Before going back to France tonight, I would like to share a few simple ideas with my Taiwanese friends. On this trip to Taiwan, during the past five days, I attended the Kaohsiung symposium "Light Wind, Warm Sun -- The Love for Taiwan," participated in a political rally in Tainan and discussed and exchanged some ideas with other people on TV, with common people, with citizens attending political manifestations, taxi drivers and many different other friends. I attended, in Miaoli, the historic "Hand-in-Hand Rally" on Feb. 28. All this made me very excited about Taiwanese democracy, which grows richer every year. On Feb. 29, I also had the honor of attending the first two debates organized by the Chinese Television Station on the referendum issue.
I am not Chinese, I am not Hakka, I am not Hoklo, I am not an Aboriginal, I am not a "New Inhabitant" -- I am simply French. And in spite of the fact that I have been to Taiwan every three weeks in recent months to discuss with you many issues on TV programs and other forums, just because I live abroad, I often interact with foreign officials, diplomats, academics and media outside Taiwan. So I'd like to compare the way the debate is going on in Taiwan and the way foreign people see the referendum issue abroad.
Many people in Taiwan think that America is against the referendum and that France is also against the referendum. But what is "America?" And what is "France?" America and France are not summarized by their presidents. There are also national and local media, and of course, the people. Presidents do not necessary understand everything, and in post-modern and democratic societies, the situation is far more complex than what you presume when you think:"France condemned us" or "America is ambiguous in its support."
Because I am what you call a "foreigner," I will comment on the referendum issue first from a foreigner's points of view. I am very lucky to be able to teach in Paris a course on the theories of identity and the geopolitics of the Taiwan Strait, so let's discuss from a geopolitical point of view the current missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait. I dare to use this expression, and regret that media abroad and diplomats far from the Taiwanese reality often turn a blind eye to this and would not even consider that what is happening now is a mounting crisis.
If Russia was targeting missiles at one Baltic state, everyone would view it this way. But this does not happen in the case of Taiwan. On the contrary: Taiwanese are described as "troublemakers." This situation is, however, simple: there is a menacing country and there is a country being menaced. Even my pan-blue friends recognize they cannot go against such a starting point in the analysis. And after French President Jacques Chirac condemned Taiwan's referendum, many if not all of the national media in France criticized him strongly for bowing to Chinese pressure to the point of making a blatant mistake in geopolitical appreciation. Some stated clearly that Taiwan was an endangered state and that it was truly shocking that we wanted to end the ban on weapons sales to the country that is menacing a democratic Taiwan.
So if the people of a country being menaced militarily rises up to say clearly they oppose the Chinese missile threat, what on earth can be said against that? How is it possible that political realism becomes so unrealistic and leaves no space for morality? Ask this question to common people abroad and you'll see whether they think Taiwan's attitude is difficult to understand.
And still, there are people within Taiwan who are against the defensive referendum, even though the menace is clear and even if a referendum is the best tool of direct democracy invented to correct excesses of representative democracy. For common people abroad who are not well-versed in the complexity of identity politics in Taiwan, such an opposition is absolutely incomprehensible. And for many diplomats, it shows that Taiwan does not want independence. Which, stated in such a simple way, is genuine ignorance.
How can we interpret the fact that some people oppose the referendum? I am afraid the answer is simple. The large quarrel that has surrounded the defensive referendum in Taiwan would not be appreciated abroad, as it comes from the central pivot and distinctive feature of Taiwanese politics. Not the ethnic division, not even the debate about changing the country's name or promoting unification, but the division between Chinese consciousness and Taiwanese consciousness within Taiwanese society. In the end, it is this conflict that rules the whole political debate from behind the scenes.
Many people consider that Taiwanese consciousness is now the strongest, stronger than the formerly all-powerful Chinese consciousness. I believe this is wrong and my observations all through the 1990s reforms and change in national identity indicate to me that Taiwanese consciousness is still finding a very hard time to make its way into society, as it should be entitled to. And this, even in central and southern Taiwan, at least among the middle class. To know that, you must discuss with people from both sides, share their life and not only listen to a few politicians or a few scholars.
