Now that both China and Taiwan intend to take a pragmatic approach to "direct air links," avoiding the question of whether such links are international or domestic in nature, the next problem Taiwan faces is how to address the impact that direct links will have on national security.
Recently, Vice Minister of National Defense Kang Ning-hsiang (
Kang also said that they should initially be handled through Kaohsiung's Hsiaokang International Airport, only flying to and from Taoyuan's CKS International Airport at some later date. He formally ruled out the use of Taipei's Sungshan Airport for direct air links.
Because Sungshan Airport is situated in the heart of Taipei City, the nation's political, economic, and military center, the government's organs of national security view using Sungshan Airport for direct air links as equivalent to opening up the airspace over the capital city to a hostile China.
This would represent an "insurmountable challenge" to the security of the capital. That's why the Ministry of National Defense resolutely opposes using Sungshan Airport for the links.
Assuming the continuation of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, "net assessment" (a methodology used by US national security policymakers) can be used to analyze the viability of using Sungshan Airport. The following national security issues that must be confronted.
First, China's intentions, methods, and capabilities: Under the premise that China has not abandoned the threat of force against Taiwan, even if taking advantage of direct links is not China's only means to attack or threaten Taiwan, this possibility cannot be ruled out.
Moreover, given that China's military has proposed the theory of "unlimited warfare," it is certainly capable of adopting such a strategy. Its potential methods would be multifaceted, however.
Second, factors outside the control of either side may arise in a crisis: Based on past experience, when tensions arise between China and Taiwan, they often give rise to hostile actions which are outside the control of either government.
Moreover, since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the US, potential terrorists have witnessed demonstrations of the effectiveness of international terrorist attacks. In the future, even if China does not order such actions, preventing nationalist extremists or other radicals from taking advantage of direct links to carry out their own special operations will be a serious problem to be confronted by both sides for the sake of their national security.
Third, crisis prevention and handling: The military can deal with the threat of a "Trojan Horse" by strengthening airport security measures and putting large numbers of troops in place. It would still be very difficult, however, to respond to all the possible scenarios that could unfold in the air.
Fourth, the extent of our capacity to withstand damage: Even if the military can respond to a threat immediately, whether to shoot down a hijacked plane that is out of control may pose a particularly grave problem because today's passenger aircraft are enormous and generally carry large reserves of fuel.
If such an aircraft is shot down over a densely populated, highly developed urban center, it will cause large-scale damage and widespread casualties in the air and on the ground. We have not yet evaluated whether this sort of risk is bearable. Nor have we determined how to limit damage, how to respond to emergency situations or how much to spend on such work.
Chang Pai-ta is a research fellow on the DPP's Policy Committee.
Translated by Ethan Harkness
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