According to media reports, the Arab world was alarmed that the Iraqi leadership fell so fast and they see the collapse as a major humiliation.
Indeed, few expected Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's regime to fall at such speed. Before the war, it was universally recognized that Saddam's army could not match the US-British forces, and that Saddam would have to pay a high price in such a conflict.
But everyone also expected Saddam to resort to a "people's war," pulling the enemy deep into his territory before adopting guerrilla warfare to attack their supply lines, divide them into a multitude of disconnected groups and inflict severe losses, thus making it impossible for the allies to continue the war they had begun in total disregard of the UN. None of this transpired, however.
How do we explain the defeat of Saddam's regime? From the pre-war strategic layout to the handling of the actual war, we can of course point to hundreds of different reasons for it. One important factor, however, must have been the relationship between the Iraqi military and Iraqi civilians. This should serve as a warning to the Arab world and, indeed to all Third World countries.
First, governments in the Arab world, including Saddam's regime, have a common characteristic -- they are all family businesses. All important government positions are held by members of the ruler's family. People who are not members of the family, even those who are particularly gifted, mainly occupy less important government positions. The consequences of such a political system are very clear -- the ruler becomes unable to expand his power base and increase popular cohesion in order to create a genuine, and strong, feeling of common identity.
This can be seen from pre-war media reports. Before the war, the media reported that Saddam was dividing Iraq into defense zones. However, all the commanders of these zones were members of Saddam's family -- a younger brother, a cousin, a son and so on. This gives the impression that the war was between Saddam's family and the US, not between Iraq and the US. This impression was reinforced by the welcome given to US and British forces once it became clear that Saddam would not be returning to power.
Second, the political environment in Iraq made it impossible to cultivate truly outstanding military leaders. Saddam saw himself as a soldier and maintained a grip on all military matters. This made it impossible for truly outstanding military leaders to emerge; Saddam, considering himself an expert in military matters, would not have tolerated them.
In addition, family members appointed by Saddam would not necessarily understand military matters. Their family ties and unconditional loyalty to Saddam were sufficient to make them top-level military leaders.
This state of affairs makes it difficult to assess an army's capacity to fight. The lack of truly outstanding military leaders could mean that troops were not as well trained as they otherwise would be. It may mean that, in real-life combat situations, army deployments and operations may be totally unstructured and that when enemy forces approach, troops will simply scatter in fear. We should not be surprised that such an army has been soundly defeated.
All this, of course, on top of the fact that the allied forces had total air superiority and superior weaponry, equipment and command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities.
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