China airs concerns in Korea row

A serious situation has arisen in the Korean Peninsula following Pyongyang's admission last October that it has a nuclear program. North Korea fears that after the Iraq problem is settled, it will be the next "axis of evil" member on US President George W. Bush's hit list and therefore seeks security guarantees and normal state-level relations with the US. In other words, it wants a US commitment to bolster the Stalinist state and underwrite its stability with aid packages and trade deals. Washington is unwilling to do that.

Pyongyang has subsequently upped the ante by expelling the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, withdrawing from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, reactivating its mothballed reactor with its plutonium-bearing fuel rods and threatened to resume long range missile testing. It has declared that it will consider any UN sanctions as a declaration of war. And has warned that it too has the right to launch pre-emptive strikes against the US and will go after it anywhere in the world.

According to an official spokesman, "Wherever they [US] are we can attack them. There's no limit to our attack ability. The strike force of the Korean People's Army will take on the enemy wherever he is."

Now enters Japan into the fray, with its defense minister warning that: "Our nation will use military force as a self-defense measure if [North Korea] starts to resort to arms against Japan."

For good measure, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly has expressed the view that the Korean crisis could prompt Tokyo to rethink its position as a non-nuclear state.

Despite such shrill rhetoric, all is not lost yet. Both Washington and Pyongyang have left some leeway for diplomacy. Washington has indicated its willingness to negotiate, though preferring to internationalize Pyongyang's breach of its obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation regime as supervised by the IAEA. This subjects North Korea to UN any sanctions imposed by the international body.

Pyongyang, on the other hand, is in favor of bilateral negotiations with Washington and is apparently keen to make it happen before the US has finished with Iraq. As for Japan, its defense minister was careful to point out that there was "no confirmation that there is imminent danger [to Japan of a missle launch]." Therefore, "Japan is not making any special preparations in response to" such a threat. And Kelly sought to soothe any fear of Japan's nuclear option by saying that he didn't believe it will go nuclear as long as the "US provides a nuclear umbrella."

All in all, it is a case of calculated brinkmanship to see who will blink first, but with all its unintended dangers.

This is where China can play a role. It was Chinese military intervention in the 1950s that saved it from being overwhelmed by US-led forces. Beijing says that it favors Korea as a nuclear free zone. And is for a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

The problem, though, is that Beijing is not cooperating with Bush's vision for a new world order. Washington believes that Beijing is not doing all it can to rein in Pyongyang. As one Beijing-based analyst has pointed out: "China is the only country with the leverage to engineer a shift in North Korea, either through threatening to choke off its supplies of oil, grain and other vital materials thought to amount to 80 percent of North Korea's needs or by relaxing its border controls to allow large numbers of North Koreans to cross into [China and head for] South Korea."

At the same time there is recognition, though, that Beijing has nothing to gain from a nuclear-armed North Korea on its doorsteps. However, it is not that simple. After all, it has helped Pakistan, another of its neighbors, to develop its nuclear and missile program. It is, therefore, not inconceivable that Beijing might find North Korea's nuclear potential useful as a strategic tool.

Another argument for China's benign role is that it certainly wouldn't want Tokyo to follow suit. A nuclear Japan, it is argued, is China's worst nightmare. Here again, it is not as clear-cut. It is quite possible that Tokyo might not exercise the nuclear option, partly because of domestic opposition and, partly, under US pressure and protection. Therefore, Beijing would assess its options as it goes along, depending on how the situation evolves. If it can influence and shape the Korean situation to its strategic advantage, it will certainly do so.

In the meantime, there is a growing perception that the Bush administration is somehow responsible for the present dangerous crisis in the Korean Peninsula. In all this, China comes out looking good.

In South Korea, where people have most to fear from their wayward other half, they are venting their anger more on US foreign policy than Pyongyang.

Earlier, the US military also got a pasting over the death of two girls crushed by an army truck, and the subsequent acquittal of two soldiers involved in the incident. The cumulative effect was the election victory last December of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun. Roh, the ruling party candidate, won in the midst of strident anti-US sentiment in the country.

The South Koreans fear their country has become just a battleground of power politics, putting it on a path to destruction. And they are increasingly looking to China for a constructive role. Beijing would certainly like to supplant the US as the region's primary power. As one Chinese analyst has put it, "If the US were to withdraw its troops from South Korea [and it might re-deploy them away from the North-South demilitarized zone], China would be much more active in limiting North Korea's military ambitions, while also providing for its security. I think that among South Koreans China is believed to be a more impartial arbiter than the US."

In other words, the Korean Peninsula will effectively become a Chinese protectorate, ushering Beijing into the role of regional power center.

But that might not happen -- not in the near future at least. Simply because Washington is not about to quit. It has large strategic and economic stakes and is not going to make a gift of them to China, though it might readjust its military presence to accommodate Seoul's fears and sensitivity.

At the same time, Beijing would not like the situation to deteriorate to such a degree that it would bring US military power right on its doorsteps by turning Korea into a military battleground. It will, therefore, seek to facilitate a peaceful dialogue and settlement between North Korea and the US. But if the Korean crisis were to develop into a war, thereis no way to predict the outcome. After that, the Asia-Pacific region will never be the same again.

Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney, Australia.