Seen from the point of view of the EU's longtime member states, the eight postcommunist countries that -- together with Cyprus and Malta -- joined the EU on May 1 seem united in their positions on most important issues. Indeed, since the US intervention in Iraq, many West Europeans see the EU's new members from Europe's East as something of a bloc.
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's division of Europe into "new" and "old" was, above all, a clever ploy that helped the Bush administration get its way by using the old strategy of "divide and rule." But, although it reflected real differences between established EU members and the newcomers, it also managed to solidify the false impression that the EU's new members share a similar identity and political agenda. Rumsfeld's remarks were divisive because Western Europe seems to know even less than the Americans about Europe's eastern half.
In reality, big differences exist among the new EU members. Even with regard to Iraq, there was little unity. While some countries -- say, Poland -- strongly supported America's war effort, others tried to balance their support for the US with their "understanding" of the views of Germany and France. Still others -- for example, Slovenia -- stood on the side of "old Europe."
Beyond politics, there are vast differences among the economies of the new members, not only in terms of wealth, but also in their structures. Industrialized and urbanized countries, with relatively small agricultural sectors, such as the Czech Republic, Slovenia, or Slovakia, have different concerns than Poland, where farmers form 20 percent of the population.
Historical traditions also play a role. Although all new member states claim to be "Western," some are more Western than others. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and parts of Poland share a common legacy of Mitteleuropa, formed during the Hapsburg Empire. Moreover, communism in those states was different than that practiced in the three Baltic countries, which were part of the Soviet Union.
At the start of the 1990s, following communism's fall, the common experiences and the shared legacy of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland were behind the idea of creating the so-called "Visegrad Group," with the aim of coordinating the three countries' efforts to join the EU and NATO. The Visegrad initiative worked to some extent, though it was temporarily paralyzed by the disintegration of Czechoslovakia just over a decade ago.
Although the leaders of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia recently declared they wanted to keep the Visegrad grouping alive even after their countries' enter the EU, the future of Visegrad cooperation is uncertain. In fact, the fate of this group is perhaps the best example of how individual identities of the new member states are beginning to assert themselves now that membership in the EU and NATO are secured.
Poland, as its stance over the EU constitution demonstrated, pursues its own specific interests in a united Europe, which may be difficult to harmonize with the interests of smaller Central European states. Once in the union, Poland will have an even freer hand, unconstrained by the need to support the aspirations of other East European countries.
Some advocates of a closer Visegrad cooperation criticize Poland's emerging strategy, while euroskeptics in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia applaud the Poles. For example, the Czech Civic Democratic Party, heavily influenced by Czech President Vaclav Klaus, describes Poland as the Czech Republic's chief ally and an example of how new members should approach the EU.
The situation could become even more complicated, because some leaders in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia would like to join the "hardcore" of European integration should some European states one day decide to create a two-speed Europe. If these countries join the hard core of European integration, while others, Poland in particular, opt to stay out, it would create a dividing line between them, burying Visegrad cooperation.
Regardless of what happens, all Europe needs to get past cliches about "old" versus "new" Europe. Poland may find that it has security and other interests in common with some states of a similar size in the current EU. The three Baltic states will most likely cooperate much more closely with the Scandinavian countries than with the other new members.
It is also time to start thinking about a new way of organizing Central Europe. For the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, close cooperation with Poland may not be the best way to protect their interests in the EU, as their interests and the interests of a big, self-confident Poland may not be identical.
It may be more natural for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia to strive for closer regional cooperation with Austria and Slovenia, the contours of which can already be seen in some existing regional groupings. Such a regional group would be bound together by a long common history and compatible interests. This would be much more effective and durable than the Visegrad initiative, which lumps together three small states with a country that has more inhabitants than its three partners put together, plus its own agenda.
Jir Pehe, once chief political advisor to former Czech president Vaclav Havel, is a political analyst and director of New York University in Prague. Copyright: Project Syndicate
Could Asia be on the verge of a new wave of nuclear proliferation? A look back at the early history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which recently celebrated its 75th anniversary, illuminates some reasons for concern in the Indo-Pacific today. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently described NATO as “the most powerful and successful alliance in history,” but the organization’s early years were not without challenges. At its inception, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty marked a sea change in American strategic thinking. The United States had been intent on withdrawing from Europe in the years following
My wife and I spent the week in the interior of Taiwan where Shuyuan spent her childhood. In that town there is a street that functions as an open farmer’s market. Walk along that street, as Shuyuan did yesterday, and it is next to impossible to come home empty-handed. Some mangoes that looked vaguely like others we had seen around here ended up on our table. Shuyuan told how she had bought them from a little old farmer woman from the countryside who said the mangoes were from a very old tree she had on her property. The big surprise
The issue of China’s overcapacity has drawn greater global attention recently, with US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen urging Beijing to address its excess production in key industries during her visit to China last week. Meanwhile in Brussels, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week said that Europe must have a tough talk with China on its perceived overcapacity and unfair trade practices. The remarks by Yellen and Von der Leyen come as China’s economy is undergoing a painful transition. Beijing is trying to steer the world’s second-largest economy out of a COVID-19 slump, the property crisis and
Former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) trip to China provides a pertinent reminder of why Taiwanese protested so vociferously against attempts to force through the cross-strait service trade agreement in 2014 and why, since Ma’s presidential election win in 2012, they have not voted in another Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate. While the nation narrowly avoided tragedy — the treaty would have put Taiwan on the path toward the demobilization of its democracy, which Courtney Donovan Smith wrote about in the Taipei Times in “With the Sunflower movement Taiwan dodged a bullet” — Ma’s political swansong in China, which included fawning dithyrambs