The Korean crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions is becoming murkier by the day. Some recently reported developments will illustrate this point. First, there was the statement by Ko Young-koo, South Korea's director of National Security Service. He told his country's parliament that North Korea had tested some 70 devices as conventional explosives to trigger nuclear weapons. Given that Seoul is not given to hyperbole on this issue, his statement is significant.
At another level, the recently held Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) conference of 11 nations in Brisbane, Australia, was a step in the direction of forging out a multinational blockade of North Korea. This would seek to choke off its economic lifeline, significantly dependent on missile exports and other products like drugs, counterfeit money and so on. Not surprisingly, Pyongyang has threatened dire consequences at the US strategy "to isolate and stifle North Korea."
The resultant brinkmanship seems designed to see who will blink first. Neither side is keen to go to war. But Washington is serious about North Korea's nuclear program and keen to impress the gravity of the situation to the point of risking a war, if necessary.
In this context, Australia has emerged as the US regional point man, evidenced by Prime Minister John Howard's recent visits to Japan and South Korea. Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer have emphasized the seriousness of the situation. At the same time, they haven't foreclosed the diplomatic option of multilateral negotiations to peacefully resolve the crisis. For instance, Howard was keen to emphasize that the blockade initiative was still at the consideration stage. According to his foreign minister Downer, any interception force to deal with North Korea was "really a long way down the track", and Australians "don't need to prepare themselves for [another military action] at this stage."
But the problem is how to strike a balance without making the PSI initiative look like a grand bluff. Hence, the Howard disclosure that Australia and the US would host the first round of military manoeuvres in September under the PSI. He said, "They're designed primarily to put us in a position to effectively gather an interception force if that's what we ultimately decide to do." He emphasized, though, that, "It would be wrong to see them [military exercises] as a ploy to send a warning shot to the North Koreans."
Such moves are not without danger, though, as pointed out by William Perry, a defense secretary under former US president Bill Clinton. According to Perry, "I think we are losing control of the situation." He warned, "The nuclear program now under way in North Korea poses an imminent danger of nuclear weapons being detonated in American cities."
Such apocalyptic scenarios are not good for domestic consumption in the US, Australia or elsewhere in the world. Howard, for instance, has been at pains to squash any fear of Australia becoming a nuclear target. He said, "I don't think North Korea has any functioning weaponry, if I can put it that way, that's capable of delivering it."
In other words, we are in the midst of a high stakes political poker game designed to put the maximum pressure on Pyongyang. And simultaneously to rope in China to avoid things drifting into a war-like situation. According to Hugh White, director of the government-funded Australian Strategic Policy Institute, "The key to George Bush's approach now is to use diplomacy to gain China's help in brokering a peaceful resolution with Pyongyang."
More so, since it is in China's manifest interest. Because: "The last thing China wants is a war on the Korean Peninsula that ends up with millions of North Korean refugees in China, and victorious US forces on China's border." It is surmised that since North Korea has "lost the assurance of China's support, there is probably no alternative" for Pyongyang but to accept a negotiated settlement to renounce its nuclear ambitions.
The problem, though, is that such analysis is too simple and neat. Its starting point is that there is a basic commonality of interests between the US and China regarding North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Therefore, Beijing cannot afford to remain apart. Indeed, Beijing is supposed to so detest the Pyongyang regime that it even commissioned a study (according to a report in the Sydney Morning Herald by its China correspondent) for a possible pre-emptive Chinese invasion of its neighbor across the border. It wasn't pressed, though, because of its unpredictable course.
According to analyst Hugh, "Beijing now seems more and more attracted to the idea of North Korea being absorbed by the South. China and South Korea have built a close relationship in recent years, and Beijing would rather deal with Seoul than Pyongyang?"
Isn't it jumping the gun to think in terms of North-South unification, and China's complicity in it? For starters, there is the question of Sino-US strategic competition, if not rivalry, in the region. As long as the Korean situation remains under controlled escalation (a political poker game), it is not entirely to China's disadvantage if the US were to remain over-stretched. This would enable Beijing to project its contrasting benign regional image.
As for China's worry on account of North Korea's nuclear ambitions, this wasn't in evidence when Pyongyang and Islamabad (Pakistan) exchanged their missile and nuclear technology and goods to their mutual advantage. Indeed, at times, Pyongyang has routed its nuclear and missile exports through Chinese land and air space. It didn't bother China in the past, and might not be a major worry even now.
Beijing certainly doesn't want a war on the Korean peninsula. But, short of that, North Korea is a useful leverage in dealing with Washington.
Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.
Congressman Mike Gallagher (R-WI) and Congressman Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) led a bipartisan delegation to Taiwan in late February. During their various meetings with Taiwan’s leaders, this delegation never missed an opportunity to emphasize the strength of their cross-party consensus on issues relating to Taiwan and China. Gallagher and Krishnamoorthi are leaders of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Their instruction upon taking the reins of the committee was to preserve China issues as a last bastion of bipartisanship in an otherwise deeply divided Washington. They have largely upheld their pledge. But in doing so, they have performed the
It is well known that Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) ambition is to rejuvenate the Chinese nation by unification of Taiwan, either peacefully or by force. The peaceful option has virtually gone out of the window with the last presidential elections in Taiwan. Taiwanese, especially the youth, are resolved not to be part of China. With time, this resolve has grown politically stronger. It leaves China with reunification by force as the default option. Everyone tells me how and when mighty China would invade and overpower tiny Taiwan. However, I have rarely been told that Taiwan could be defended to
It should have been Maestro’s night. It is hard to envision a film more Oscar-friendly than Bradley Cooper’s exploration of the life and loves of famed conductor and composer Leonard Bernstein. It was a prestige biopic, a longtime route to acting trophies and more (see Darkest Hour, Lincoln, and Milk). The film was a music biopic, a subgenre with an even richer history of award-winning films such as Ray, Walk the Line and Bohemian Rhapsody. What is more, it was the passion project of cowriter, producer, director and actor Bradley Cooper. That is the kind of multitasking -for-his-art overachievement that Oscar
Chinese villages are being built in the disputed zone between Bhutan and China. Last month, Chinese settlers, holding photographs of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), moved into their new homes on land that was not Xi’s to give. These residents are part of the Chinese government’s resettlement program, relocating Tibetan families into the territory China claims. China shares land borders with 15 countries and sea borders with eight, and is involved in many disputes. Land disputes include the ones with Bhutan (Doklam plateau), India (Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin) and Nepal (near Dolakha and Solukhumbu districts). Maritime disputes in the South China