The remaining influence of Chinese consciousness on Taiwanese minds is even more striking. And this, for me, explains for a great part why some in Taiwan fight against such a referendum. It can also explain what appears as the tragic weakness of their arguments. Just one example: Some people tell me: "Weapons purchase is a complex matter, we the common people do not understand, this referendum is useless, it is just to make political noise, it is so boring! Just let the government decide!" But they are, in a way, perfectly contradictory. If they oppose the issue, remember some do support it.
And if, on such a complex matter that has to align with national security, there are so many pros and cons, then how is it possible to imagine leaving the government taking a decision without consulting the people? The reality is that the pan-blue camp politicians see (rightly) in it a new step forward in the democratic process that threatens to ruin the illusions of a unified China. The process has been continuous throughout the 1990s: they cannot or dare not oppose any more democracy in principle (even though many did, and this to a very late date), but when democracy unfolds to the point that it starts to endanger their stance on national identity, then their support for democracy becomes extremely fragile.
From a political science point of view, this is a logical, but dangerous, reaction within the pan-blue camp. It is a consequence of the division between Chinese consciousness and Taiwanese consciousness within Taiwan which does not fit the ethnic divisions.
If we look at those abroad who oppose the referendum, we may remark easily that they are precisely the ones who say "Those Taiwanese are so annoying," every time Taiwan dares to explore further an international status quo that is fundamentally unfair to the nation. And they are the same as those who refuse, on inexplicable grounds, to consider that Taiwanese people's identification with Taiwan as natural, logical, acceptable and perfectly legitimate.
Can the Taiwanese people accept that? I know the answer. So the next question is now to those in Taiwan who oppose the referendum: Can you show any difference to them in your way of thinking, from the starting point of your argument, on the question of knowing whether it is legitimate to consider Taiwan as one's own nation?
In the political debate in Taiwan, there is an intense war of words, with politicians often wandering far from the main point when debating, using personal attacks and petty arguments which do not bring anything at all to the intellectual debate. People often forget the main division lines, like the conflict between Chinese consciousness and Taiwanese consciousness.
And thus people forget that first making clear the starting point of their opponent's argumentation helps a lot to get straight to the point, to save everyone's time and to understand that, in fact, the political debate in Taiwan runs along a very simple division line. As I suggested above, this is not the ethnic division, not even the debate about changing the country's name or promoting unification, but the division between Chinese consciousness and Taiwanese consciousness. You just need to know one's position on this to deduct one's likely position on every major political decision in Taiwan.
And if I am not wrong when I say that the central division line is between Chinese consciousness and Taiwanese consciousness, it means that the peace referendum is a also question about Taiwan's Chinese and Taiwanese consciousness. People who deeply love Taiwan and who strongly identify with Taiwan do not not oppose this referendum. Pan-blue politicians who claim on all TV programs that they love Taiwan, too, cannot decently oppose this referendum and should stop blurring people's minds: Taiwan is being threatened and foreign politicians do not care. This is the sad reality. The 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally and the referendum are the only tools available for Taiwan to try to convince the world that it is not illegitimate to refuse unification by force.
Pan-blue politicians are playing an ugly game which will be remembered by researchers and historians. Opposing the peace referendum is nothing else than opposing Taiwan. My statement might appear very strong, but I endorse it fully and unequivocally.
Last Saturday, I attended the historic 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally (to protect Taiwan) with President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝). It is gratifying to see how successful it has been. We'll never know how many people have attended, since in addition to those who had officially registered to attend, large crowds gathered spontaneously. It is not impossible that 3 million people were present! Let's now hope that the world will not ignore this major event. On Saturday Taiwan again met history and the appointment Formosa had was with the nation's own fate. Taiwan should now be safer, because the so-called "realism" of international politics have limits, too. Who will now dare attack without risking huge reprobation from media and people? Who will now be able to deny, as the ministry of foreign affairs of my country did when Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) was in France, that anyone in Taiwan is longing for independence? Who will now be able to deny that the Taiwanese people's identification to Taiwan is legitimate? Congratulations, Taiwan: You've made it.
Stephane Corcuff, a French political scientist specializing in identity politics in Taiwan, has recently authored the book Light Wind, Warm Sun -- Taiwan's Mainlanders and the Transition of National Identity (風和日暖 -- 臺灣外省人與國家認同的轉變), published in Taipei by Asian Culture in January.
Translated from Chinese by Luna Liu
and adapted by the author
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