With regard to the three de-mands that the WTO Secretariat presented to Taiwan under pressure from China, we find them unreasonable and would like to express our different views.
Both Taiwan and China applied to enter the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor of the WTO, in accord with Article 33 of that agreement. Hong Kong and Macau, however, entered GATT with the endorsement of their suzerains, Britain and Portugal respectively, in accord with GATT Article 26, paragraph 5(c). Clearly Taiwan's qualifications are fundamentally different from those of Hong Kong and Macau.
When the WTO was established in 1995, neither Taiwan nor China had completed the GATT accession process. Therefore both changed tracks and applied for WTO membership on the basis of Article 12 of the WTO agreement.
Examining the text of the agreement, we noticed that although both "state" and "separate customs territory" constitute qualification for accession, an explanatory note indicates that the terms "country" or "countries" as used in the agreement are to be understood to include any separate customs territory member of the WTO.
Thus all members are equal under WTO writs and Taiwan clearly enjoys the same full membership status that China and other members do. Solid legal reasoning says that since China's representatives are referred to as a "permanent mission," Taiwan's should be as well.
Some might say that two statements made by the GATT Council chairman in 1992 when the council approved the formation of a work-ing party to examine Taiwan's application -- "as a part of the understanding, the representation of Chinese Taipei in GATT would be along the same lines as that of Hong Kong and Macau" and "titles carried by its representative would not have any implication on the issue of sovereignty" -- are in fact a justification for Taiwan's name change and demotion by way of terms devoid of sovereignty. In this regard, we hold a different view.
According to the minutes of GATT Council Meeting 259 in 1992, chairman Martin Morland stated that in view of the "one China" principle, many members felt Tai-wan shouldn't accede to the GATT before China did. Thus there was a consensus among members:
First, the accession working party on China should accelerate the pace of its work. Second, a working party should be established at that meeting to evaluate the application filed by Chinese Taipei on the basis of Article 33. Third, the GATT Council should examine the report on, and adopt the protocol for, China's accession before adopting the protocol of Chinese Taipei.
The minutes record, "The Council so agreed." However, after the chairman made the above-mentioned statements on the status and title of the Chinese Taipei delegation, the record merely indicates, "The Council took note of the statement."
"Taking note" is not equivalent to "agreement." The statements made by the chairman regarding the status of Taiwan's delegation did not obtain the agreement of the GATT Council, so they do not constitute a legal basis for putting pressure on Taiwan.
Moreover, Taiwan and China both entered the WTO on the basis of Article 12 of the WTO agreement. The power of that agreement is far greater than that of the GATT Council chairman's statements, which have no binding force. The power-oriented GATT has transformed into the rule-oriented WTO. Its operations are not decided by any single member state or by the WTO Secretariat. Taiwan's "permanent mission" is clearly spelled out in WTO documents and obviously represents the will of the WTO.
Thus, our mission to the WTO must clearly present Taiwan's position on this matter to avoid a situation in which the Secretariat becomes biased toward Beijing and acts against Taiwan's interests before we have a chance to respond.
Since Taiwan acceded to the WTO as a "separate customs territory," all terms that imply sovereignty such as Republic of China, Legislative Yuan, Executive Yuan,can be toned down with terms such as government, legislative organs and administrative organs. But the procedures and qualifications behind Taiwan's accession to the WTO were fundamentally different from those governing the accession of Hong Kong or Macau to GATT and cannot be equated.
The history of GATT shows virtually all members that entered on the basis of Article 33 were "governments" of sovereign states. Taiwan was the only one to enter as the "government" of the "Sepa-rate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu." Thus there is no precedent to be consulted regarding the title of Tai-wan's delegation and similar mat-ters. It is a matter of law that since Taiwan entered the WTO under the same clause of the agreement, it is entitled to equal treatment.
Tony Jian is a DPP legislator. Cho Hui-wan is an assistant professor in the Graduate Institute of International Politics at National Chung Hsing University.
Translated by Ethan Harkness
Could Asia be on the verge of a new wave of nuclear proliferation? A look back at the early history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which recently celebrated its 75th anniversary, illuminates some reasons for concern in the Indo-Pacific today. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently described NATO as “the most powerful and successful alliance in history,” but the organization’s early years were not without challenges. At its inception, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty marked a sea change in American strategic thinking. The United States had been intent on withdrawing from Europe in the years following
My wife and I spent the week in the interior of Taiwan where Shuyuan spent her childhood. In that town there is a street that functions as an open farmer’s market. Walk along that street, as Shuyuan did yesterday, and it is next to impossible to come home empty-handed. Some mangoes that looked vaguely like others we had seen around here ended up on our table. Shuyuan told how she had bought them from a little old farmer woman from the countryside who said the mangoes were from a very old tree she had on her property. The big surprise
The issue of China’s overcapacity has drawn greater global attention recently, with US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen urging Beijing to address its excess production in key industries during her visit to China last week. Meanwhile in Brussels, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week said that Europe must have a tough talk with China on its perceived overcapacity and unfair trade practices. The remarks by Yellen and Von der Leyen come as China’s economy is undergoing a painful transition. Beijing is trying to steer the world’s second-largest economy out of a COVID-19 slump, the property crisis and
As former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) wrapped up his visit to the People’s Republic of China, he received his share of attention. Certainly, the trip must be seen within the full context of Ma’s life, that is, his eight-year presidency, the Sunflower movement and his failed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, as well as his eight years as Taipei mayor with its posturing, accusations of money laundering, and ups and downs. Through all that, basic questions stand out: “What drives Ma? What is his end game?” Having observed and commented on Ma for decades, it is all ironically reminiscent of former US president Harry