US ignoring Afghanistan mistakes

The reasons for initiating a war and the process by which it is done are no doubt very complex, but the strategic thinking done to prepare for war must be painstaking and cautious. There are numerous similarities in the background environment and underlying conditions of the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US should really consider ahead of time the lessons it has learned from its experience in Afghanistan.

Originally, the primary strategic objective of the war in Afghanistan was to eradicate the terrorist organization headed by Osama bin Laden, but today bin Laden and his organization still exist, the Afghan civil war is still underway, 9,000 US soldiers are still deployed on Afghanistan territory, and the Afghan interim government, which the US is propping up, appears highly tenuous. Obviously, the US has already invested significant resources but has not achieved the hoped-for strategic goals. Moreover, it could very well end up trapped in an Afghan quagmire from which it would be very difficult to extricate itself.

Two weeks ago, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov pointed out that the leaders of the Taliban and al-Qaeda are safe and sound and continuing to prepare for terrorist attacks. One week ago, the United Arab Emirates daily Gulf News reported that bin Laden is now hiding in a mountainous region of Pakistan with just a small retinue of followers. He changes living quarters every night and never uses satellite communication to avoid being traced. It would appear that bin Laden won't be caught any time soon.

Meanwhile, the US military in Afghanistan long ago lost the formal advantages it enjoyed in fighting a modern form of warfare. Instead, it is now fighting a mountain war in snowy caves located largely over 3,000m above sea level. Small bands of enemy guerrillas constantly shuttle between the caves and their hiding places to launch surprise attacks. These tenacious guerrillas come from Chechnya, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan, and they use classical guerrilla hit-and-run tactics. A US military officer once pointed out to the media that unless someone is shooting at you, you have no way of distinguishing between friend and foe. Today the US military in Afghanistan is fighting a traditional guerrilla war against an invisible enemy.

The Afghan interim government is in an even more precarious state. The Afghan army consists of 100,000 men from the militias of warlords throughout the country, while troops loyal to the president amount to only 3,000 people. A presidential election will be held in Afghanistan next year. Without the support of the various warlords as well as international support, the stability of any new government will probably not be greater than that of today's government.

Apart from suffering attacks on all sides by guerilla fighters, the reasons the US military has become bogged down in Afghanistan have to do with special characteristics inherent to the country. Afghanistan is 18 times the size of Taiwan, and the population is slightly larger than this country. But the entire country has only 30,000 telephone numbers and 100,000 television sets. There are no mobile telephone or Internet users. With basic infrastructure so lacking and people accustomed to living under such conditions, how much harm can the massive firepower of the modernized US military cause?

Furthermore, Afghanistan is filled with lofty mountains, the highest among them reaching 7,485m, while only 12 percent of the country is arable land. How can the mechanized equipment of the US military be used for large-scale military actions? Instead, the terrain provides anti-government forces the cover to conduct guerrilla war. Moreover, Afghanistan is a landlocked nation bordering China, Iran and three Central Asian countries. The border stretches for 5,529km. Not only is it easy to flee and hide, but also support can be obtained from abroad. One US official estimated the military campaign in Afghanistan will continue for another six years.

The Bush administration doesn't want to adopt the Afghan model for the postwar reconstruction of Iraq because they want to avoid revisiting the last 10 months of Afghan chaos in Iraq. This understanding on Bush's part proves that the US has made strategic mistakes in Afghanistan. Like in the Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a superpower is once again mired in a long-term war. The background conditions in Iraq are very similar to those in Afghanistan. Clearly US strategic thinking hasn't benefitted from the lesson of mistakes made in the Afghan war.

Lee Li-ming is a researcher at Tamkang University's Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies.

Translated by Ethan Harkness