French President Jacques Chirac has alarmed the EU candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The French president has accused them of being "childish" and "irresponsible" in voicing their pro-US stance on the Iraq issue, and warned that their position could be "dangerous," as the decision to let them into the EU has not yet been ratified.
Quite a salvo. Then the French president assumed the role of kindergarten instructor vis-a-vis what he called "badly brought up" candidate countries, telling them that they were "ill-behaved" and that "they missed a great opportunity to shut up."
To anyone who remembers that 40 years ago the president Charles de Gaulle slammed Europe's door shut in the face of Britain's request to join the European community -- the general thought the British too tied to the US to enter the European family -- these remarks are worrying. But put things in perspective -- Chirac is not de Gaulle and Europe has moved far beyond the time when its agenda was unilaterally written by France.
Chirac's self-appointed role as an expert in diplomatic good behavior cannot be taken seriously, even by those of us who know (and love) France. Instead, his outburst is best explained as a sign of frustration over the fact that French influence in the EU is being diluted. Like King Lear after he lost his kingdom, there is nothing France can do about its lost influence but rage impotently.
But this dispute within Europe goes deeper than the matter of France's lapsed primacy. I have always been skeptical about the rhetoric of a "common" foreign policy for the EU. How can you possibly expect a country such as, say, France to accept being voted down by its EU partners on vital foreign and security policy issues? At best, Europe should hope for a "more common" foreign and security policy, even though this fails to answer Henry Kissinger's old question: If you want to speak to "Europe," whom do you call?
I have long worked to secure a "much more common" foreign policy within the EU. Therefore I am worried by today's split within the EU as well as between some member countries and the US over Iraq. When eight European leaders published their appeal to heal the growing transatlantic rift, they were accused of undermining European unity. Nothing could be more incorrect. They were only exposing the lack of unity that already existed.
It all began last autumn when German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, desperate to hold on to power, made Iraq an issue in the German election campaign. He played on Germany's well-known and respectable pacifist feelings. But by declaring that he would not, under any circumstance, participate in military actions against Iraq, he undermined the efforts at the UN to put maximum pressure behind the demands that Iraq disarm.
Then France embraced Germany. French ways in foreign policy are often murky and difficult to decipher, unless it is crystal clear where France regards its interests to lie. Usually France likes to keep its options open. But when the French and German governments celebrated the 40th anniversary of the Elysee Treaty last month, France seemed to paint itself into a corner by supporting the German view.
All this was done without consultations between the French and German governments and their partners within the EU. It was a demonstration of the special relationship between France and Germany that has for so many years been the driving force in European integration.
The history of Franco-German reconciliation is impressive indeed. But it can no longer be taken for granted that other EU countries will automatically ratify the agreements that they reach between themselves as the lodestar for common policies. This is particularly true when their objective is to establish an alternative to American leadership in security policy. Enlargement of the EU with a number of Central and Eastern European countries will strengthen resistance to Franco-German initiatives in this direction.
The letter from the eight European leaders -- and the later statement from the "Vilnius Ten" group of Central and Eastern European countries -- demonstrated that France (and Germany) cannot dictate a European agenda that creates transatlantic rifts. This has obviously caused frustrations. But it should not have been a surprise to anyone.
The split within the EU and NATO has increased the risk of armed conflict with Iraq because the pressure on Iraq to comply with the UN resolutions was weakened. Chirac and Schroeder do not seem to grasp this. So this has not been one of Europe's finest hours, especially not while the EU's institutional convention is discussing a text that calls for EU governments to "actively and unreservedly support the union's common foreign policy."
The German acronym for the EU's "common foreign and security policy" is GASP. That seems an entirely appropriate expression for what we have been witnessing.
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen is a former foreign minister of Denmark.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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