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Idling toward continued cross-strait stalemate

`The "one center and two basic points" policy is evidence that Beijing has shifted its policy toward Taipei since Chen came to power.'

China's policy toward Taiwan centers upon economic development, hoping to gather up strength in order to solve internal problems. Beijing does not wish the Taiwan issue to hinder its own economic development. At the same time, it has made stabilizing Sino-US relations and working on the people of Taiwan the basis of its policy toward Taipei. This policy approach is called "one center and two basic points."

China does not wish the Taiwan issue to become a cause of conflict in Sino-US relations because a stable relationship with Washington is vital to its economic development. At the same time, it wishes to adopt a flexible policy toward Taipei by taking a cooperative approach. Beijing wishes to promote a common interest in maintaining the status quo and peaceful unification. It hopes such an approach will encourage the US to pressure Taipei to cooperate with Beijing and prevent it from seeking independence.

On the other hand, China knows that winning the support of the people of Taiwan is the key to solving the problem. The will of the Taiwanese people is not only the key that will unlock the door to unification -- it is also a safeguard against President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) leaning toward independence. China, therefore, has increasingly emphasized "placing its hope in the people of Taiwan" and "working on the people of Taiwan."

The "one center and two basic points" policy is evidence that Beijing has shifted its policy toward Taipei since Chen came to power -- even though it considers Chen an independence activist. A series of adjustments include the new definition of the "one China" principle and the terms for direct-links negotiations.

With regard to the "one China" principle, China has repeatedly made concessions in order to gain the acceptance of both the US and Taiwanese and to pressure Taiwan's government to accept it.

In addition, Beijing has repeatedly depoliticized the issue of direct links in order to ensure its success as early as possible. China believes direct links will be beneficial to economic development and unification. It is one of the few areas in which China can exert her strength in cross-strait relations at the moment.

This trend has continued despite Chen's remark last August that there is "one country on each side" of the Taiwan Strait. Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen (錢其琛) said last October that cross-strait aviation and shipping links could be interpreted as "cross-strait air and shipping routes."

Direct links negotiations can be unhooked from next year's presidential election, by not considering whether the links issue can help a stubborn, independence activist such as Chen get re-elected.

At the Chinese Communist Party's 16th National Congress last fall, the new definition of the "one China" principle became the party's policy. Later, when Qian met with former US secretary of defense William Perry, he offered a more flexible interpretation for the "one China" principle -- "both the mainland and Taiwan belong to the same country."

This trend shows that Beijing has not built is policy toward Taipei in response to Chen's pro-independence attributes or on Taipei's China policies. Instead, China's policy is built on the "one center and two basic points" approach.

Beijing knows that the will of the Taiwanese people is a safeguard against Chen's independence policy, but it does not know how to effectively influence the Taiwanese. It also fears that it will lose this safeguard against Chen if he gets re-elected.

Because of these worst-case-scenario concerns, China resorts to military coercion.

Due to distrust and the difference in policy standpoints, both sides of the Strait are unlikely to have any exchanges in the near future -- the stalemate will continue. The possibility of a national referendum on independence in Taiwan or a declaration of independence as well as China's military threats will continue to strain the situation.

The US' pressure on both sides of the Strait, and the centrist approach favored by a majority of people in Taiwan, the possibility of Beijing being able to integrate Taiwan by military means or a unilateral declaration of independence by Taipei seems unlikely.

Cross-strait relations are likely to remain stable -- if stalemated -- over the next few years. Direct links will remain the focus of cross-strait exchanges and negotiations in the short term and the medium term.

Tung Chen-yuan is an associate research fellow at National Chengchi University's Institute of International Relations.

Translated by Grace Shaw
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