During their meeting in Crawford, Texas, in late October, Chinese President Jiang Zemin (
Jiang's offer was made mainly out of consideration of the following points.
First, the US began to strengthen military exchanges with Taiwan when former US president Bill Clinton was in power. Although the US Congress did not pass the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, most of the provisions of that bill can be seen in various national defense authorization and appropriation bills.
In addition to the massive arms sales to Taiwan by the Bush government in April last year, the US plan to include Taiwan in its missile defense system is interpreted by Beijing as another step toward a quasi-military coalition with Taiwan. Adding to China's concerns are pro-independence forces. Beijing has sought to reverse this trend.
Second, the Bush administration's speedy deployment of its global missile defense system is ostensibly aimed at "rogue states" and the "axis of evil."
But Beijing is aware that the US views China as a potential enemy and therefore wishes to disabuse the American people of that image.
Third, whenever China demands that the US abide by the terms of the joint communique and scale down its arms sales to Taiwan, the US always rejects the plea, raising the issue of China's missile threats against Taiwan.
And fourth, Taiwan has launched a campaign to oppose China's missile deployment along its southeast coast, which has hurt China in the international community.
China can expect to benefit from its offer. First, it hopes the US administration will appreciate its "goodwill" and be further persuaded that China can be its partner.
Second, the American people might indeed change their impression of China.
Third, the offer will have an international public-relations effect, even before any negotiations with the US.
Fourth, since the deterrence effect on Taiwan of ballistic missiles has been diminishing, China has little to lose by removing them. If an emergency were to arise in the Taiwan Strait or if Taiwan decided to declare independence, China could simply redeploy them with considerable effect.
And fifth, Beijing wants to sound out the US about its real intentions in selling weapons to Taiwan.
But Jiang's offer will not necessarily serve its intended purposes. There are several reasons for this. First, US arms sales to Taiwan are conducted in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act and supervised by Congress.
Second, the arms sales form an element of US global strategic considerations.
Third, they involve the US military-industrial complex and reflect the interests of the US weapons industry.
Fourth, since contradictions and conflicts still exist between the basic structural and strategic interests of the US and China, it is not easy for them to reach common ground on this issue.
And fifth, in this post-Cold War era, the US would not go so far as sacrificing arms sales to Taiwan for the sake of its war on terror.
Because the US and China are working closely together in the fight against terrorism, however, we should keep in mind that the US might, under various pretexts, stop providing certain weapons systems to Taiwan temporarily or even for a protracted period.
Although Taiwan only has limited influence on this issue, the government should still comment publicly in response.
Taipei may say that it welcomes any statements and gestures from Beijing which are conducive to peaceful dialogue across the Strait, that it welcomes Beijing's offer to remove the missiles or place a freeze on deployments, and that it hopes Beijing can express genuine goodwill by removing the missiles unconditionally.
Further, it could say that Taiwan's ballistic missiles and the cruise missiles deployed on Kidd-class destroyers and F-16 fighter planes all have long ranges, but that Taiwan has no intention of launching them unless it is attacked. Taipei may warmly welcome any indication from Beijing that it is disposed to negotiate on confidence-building measures with Taipei regarding missile deployments.
Finally, if China ignores Taiwan's goodwill or does not reciprocate, Taiwan should explain to the world that China's offer to remove missiles in exchange for reduced US arms sales to Taiwan was an insincere offer.
Edward Chen is the director of the Graduate Institute of American Studies at Tamkang University.
Translated by Jackie Lin
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