Bush and Hu's visits to Australia

The recent simultaneous visits of US President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) created considerable hype in Australia. Undoubt-edly, these were important visits. But they were part of the Asia-wide round-up after the Bangkok APEC summit. It was, nevertheless, projected by Canberra as some sort of Houdini-like achieve-ment to have the leaders of the world's most powerful and most populated country visiting Aus-tralia at the same time. It created a parity of sorts between the US and China; the latter billed as the rising superpower of the 21st century.

Now that the hype is over, it is possible to make a dispassionate analysis of the two visits.

The first thing to note is that US is Australia's security ally. Canberra's commitment to the US is unequivocal.

However, Sino-US relations are chugging along, with international terrorism overriding all other US concerns. Beijing is quietly expanding its political and economic space with a benign international profile. Its charm offensive has also captivated Canberra, further reinforced by the lure of a seemingly limitless market in China for its gas and other raw materials. During Hu's visit, another large contract for the supply of gas from Australia over many years was announced.

There is a sense in Australia that China's growing interest is driven by economic imperatives of ensuring supplies of essential raw materials for its rapid growth. Therefore, it is a relationship based on mutual self-interest.

According to Geoff Kitney, a prominent Sydney Morning Herald commentator, "With its economy ever hungrier for the raw materials needed to feed its rapid expansion, China has focused on Australia's potential as a supplier. Desperately needing to reduce its dependence on Middle East oil for its energy supplies, China has come to Australia for natural gas and has negotiated deals on an unprecedented scale. The experts predict similar demand for other raw materials."

At a political level, Canberra sees an advantage in cultivating ties with China to neutralize its image in Asia as the US "sheriff." Its growing relationship with China tends to validate its Asian credentials. There is quiet confidence in Canberra that it can simultaneously develop and manage its relations with Washington and Beijing.

It is not that Canberra is unaware of the pitfalls. Take the case of Taiwan, for instance. In his address, Hu made his pitch on Taiwan: "A peaceful solution to the Taiwan question serves the inter-ests of all Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan."

He added, "It also serves the common interests of all countries, including Australia. The greatest threat to peace in the Taiwan Strait is from the splittist activities by the Taiwan independence forces. The Chinese Government and people look to Australia for a constructive role in China's peaceful reunification."

In other words, Beijing would expect Canberra to play a bridging role of sorts with the US.

This seems unlikely because its US ally takes for granted Austra-lia's support for its position on Taiwan. Bush told Australia's parliament that his country expected Australia to support its Taiwan policy of defending its right to separate existence.

According to Prime Minister John Howard, Australia remains committed to a "one China" policy, including peaceful reunification with Taiwan. Elaborating on this, he said, "Against that background, we would want to see a spirit of calm and peaceful dialogue pervade the whole area and that applies to the attitude of China, the attitude of Taiwan and the attitude of the United States."

And he felt "confident that with that approach this matter can, over time, be resolved in a commonsense and peaceful process." In other words, it is a case of pious hope over reality.

The reality is that China is committed to unifying with Taiwan, by force if necessary. At the same time, the US is commit-ted to prevent unification by force. As its ally, US counts on Australia for support. Beijing, on the other hand, hopes to subvert/neutralize this from Australia's increasing economic stakes with China.

China is already Australia's fourth largest and fastest growing export market, estimated at about A$18 billion (US$12.7 billion) a year. Hu told the Australian parliament that the scope for economic ties between the two countries was immense.

How will Canberra manage this difficult task of reconciling its growing economic stakes with China and security alliance with the US? The hope is that Canberra might not have to make this choice, at least not for quite a while.

Beijing doesn't seem to be queering the pitch on Taiwan. It is hoping, and Canberra appears to share this hope, that its relationship with Taiwan will be resolved through greater economic integration across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan will eventually be sucked into China's economic whirlwind.

North Korea is another flashpoint. Here again the hope is that Beijing shares US and Australian concerns on Pyongyang's nuclear threat and will play a constructive role to contain, manage and resolve the crisis.

It might seem like a wish list, but much rides on how Beijing will act both on Taiwan and North Korea.

In other words, as long as Sino-US relations are manageable, Australia will be fine with its simultaneous political equation with China and the US.

But there is an underlying strategic rivalry between the US and China. The US focus on terrorism and the need for Chinese cooperation might have pushed this to one side, but China remains its "strategic competi-tor." To this end, the US is determined not to let any other rival power threaten it militarily. This suggests there are problems ahead in the medium and long term.

For instance, the US is going ahead with its missile defense plan, which includes Japan and Australia as regional nodal points. China regards this as directed against it. Australia is also increasingly being integrated into US strategic planning, including some of its major defense purchases from the US. It hosts American facilities, and there is talk of even greater access for US forces in Australian territory.

Against such overriding security imperatives, Canberra might not have much choice but to side with the US in any high-stakes power game.

Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.