Even when the US is at the zenith of its power, things don't seem so easy and smooth. For example, a small and impoverished country like North Korea is proving a hard nut to crack. Its brinkmanship on the nuclear question is a serious constraint on US power, for fear that things could get out of control with dire consequences all around.
Even if one were to discount North Korea's nuclear deterrent (it is believed to have a couple of atomic bombs, with more in the process), the sheer scale of its conventional military power, in terms of threatening South Korea and Japan, is scary. With its million-strong army and an array of weapon systems from artillery to missiles, Seoul is within easy reach. And Japan is a missile target.
South Korea is understandably nervous, with much of the blame for igniting the crisis directed at Washington. As Elizabeth Economy and Eugene Matthews point out, "Anti-US sentiment in South Korea is at its highest level since the country's founding in 1948. Most South Koreans believe that the United States does not appreciate the danger it [South Korea] confronts on a daily basis from North Korea, and they see America's recent harsh rhetoric as having exacerbated that danger, by increasing the North's sense of isolation and paranoia."
ILLUSTATION: MOUNTAIN PEOPLE
There is also a pervasive sense of danger in Japan. The Japanese probably regard it as the most dangerous scenario since World War II. There is a growing political constituency favoring militarization, including nuclear weapons. Taken to its logical conclusion, its ripple effects in the region are too horrible to imagine.
In other words, the crisis on the Korean Peninsula requires urgent resolution. But it is increasingly realized that a pre-emptive strike is not a feasible proposition because of its unpredictable consequences. The scale of human and material destruction is too grim to contemplate. This leaves diplomacy as the preferred alternative.
Diplomacy has two facets: coercive and persuasive. Both require international cooperation. Regarding the first, UN-approved international sanctions are the obvious course. Pyongyang, though, has raised the stakes by declaring that it would regard sanctions as a declaration of war. In any case, with China effectively ruling out a Security Council-approved sanctions regime (with its veto), it might not come to that. Any attempt to cobble together a sanctions regime outside the UN will have to reckon both with Pyongyang and Beijing.
Regarding persuasion, China is again the crucial factor. And it won't work unless Pyongyang is clear about the alternative. Beijing, therefore, would need to forewarn Pyongyang that unless it abandoned the nuclear path, it would be on its own. Considering Pyongyang's overwhelming dependence on Beijing for its economic lifeline (thin as it is), China has considerable leverage over its "brotherly" communist neighbor.
Why isn't China then exercising this leverage? Beijing contends that it is quietly working on Pyongyang to see reason. And feels hurt that it is not getting the credit it deserves. Without Beijing's restraint, it is implied, things could get worse. In other words, Beijing indeed is contributing to regional stability through its tact and statesmanship. China is thus coming out in the region as a responsible power, a counterweight of sorts to US "brashness."
Though exasperated at times with China's unwillingness to put the necessary pressure on North Korea, Washington believes that Beijing is -- or should be -- concerned about Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions.
This is the conventional wisdom. And it is not working. Therefore, it might be necessary to go beyond the conventional straitjacket to explore other possible explanations. China fancies itself as an alternative superpower. But the US is not keen on competition. Indeed, it regards China as a strategic competitor. And under its new strategic blueprint it is determined to maintain its supremacy at any cost.
According to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, "The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy to impose its will on the United States." It adds, "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States." No prizes for guessing where this message is directed.
Beijing is quite aware of its limitations and has scrupulously avoided confronting the US politically and militarily. Indeed, it has forged cooperation with the US against terrorism. For the foreseeable future, China has no hope of competing with the US in raw power. But it certainly can tap into other areas to erode the US position and is steadily doing it.
It has lately been projecting a benign and responsible image among its Asian neighbors. With ASEAN countries, it has entered into a framework agreement to promote free trade over 10 years. The lure of China's vast market is being dangled before these countries feeling the pinch of the US economic slowdown, notwithstanding the fact that it is much more competitive with its regional neighbors in terms of markets and investments.
Beijing has also been seeking to appear reasonable over the South China Sea islands issue and development of its resources. Similarly, at the recent SARS summit of ASEAN countries in Bangkok, Beijing agreed on regional cooperation to confront the epidemic. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao (
China's charm offensive in Asia has won it considerable goodwill, at a time when the US is preoccupied with terrorism, Iraq and the Middle East in general. Above all, it has made an impact with its softly-softly approach on North Korea. An impression is thus created that without China's steadying and restraining hand, the North Korean crisis could easily explode. More remarkably, even Washington sets store by Beijing in resolving the crisis, believing that Pyongyang's intransigence will eventually exhaust China's patience in favor of concerted international action for its downfall.
But it might not turn out that way. North Korea is China's diplomatic trump card to maintain and promote its great-power ambitions. It has promoted Beijing's credentials as a peacemaker of sorts by its hosting US-North Korean negotiations. And it is being suggested by some Chinese analysts (with official nod, no doubt) that, at some point, if North Korea were to continue being difficult, Beijing would have to disabuse their mind of "the illusion that China will support them whatever they have done." Washington would like to believe this.
But will it happen? It is difficult to be categorical. But if Kim Jong-il were to cave in or be overthrown with Chinese involvement, US global domination will be even more entrenched. It is not a prospect that Beijing would like to be part of.
Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.
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