In the months leading to the March 20 presidential election, contending political leaders have intensified the already highly acrimonious partisan wrangling and mudslinging that have allowed for little progress on issues of substantive benefit for the overall security and well being of the Tai-wanese in the last few years. While these leaders maneuver for short-term gain in the domestic political arena, the cross-strait balance of power and the overall international balance of influence affecting the nation's future ominously and unrelentingly moves against democratic Taiwan.
China has markedly advanced its already advantageous position in international affairs since the 1970s, when the PRC replaced the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) in the UN, scores of countries switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing, and the US cut its diplomatic, defense and other official ties with Taiwan for the sake of normalizing relations with China.
Beijing is more determined than ever to isolate Taiwan from official international interchange as part of a broader effort to press Taiwan's government to come to terms on unification in ways acceptable to China.
An important opportunity for Taiwan came with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union -- developments that seemed to end the main reason why the US and some other Western powers felt impelled to cut back ties with Taiwan for the sake of improving relations with China in seeking a broader united front against the USSR.
The concurrent Tiananmen crackdown shocked the US and much of the rest of the world, prompting sanctions and pressures on Beijing from various quarters. Taiwan's moves toward greater democracy after the ending of martial law in 1987 also received widespread praise and positive media attention. Arguably Taiwan should have been able to make substantial diplomatic and foreign policy gains in this new international environment, but its showing was poor as the reality saw few countries willing to confront China over the "Taiwan issue."
China's economic prowess grew markedly in the 1990s; the China market now far outshines Taiwan's struggling economy; if international actors are forced to choose, they generally choose to side with Beijing. Even many businesspeople in Taiwan have come to similar judgments, assessing that their interests are best served by cooperation with the rapidly growing Chinese economy.
Economic strength has fed military strength, while the end of the USSR meant that Beijing could focus more on coastal threats and especially the danger of Taiwan moving toward independence -- an anathema to Beijing that appeared increasingly likely under the leadership of former president Lee Teng-hui (李光耀) and President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).
The result is an increasingly rapid buildup of military forces designed to improve Chinese power projection capabilities to coerce Taiwan. US President George W. Bush's administration was more supportive of Taiwan than the previous US administration -- representing one of the few bright spots on Taipei's foreign horizon.
Prevailing conditions, notably US power and purpose, sustain a balance in the Taiwan Strait and in East Asia that for now preserves stability and buys some time for Taiwan. Perhaps because they take US support for granted, Tai-wanese leaders of various political camps have seemed less attentive to solidifying relations with the Bush administration, the US government most supportive of Tai-wan in over 30 years. They have focused instead on domestic political maneuvers, cross-strait relations and foreign affairs that have included criticisms of US policies and behavior, and actions in cross-strait relations and trade relations that have complicated US interests and Taipei's relations with the US.
Such an approach might appear acceptable if Taiwan had the power and influence to sustain an independent posture in the face of the unrelenting power and influence of China, but a sober assessment of its steadily diminishing standing in world affairs would appear to provide Taipei over the longer term with little choice other than to consolidate relations with the US or to choose accommodation with Beijing.
The arguments against the former course are many. Most notably it would: force Taiwan's leaders to curb rhetoric and actions seen in the US as disturbing cross-strait stability sought by US leaders, press Taiwanese authorities to take more substantive actions including increased military spending to support defense efforts sought by Washington to complement increased US defense efforts to deter China from attacking Taiwan and push Taiwan's leaders to deal more forthrightly with US complaints over trade issues.
Taiwan also has no assurance that a future US government might not reverse course in cross-strait relations, as has happened in the past.
It is precisely with that outcome in mind that Taiwan's leaders should be taking steps now to consolidate ties with a friendly US administration rather than continually irritate US leaders with political, military and other moves that may provoke a positive response in domestic politics but work against long-term US-Taiwan relations.
Taiwan's leaders should have some assurance that once they improve their relationship with the Bush administration and set precedents of closer US-Taiwan relations, these precedents will prove hard to reverse. In particular, the US Congress, media and interest groups that have long been friendly to Taiwan can be expected to resist a reversal in relations.
Congress and these other groups have a hard time under the division of powers in the US Constitution to initiate steps forward in US relations with Taiwan, but Congress is much better positioned to block a reversal of existing relations.
Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
The past few months have seen tremendous strides in India’s journey to develop a vibrant semiconductor and electronics ecosystem. The nation’s established prowess in information technology (IT) has earned it much-needed revenue and prestige across the globe. Now, through the convergence of engineering talent, supportive government policies, an expanding market and technologically adaptive entrepreneurship, India is striving to become part of global electronics and semiconductor supply chains. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Vision of “Make in India” and “Design in India” has been the guiding force behind the government’s incentive schemes that span skilling, design, fabrication, assembly, testing and packaging, and
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.