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Editorial: The blue camp's pre-nuptial troubles

In Chinese culture, being "well matched" is an important condition for marriage. A marriage is more than just the union of the bride and groom; it is the union of their two families. If the wealth, social standing and lifestyles of the two families are too different, the marriage may not be blessed by friends and relatives, and the relationship will be more fragile. The political alliance between the KMT and the PFP is an example of a "bad match." Not having formally tied the knot, the two parties are already bickering incessantly about how power should be divided between themselves.

Once KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and PFP Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) hammered out an arrangement to run on a joint ticket, their first action was to try to establish a joint policymaking committee to serve as the highest organ for operations and policymaking in the alliance. Little did they expect this small first step would have to be aborted because of irreconcilable differences between the two parties. Even the common goal of toppling President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) in the next election has not been enough to iron out the fundamental differences between the two sides. Dividing benefits between themselves can't solve the problem of mutual contempt.

Lien and Soong had originally envisioned having the policymaking committee handle everything from campaign arrangements to assembling a Cabinet. In other words, if victorious, the policymaking committee would have transformed into a platform on which the two parties would divide power. Some of the KMT's six vice chairmen are still wary of Soong while certain party elders who were not selected to be on the committee are dissatisfied. The PFP -- having only a single vice chairman and resources that can't match those of the KMT -- can't agree to expand the committee's size. Having too few members on the committee has upset the KMT with its numerous party elders, but too many members would leave the Soong-centric PFP unable to match ranks with the KMT. This dilemma has blocked the establishment of the committee.

Not setting up the committee revolves around the above-mentioned problems, but it also gives rise to new problems. Some people in the KMT are unhappy about the possibility that Soong may be acting like a "co-chairman and secretary-general" at the same time. Meanwhile, PFP legislators accuse the KMT of "deliberately blurring Soong's power status in the alliance" by not letting him serve as convener of another campaign group. The mutual suspicions between the two parties are obvious. The KMT's recent move of elevating Chiang Ping-kun (江丙坤) and Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) to the posts of vice chairmen also alarmed the PFP, which believes the KMT is using Ma to suppress Soong while paving the way for Chiang to lead a future Cabinet, despite earlier rumors that the two sides had agreed to have Soong serve as vice president and premier concurrently.

The good thing about Lien and Soong ditching the memorandum they signed at the time and canceling the committee, is that no one has anything to fight over now. But this also reveals the instability of KMT-PFP cooperation. If Lien and Soong can't tackle obstacles within their parties, how could the people of Taiwan expect them to realize the vision they have put forth?

After this major change in the framework of KMT-PFP cooperation, the campaign machine will answer directly to the two party chairmen. Perhaps there is nothing wrong with that. But the process of this change has exposed the rivalry, wrangling and mistrust between the two parties. In the future, either side could become unhappy about having to make compromises toward the other. This will inevitably become a hidden variable in KMT-PFP cooperation.
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