force structures, Australia is being assigned an even more important role. Editorializing on this, the Sydney Morning Herald said, "The proposal for joint training facilities in northern Australia, which could bring thousands of American troops to train at upgraded bases in the Northern Territory and far north Queensland, is part of this new strategic vision. It has been welcomed by the Australian Government."
At another level, Australia is also committing to the US missile defense program, making available its bases, facilities and technology for early warning systems. Not only that, it seems willing to deploy ballistic missile interceptors near its capital cities. As one commentator has pointed out, "It was the first time an Australian [defense] minister had canvassed the option of missile defenses for Australian cities."
All this is anathema to China. But Australia is so interlocked into US global strategy that it is difficult to visualize any Australian government being able to have much leeway in the matter.
But China is not deterred. Ambassador Fu, therefore, sought to address issues that might concern Australia about a resurgent China. First, she said that China was very happy with the integration of Chinese people as Australian citizens. To quote her, "The Chinese Australians are very Australian. They feel well accepted, comfortable, at ease. There is none of the kind of tension we usually find with Chinese ethnic groups overseas. Australian society is very successful."
She also sought to address the question of China's strategic competition with the US for global supremacy. According to her, "With the United States, we don't believe we are rivals ... We are not interested in competing for world power. We have too many people to worry about."
In terms of China's overall future foreign policy orientation as an expanding global power, she said that China would be "different," because "the world has changed. It's not like in the past when powers had to expand territorially in order to get markets ... It's a new world, a globalized world. China is a huge country with a big population to take care of ... so China is going to primarily engage with its own problems for a long time to come."
In other words, Beijing is not only seeking to calm Australia's own reservations about China's future, but also enlisting it to interpret this message to the US.
There is nothing in what Fu said that hasn't been said before. But there are two important reasons for its amplification in Australia. First, Australia is a vast quarry with minerals that China would need for its economic development.
Second, Australia too values expanding economic opportunities with an upcoming China with growing demand for its mineral resources. Already, as economic analyst Ross Gittins, has pointed out, "China has overtaken the United States as our second biggest export destination."
And this gives China an important lobby in Australia to work on.
Also, with growing clout in the Asia-Pacific region, China can legitimize Australia's credentials in Asia.
Beijing couldn't have failed to notice rumblings in Australia between the Government and the opposition Labor Party (the alternative government, if the present conservative ruling coalition were to lose power during the elections in the next few months) over the latter's commitment to withdraw Australia's miniscule military presence in Iraq. This is viewed in some circles as putting pressure on the Australia-US alliance.
But the fact is that the vast majority of Australians (across the political spectrum) regard their alliance with the US as central to their national existence. Some might quibble about Australia's relative weight in the alliance and seek to exercise greater autonomy. But most do not want to risk it on that.
Beijing can't be unaware of the strength of the US-Australian alliance. What it is seeking to do, therefore, is to build up an important constituency in Australia to heed China's interests and interpret them to the US. In the meantime, nurturing Australia as a reliable quarry for China's growing mineral demands is important in a troubled world.
Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.
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