As member states to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) wrap up the Third Preparatory Committee meeting for next year's NPT Review Conference from April 26 to May 7 in New York, the future of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime hangs in the balance.
While the international media is focusing on developments in Iraq, the committee is being held at a critical juncture. This will be the last meeting prior to next year's conference, and at stake are the viability and future of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Indeed, developments since the 2000 committee depict a rather gloomy picture. The "13 Steps" toward nuclear disarmament, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the negotiation of a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) have not made any progress. While the US-Russian Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT or the Moscow Treaty) of May 2002 reduced the two leading nuclear weapon states' arsenals to 2,200 each by 2012, it does not carry the effect of an arms control treaty that is irreversible and verifiable.
At the same time, the international nuclear non-proliferation regime's authority and integrity have received major assaults over the last few years. Among these are the North Korean nuclear weapons program, questions surrounding Iran's nuclear activities and the revelation of an international nuclear proliferation network involving Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear arms program.
These grave developments raise serious doubts about the effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime in its ability to detect, deter and stop nuclear proliferation activities. It also highlights the weakest joint in the current international non-proliferation arrangement: the variation and inability of national export control systems to screen and prevent proliferation transfers and exports. The greatest concern of all is the possibility that terrorist groups that may gain access to weapons of mass destruction and use them.
changed landscape
At stake are two critical issues: Has the international nuclear proliferation landscape so drastically changed that the current regime, established a quarter of a century ago, can no longer handle the emerging challenges and therefore necessitates alternative strategies? Whether or not the regime, while assaulted and vulnerable, remains the best available and widely-acceptable instrument to serve the international nuclear non-proliferation cause but one that still can and should adapt to the changing international security environment?
Obviously, developments over the past two decades pose serious challenges to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Three come out prominently. One is the political foundation of the NPT. The grand political bargain negotiated at the time and reiterated in 1995 and 2000 is the commitment of non-nuclear weapons states to seek nuclear weapons while the five designated nuclear weapons states -- the US, Russia, China, France and the UK would undertake good-faith efforts in nuclear disarmament. That bargain is being undermined by the slow progress in nuclear disarmament.
The second development is that since the early 1970s when the first oil shock led to a growing interest and demand for nuclear energies. In accordance with Article 6 of the NPT, over the last three decades, there have been both significant increase in the development of nuclear power and the availability of nuclear materials and technologies that are dual-use.
Third, and related to the second, is the ability of the international non-proliferation regime to monitor nuclear transactions in a way that can detect noncompliance without hindering peaceful use of nuclear energies. To achieve this objective requires not only an effective IAEA inspection regime and recipient states' willingness to enter into safeguards agreements with the former but also the scope and effectiveness of national export control systems of supplier states. The growing number of dual-use nuclear items and technologies adds further complication in balancing commercial interests and non-proliferation concerns.
Can the international nuclear non-proliferation regime deal effectively with these developments and challenges? There are essential approaches to this. One is to consider the regime a lost cause and seek alternative strategies. The other is to amend the regime to make it more effective.
The current US policy reflects the first approach. While not completely discarding the regime, Washington clearly shows less faith in the regime's ability to stop proliferation and has launched its own counter-proliferation offensive, including the pre-emptive use of force for regime change, the development of missile defense shields, and greater resort to coercive diplomacy such as economic sanctions.
cooperation needed
However, the US approach raises serious questions and its effectiveness is far from clear. The irrefutable fact is that regardless of its unchallenged power, its ability to stem nuclear proliferation depends on international cooperation, which is best achieved through such international arrangements as the NPT. Indeed, the pursuit by one state of absolute security can cause others to seek greater military capabilities. This is the logic of the security dilemma. The use of overwhelming force cannot effectively deal with the non-state operated international nuclear smuggling network; at the same time, it can actually harden the determination of proliferant states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid Saddam Hussein's fate.
The current international nuclear non-proliferation regime must adapt to the new environment to remain a viable instrument for preventing nuclear proliferation. This requires major political and technical efforts and can be achieved only through the broadest extent of international cooperation. On the latter, the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards regime in both extending the signing and ratification of the Additional Protocol to the largest number of member states possible and giving the agency greater resources so that it can effectively carry out its mandate.
In addition, the lesson of the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear proliferation network suggests that national export control systems also need to be strengthened as the first-line defense against illicit transfers. Greater awareness and resources must be invested in developing the necessary infrastructure and training personnel, as well as better coordination among member states in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a multilateral nuclear export control regime.
However, the ultimate solution to nuclear proliferation is a political one. It requires addressing the issue of why states seek nuclear weapons and the obligations of the nuclear weapons states in good-faith disarmament. One of the key factors in influencing states' decisions to go or forgo the nuclear options is the security environment under which a particular state is situated. In regions where perennial hostility pits states against one another, there is strong pressure for the weaker party to seek nuclear weapons capabilities. This certainly applies to South Asia, the Korean Peninsula and to some extent, to the Middle East. In addition, the pursuit of prestige and regional dominance also has driven states to acquire nuclear weapon capabilities. Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iraq to various degrees exemplify these proliferation drivers.
Perceived failure
The perceived failure of the nuclear weapons states in fulfilling their part of the bargain sends a wrong message to the international community. This tarnishes the image of the regime and raise questions about its viability as it continues to maintain two-tiered groups of the haves and have-nots within.
However, perhaps more damaging than the apparent double standard is the US decision to develop mini-nukes, the so-called the bunker busters. The US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2002 blurs the boundary between nuclear and conventional use of force, giving legitimacy to nuclear weapons at precisely the moment when the international nuclear nonproliferation regime needs to be salvaged.
Clearly, to rein in nuclear proliferation needs bolder initiatives and political leadership. The UN Security Council last week adopted a binding resolution criminalizing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by non-state actors and requiring member states to adopt and enforce measures to prohibit such activities. US President George W. Bush last February proposed major initiatives calling for renewed efforts to combat the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. The Proliferation Security Initiative, a US-led multilateral effort, seeks to interdict shipments of WMD related items.
These initiatives are laudable. But to ultimately win the nonproliferation war, not just engage in nonproliferation battles, requires even more extensive international cooperation in salvaging and rejuvenating the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. For long-lasting international peace and security, and securing its own fundamental interests, the US must take the leadership role and indeed lead by example. The Iraqi experience shows that the US can ill afford the absence of international cooperation and its resources are better spent in cultivating its leadership rather than squandered in unilateralism.
Yuan Jing-dong (
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