An effective submarine plan, not a `silly' plan

The administration of US President George W. Bush has promised to sell eight submarines to Taiwan. This promise, breaking a decades-long taboo on US-Taiwan arms sales, is of course based on an assessment by US bureaucrats of the military situation in the Taiwan Strait.

Eight to 12 submarines would create a deterrent submarine force, undoubtedly the "good thing" the Ministry of National Defense has been dreaming of. But good things never come easily, and no matter what type of submarine Taiwan might buy, the questions of the defense budget and which shipyard will build the submarines are headaches.

Therese Shaheen, the chairwoman of the American Institute in Taiwan, has said Taiwan is `silly' to spend large sums of money on submarines. This makes us think that she understands the reason that the US wants to sell these eight submarines. The defense minister and legislators should delve further into her words before reacting.

A submarine blockade of our ports is part of China's plan for an attack on Taiwan. This threat has always been overestimated. These eight submarines, plus the two currently in service, still only reach a ratio of 1:6 to the submarines of the People's Liberation Army. The use of submarines to break through a submarine blockade is merely a strategic approach without much effect.

Taiwan's building of a submarine force should be based on deterrent considerations, and provide a warning to Beijing that in the event of a blockade, we have the ability to place important Chinese ports under blockade.

Relying on the US and Japan to continue maintaining "submarine order" does not imply a loss of face, because Taiwan's international sea lanes directly affect the interests of the US and Japan.

Over the past half-century, the competition for naval strength in the waters around Taiwan has involved the US, Japan and China. The restrictive force of Taiwan's surface and air anti-submarine forces has been very limited.

The main use of the four Kidd destroyers already purchased is that their anti-aircraft firepower does not suffer the restrictions of ground-based anti-aircraft defenses and they can thus engage in war in distant waters. If equipped with the supersonic combustion ramjet (Scramjet) anti-ship missiles of the Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology, important Chinese ports could be threatened, and the deterrent force would not be less than that offered by submarines.

Blockade warfare cannot be completed by reliance on submarines alone. Stopping and inspecting ships moving towards Taiwan requires surface ships. If the anti-air firepower of Taiwan's third-generation vessels could be universally improved, and if the 12-hour reach of the P-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft were added, transportation lanes could be kept open with the assistance of the US and Japan.

The P-3C anti-submarine aircraft the US has promised to sell to Taiwan is in fact the military equipment Taiwan urgently needs. Carrying submarine bombs, torpedoes and Harpoon missiles, it can offer outstanding surface and submarine detection equipment, and it has more applications than a submarine. It is an anti-submarine, patrol, and long-distance bomber aircraft. In peacetime, it can be used to patrol for infiltration and illegal immigration. In wartime, it can be used for anti-ship and anti-submarine missions.

If we can get permission to build the submarines in Taiwan, that would be a different matter. Taiwan, moving toward becoming a modern ocean state, should not pass up an opportunity to transfer technology to improve its shipbuilding skills. If the submarines are purchased on this condition, the money would be well spent.

Huang Yao-ming is a board member of the Coconut Tree Foundation.

Translated by Perry Svensson