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Missile defenses are not enough

`China's missiles are primarily aimed at Taiwan's C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and air-supremacy capabilities. Other targets include military and crucial infrastructure facilities ... The threat will increase with the rising number of missiles and improved accuracy.'

President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) said on Nov. 30 that intelligence data obtained by the government show that China has now deployed 496 M-class missiles along its southeastern coast, within 600km of Taiwan. One hundred ninety-two missiles are in Jiangxi Province, 208 in Fujian Province and 96 in Guangdong Province. Chen said that since the nation is facing an external threat, he will cite Article 17 of the Referendum Law (公民投票法) and hold a referendum.

The threat posed by China's M-class missiles to Taiwan's security is beyond doubt. Assessments of the seriousness of the threat vary since these judgements involve a comprehensive assessment of China's political ambitions and military prowess.

If these missiles were fired, it would take only seven or eight minutes for them to hit targets in Taiwan. But the military would not have even this much time to react. Any reaction could only begin once incoming missiles were detected; then calculation of trajectories and interception points would have to be carried out before an interception mission could begin. The missiles' trajectories are low and therefore the time available to react to them is short, perhaps three or four minutes, or even less.

In terms of active defense, if the missiles were not intercepted at once, our military would not have the capability to fire an additional wave of defensive missiles.

According to reports from the US Department of Defense, China uses a global positioning system and inertia navigation equipment to reinforce the missiles' accuracy, and CEP (circular error probable) to equip them with precise attack capabilities. This poses a threat to Taiwan's command, control and communications systems, missile bases and airport facilities, which are vital to the military's air control capabilities.

If China attempts the sort of decapitation strike the US launched against Iraq and makes Taiwan's political and military leaders its primary targets, Taiwan will be plunged into a state of anarchy and therefore will be unable to undertake organized and effective defense and resistance.

In a symposium held by the Atlantic Council on Nov. 24 to discuss the impact that the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) reform and modernization efforts have had on Taiwan, retired US Rear-Admiral Eric McVadon said that there are two types of DF-21 Chinese medium-range missiles.

One type can carry nuclear warheads with a range of 1,800km and threaten US bases in Japan and Okinawa. The other type, he noted, is the new DF-21 missiles that carry conventional warheads intended to destroy missile defense systems, and thereby remove defenses against short-range missiles.

In other words, if Taiwan's anti-missile bases are destroyed by DF-21 missiles, we will have no active defense power against the nearly 500 M-class missiles.

China cannot rely solely on the 496 missiles to conquer Taiwan, but missile attacks might be the prelude to a large-scale Chinese invasion and have a decisive effect on a war in the Taiwan Strait. To make the first battle a decisive one and preclude US intervention, China's military build-up prioritizes the projection of power, the ability to move the battlefield and preparation of the battlefield along the southeastern coast.

Judging whether the threat is an imminent one must not be assessed only on the basis of previous types of war, the current political atmosphere, Beijing's intentions or the number of missiles. It must be evaluated on the basis of the overall development of the PLA's projection of power and its ability to shift from peacetime to wartime functions.

China's missiles are primarily aimed at Taiwan's C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and air-supremacy capabilities. Other targets include military and crucial infrastructure facilities. The 496 short-range ballistic missiles (excluding cruise missiles) have long targeted Taiwan's major military and political targets. The threat will increase with the rising number of missiles and improved accuracy.

If the Referendum Law had been passed two or three years ago, or before the number of missiles deployed had reached a certain threshold (150 or 200, for instance), perhaps it would have had greater strategic value.

China has steadily increased its missile deployments against Taiwan over the past years. Taiwanese people may therefore have gotten used to the threat and even become indifferent to it, like a frog in water with a steadily rising temperature.

This attitude is a serious weakness in the people's psychological defenses.

China has not waged war so far primarily because of its lack of political will and the insufficiency of its current military capabilities.

Its increasing missile deployments will boost China's probability of military success.

This is likely to prompt Beijing to use military force to resolve the cross-strait problem, and to restrain the forces in China that advocate a moderate path toward Taiwan. As soon as Beijing develops blind faith in military force and begins to ignore political dialogue, the situation will become less stable in the Taiwan Strait.

According to the report by the US Department of Defense, China will soon have deployed as many as 650 M-class missiles, all pointed at Taiwan.

Based on a 1:2 ratio between China's missiles and Taiwan's defensive missiles, Taiwan will need 1,300 air defense missiles in the Patriot class to defend itself. This will put serious pressure on Taiwan's treasury.

Therefore, in addition to establishing missile defense systems, other political or diplomatic tools should be used to redress the strategic imbalance that has been created by China's missile deployment.

The European Parliament has passed resolutions and produced policy documents over the years demanding that China remove its missiles that are deployed against Taiwan.

How can those being threatened -- the 23 million Taiwanese people -- choose to keep silent? The president should cite Article 17 of the Referendum Law to hold a defensive referendum, allowing Taiwanese people to use democratic and peaceful means to express their gentle but steadfast opposition to the military threat.

If defensive referendums that symbolize democracy and security are applied in a proper way, they will become an effective "political theater missile defense" (TMD) system for Taiwan. Compared to investing heavily in the construction of a military TMD whose effectiveness is yet to be evaluated, or developing any type of deterrence force in response to China's missile threats, the referendums can demonstrate civilized values.

Chang Pai-ta is acting deputy chief of the the Democratic Progressive Party's China Affairs Department.

Translated by Jackie Lin
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