Print

Mail

wiki links

A cross-strait task force is needed

Now that the tensions of late last year and early this year have been mitigated somewhat, perhaps it is easier to ponder why tensions had been raised, and what might be done to avoid such problems. President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) efforts to improve cross-strait relations in his first two years in office had no results. The economic recession, especially the high rate of unemployment, was improving, but slowly, and the opposition-led Legislative Yuan had thwarted stimulus and reform generally. In addition a coalition between the two opposition parties had been formed. Prospects for a second term of a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-led government were uncertain at best. It seems clear that a decision was made to turn tough on the China relationship in preparing for the next election.

In Washington, the government, at least in public, had maintained a strict neutrality on the forthcoming election in Taiwan. Information and analysis received there is not publicly known, of course, but most of the China experts in the think tanks saw this "get tough" strategy as purely an election gambit, irresponsible, placing the US at risk of possible military action. They were certain that the eventual objective was independence. Words such as "moving toward independence," and that Chen was "untrustworthy," among other statements often used by China, were heard.

That there were also other very legitimate and very fundamental reasons for Chen's strategy did not seem to be explored. A referendum, for example, for the DPP was clearly a fundamental necessity. Even more important, the leadership saw some "re-engineering" of the Constitution by making fundamental changes was vital to continuing the populist democracy they now have.

So the Taiwan side saw this framework, while the US understandably saw this as an unacceptable risk for America. One could ask, why was this not discussed before it became a problem? Perhaps in some fashion it was.

On the US side, the tension eventually generated an important policy statement. Henceforth the US would involve itself more closely with changes in Taiwan's domestic political reform. In doing so, it will define what provocation is, what the status quo is, and what moves are going in the wrong direction.

This brings many questions, including very importantly, China's reactions to any of this. How the US will involve itself on domestic political issues being debated in a democracy by directly elected officials, is another. There is within this problem a legitimate element of interest by the US, as its commitments on Taiwan's security (and its less stated position on Taiwan's sovereignty), present rather important risks for the US. At the same time, however, any legitimate reform will inevitably be cast in the cross-strait context and opposed by China.

However this US policy evolves, it will be delicate to say the least. That means a better system of communicating with each other. It is in the US and Taiwan's interest and that of stability in East Asia, that there is continuous attention at senior levels to discover and address potential problems that could possibly quickly get out of control.

In the US, national security policy revolves around the State Department, the Department of Defense and the National Security Council, in various degrees of coordination. In Taiwan, the President's office and various advisors seem to make policy while the institutions of national security remain relatively uninvolved.

For the US-Taiwan relationship, especially on national security matters in the US, a cross-strait Task Group, made up of deputy assistant secretaries or their equivalent from say, the State Department, Defense Department, and the National Security Council could be tasked with producing a report to the president or a designated senior official chosen by him. The report would be based on a regular quarterly meeting of this group with their Taiwan counterparts, and would include recommendations on any action that should be addressed.

The Taiwanese side would be expected to have a similar process to assure the president or his designated senior officer would be equally informed. There is a need for the Presidential Office on both sides to be kept informed as the relationship is not only important for foreign affairs but also domestic affairs.

Taking into account the style and preferences of the two leaders -- US President George W. Bush and Chen -- a channel to discuss such matters at a level in government high enough to be heard internally by the leadership in each country -- a channel that would be acceptable to the two leaders -- is needed. But it also needs the filtering of these discussions, by the deputy assistant secretary or equivalent level officials who are close to the experts in the bureaucracy.

If one ponders the possible communications process noted above, and the events that unfolded late last year and early this year, actions that took too much time to understand might have been understood soon enough to compromise and keep unnecessary tensions from developing. Determining how to address legitimate democratic domestic developments in Taiwan, while also protecting American interests, is a formidable challenge. It doesn't need misunderstanding to make it more difficult.

Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
This story has been viewed 2323 times.