In the recent mayoral election, Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (
In Kaohsiung, KMT candidate Huang Jun-ying (
In Taipei, the KMT was victorious, having led the race all the way. But in Kaohsiung, efforts at cooperation within the party and within the pan-blue camp were unsuccessful in the beginning, delaying Huang's nomination and causing him to fall behind.
But when the likely effects of tactical voting became clear in Kaohsiung, Huang received a boost and, in the end, he almost tied with Mayor Frank Hsieh (
Besides the number of votes received, another factor that has a decisive bearing on the outcome of local elections is the extent of the cooperation within each of the two major camps. When the parties of the pan-blue coalition fail to cooperate, the green camp, which has always maintained a united front, is likely to win the election. When the blue camp is successful in holding its coalition together, the green camp is likely to lose the election.
We saw in the 1994 Taipei mayoral election that the split in the pan-blue camp between KMT candidate Thomas Huang (黃大洲) and New Party candidate Jaw Shaw-kung (趙少康) handed victory to the green camp's Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). The Kaohsiung mayoral election of that year, by contrast, saw no challenge from the New Party and the KMT's Wu Den-yi (吳敦義) defeated the DPP's Chang Chun-hsiung (張俊雄) hands down. The blue camp won both this year's and the 1998 Taipei mayoral races because Ma built a winning coalition.
Finally, Chen defeated two other candidates in the last presidential election because of divisions within the blue camp. In this year's mayoral races, we can identify a few possible models for a pan-blue coalition. The first is the Ma model, a coalition based on advantage. Put simply, this involves a strong candidate emerging from the blue camp, a candidate who is so strong that the other parties are simply unable to nominate anyone able to compete.
This type of coalition is built from the bottom up -- the party leaders have no choice. The PFP, for example, was unable to come up with a suitable candidate for the Taipei mayoral race. Its supporters made the decision for the party during the campaign -- James Soong (宋楚瑜) had no reason not to support Ma. But this type of coalition would appear unlikely to be formed for the 2004 presidential election because no political figure in the blue camp enjoys the kind of advantages that Ma enjoys in Taipei.
The second model is the Huang Jun-ying model, which means integration based on tactical voting. The pan-blue camp is initially subject to splits as its constituent parties have their own calculations and their own supporters. But opinion polls prior to the election reveal likely tactical voting patterns, ultimately prompting a coalition-building process from the voters up to the party leaders.
The PFP supported former interior minister Chang Po-ya (張博雅) because Vice Chairman Chang Chao-hsiung (張昭雄) refused to stand. As soon as Huang Jun-ying gained a significant lead over Chang Po-ya in opinion surveys, Soong had no choice but to go with the flow and support Huang. Basically, the people's spontaneous, strategic calculations limited the party's room for maneuver. This may be the type of model that the PFP is counting on for the 2004 election.
Soong will believe that he stands a better chance than KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) on the basis of many opinion surveys and his personal experience of four years ago. Should Lien and Soong compete for support within the blue camp, those pan-blue voters who are inclined to vote tactically will likely lean toward the PFP. The performance of Huang Jun-ying in Kaohsiung is a good example of effective tactical voting.
But integration based on tactical voting is obviously quite risky. Political parties cannot expect to seize the precise moment at which a critical mass decides to vote tactically -- they can only hope to serve as a catalyst for such a development. Nor can they be absolutely sure of the direction of tactical voting. It is possible that voters will vote for other parties' candidates when tactical voting takes place. Moreover, the effects of tactical voting can also be limited if it happens too late.
The third model is based on an agreement reached between Lien and Soong (or possibly involving Ma) by distributing power at the top level. Lien, for example, could run for the presidency with Soong as his running mate, but on the condition that Soong will serve concurrently as vice-president and premier, assuming the blue camp wins the election, and that Soong will later receive Lien's backing to run for the presidency in the next presidential election. (Another less likely possibility is a KMT-PFP merger).
This would be a coalition built by negotiation from the top down. The green camp would likely condemn this type of bargaining practice, but a Lien-Soong coalition would have a great unifying effect on pan-blue voters. No one, however, can predict whether the party leaders would agree upon the terms and conditions required for this type of coalition. Of course, the pan-blue coalition could also fail due to a lack of decisive strength, a breakdown in negotiations or a failure to achieve the desired result from tactical voting.
Unless the country's poor economic performance prompts voters from the center to shift allegiance to the blue camp, or there are splits within the pan-green camp (for example, if the TSU nominates its own candidate), Chen will no doubt get re-elected.
We can see from the recent mayoral elections, however, as well as from other previous elections, that a pan-blue coalition will be the decisive factor in the upcoming presidential election. Given the KMT's and PFP's preferences and tendencies, a coalition based on advantage is sure to be victorious. If no promising candidate is available, a coalition based on negotiation is the next best alternative, but it is not without the risk of disagreements.
Finally, strategic voting is the last option, and one which will be very difficult to control. To prevent the PFP from pursuing strategic voting, the KMT may threaten to have Ma join the campaign in order to force Soong to accept a negotiated coalition. Alternatively, it may pursue strategic voting with a Lien-Ma pairing. In any case, if the pan-blue camp is not properly integrated, the success of the DPP in the presidential election will be guaranteed.
The key to a pan-blue coalition now lies in the hands of Lien, Soong and Ma. The gradual rise in Ma's political stature is closely linked to a series of election campaigns. In the past, the KMT power structure involved several divisions -- party apparatus, central administrative apparatus, legislative caucus and local officials. Of the local officials, Ma enjoys the greatest influence because he once defeated Chen.
Having lost the 2000 presidential election, the KMT has lost its grip on central government. The party apparatus has been greatly weakened as a result of the loss of power as well as of the disposal of party assets and personnel reductions. The last Legislative Yuan election also drastically compressed the power of the KMT's legislative caucus. Since Ma won the Taipei mayoral election by almost 400,000 votes and Kaohsiung has no KMT mayor to challenge him, Ma is undoubtedly the number two man in the KMT.
Although Ma's standing in the party and his electoral success are two separate factors, he will be expected to take a more prominent role in the KMT now that he has been re-elected in Taipei. He will, therefore, have a great impact on Lien and Soong.
Lien, Soong and Ma will determine how a pan-blue coalition should be organized and whether it will succeed. That pan-blue coalition will in turn ultimately determine whether the DPP will continue to govern beyond 2004. It will also influence the country's direction until 2008. This year's elections have made this trend very clear.
Wu Yu-shan is the director of Academia Sinica's Institute of Political Science.
Translated by Grace Shaw
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