Now that the presidential election is over, risks and opportunities abound in cross-strait relations. Governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait must seek to resolve structural problems to break the vicious circle of mutual antagonism. In this way, both governments can gradually and pragmatically establish a stable framework for peaceful cross-strait interaction.
Faced with President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) re-election, China may simultaneously step up its military threats against Taiwan and gradually draft Taiwan-friendly policies that reflect public opinion in Taiwan. However, the issue of Taiwan's constitutional reforms, which Chen proposed during his election campaign to be put to a referendum in 2006, has unnerved China.
Moreover, the election campaign language, too acrid for China's taste, has prompted a surge of nationalism in China. This nationalist sentiment conditions China's Taiwan policy, restraining China from formulating a moderate policy to ease cross-strait tension. Furthermore, similarly provocative rhetoric may appear during the year-end legislative elections. The political situation may well change, but China is unlikely to make any significant policy changes before the year-end elections. In such a political climate, we may have to wait till next year, or even till Taiwan's constitutional reforms become clearer, before we can embark on a new course of interaction.
Cross-strait relations are like a two-level, three-sided race. Both Chinese and Taiwanese policy-makers must consider internal demands and external conditions. At the same time, the cross-strait situation is a delicate equilibrium between China, Taiwan and the US -- a status quo any unilateral action cannot alter. From this perspective, it is still impossible for Taiwan to unilaterally realize de jure independence, but Taiwan will stress its de facto independence.
Likewise, it is impossible for China to unilaterally invade Taiwan by force to meet its end of unification. With its domestic development and stability in mind, China may even prefer to maintain stability across the Strait. Nevertheless, it is equally improbable that China will renounce its goal of unification. As a result, China will still continue to intimidate Taiwan with military threats, lever the US to bridle Taiwan's independence and pin their expectations on the people of Taiwan.
Meanwhile, the US will not spontaneously propose a resolution to the cross-strait standoff or pressure one side to accept the other's claim, but it must manage to sustain the status-quo of neither unification by force nor independence for Taiwan.
Third, the foundation of mutual trust is now weak. We can see this from two angles. First, the gap between China's and Taiwan's positions is too wide. As China persists in unification and Taiwan pursues an independence course away from the People's Republic of China, skepticism towards each other's policies is strong from the start. Secondly, the mechanisms of policy-making in China and Taiwan are different. Also, the cycles of power transfer in Taiwan and China differ, resulting in misunderstandings.
For example, each time Chen puts forth a policy geared to improving cross-strait relations, Taiwan anxiously awaits China's response. Yet, due to the long process of decision making in China's government and its prioritization of stability and continuity, Taiwan usually fails to harvest the expected results in the short term. When its goodwill comes to naught, Taiwan has no choice but retreat to its original position. On the contrary, China constantly perceives Chen as fickle in his cross-strait policy. Every time China is busy formulating a response, the government in Taiwan already sends forth an opposite signal, making any response a slap in China's face.
Finally, devoid of communication channels, cross-strait relations fall into the "prisoners' dilemma." Without a channel for mutual communication, both China and Taiwan fail to precisely interpret the other party's intent. They often interpret each other's policies in a relatively negative light and thereby aggravate mutual mistrust. Consequently, both create a stereotype of each other's government and continue to respond in the worst ways.
Since the US plays the role of inspector in the cross-strait standoff, China and Taiwan hope to endear themselves to the US for fear of being double-crossed by the other. As a result, neither side of the Strait wins, and the US gains the most short-term benefit. However, deteriorating cross-strait relations would also damage US interests and could even lead to everyone losing out. The only solution is to establish a negotiation platform and a stable framework for communication so that the two sides can understand each other and compromise with each other. Otherwise, as in a typical "prisoners' dilemma," a rash attempt at testing the opponent's policy could worsen relations.
Many factors push Taiwan and China toward a self-fulfilling prophecy: the hostility during Taiwan's election, the severe lack of trust, the discrepancy between Taiwan's and China's decision-making mechanisms, the different paces of power transfer, and the absence of communication. China doubts Taiwan's new policies, thinking that they need to take time to observe policy consistency.
On the other hand, restrained by the power cycle and its concerns about consolidating power, Taiwan's government must adjust its China policy when China offers no timely response. This has prompted China to presume that Taiwan is trying to deceive rather than to sincerely improve cross-strait relations. China and Taiwan therefore have moved further apart and become more reluctant to make concessions. The impetus in this vicious circle pushes both Taiwan and China toward more conflict.
Based on this analysis of structural risks, it seems there is a long way to better cross-strait relations. However, the accumulated experience of frustrations allows China and Taiwan to understand the limitations in the other party's position and situation and helps both sides deal with problems in a more pragmatic manner and face the urgency of handling potential risks.
In this light, we think that an interaction framework, built on a mechanism to tackle lesser issues, will facilitate communication and allow trust to accumulate. Tailored to the interests of the three parties and lowering risks, the focus on lesser issues could be a departure point for better cross-strait relations in the future.
Tung Chen-yuan is an associate research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University. Hsu Szu-chien is an assistant research fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica.
TRANSLATED BY WANG HSIAO-WEN
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