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US-Taiwan relations still evolving

US President George W. Bush recently signed into law the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003. Like so many authorization bills, it carried with it some "pork barrel" items. Pork added to legislation usually is thought of as some member of Congress getting funds for his or her constituency to build a sewage project, or maybe a public park named after someone famous. Foreign relations also have constituencies in the US and though the objectives are quite different, the process is similar.

Taiwan got a share of it this time. It came in several sections of this legislation. In addition to some "Sense of the Congress" items, which sound good but are often ignored, it contained a much stronger statement to the Executive Branch: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for purposes of the transfer or possible transfer of defense articles or defense services under the Arms Control Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, or any other provision of law, Taiwan shall be treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally."

In dealing with domestic politics, there is wiggle room in this for the executive branch through flexible interpretation, but simply ignoring the section carries with it some political risk. If section 1206 formally becomes policy, for example, it would demonstrate a stronger relationship between the US and Taiwan, and it could put Taiwan higher on the priority list for licenses to buy arms. Both of these results, however, can be accomplished in other ways.

For Taiwan, the struggle between Congress and the executive branch over authority on foreign policy started in earnest with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979. In that case, Congress won big. The act became a unique law that to this day determines our legal relationship with the people of Taiwan. Like the recently passed law that includes section 1206, however, the TRA also had wiggle room, and this has been displayed over the years most often on security issues. The first and most important example of this flexibility has been the interpretations of the Aug. 17, 1982, communique between the US and China that resulted eventually in the US being able to continue arms sales to Taiwan.

Not without difficulty, however. There are strong forces in the China-expert community that have always sought a strict interpretation of the communique to avoid problems with Beijing. This view succeeded in blocking the sale of new fighter aircraft throughout the 1980s, but failed to prevent the technology transfer necessary for Taiwan to build its own new fighter -- the IDF.

During the years before the IDF was built, Taiwan's air force was in dire need of replacements. Eventually, for a variety of reasons, an interpretation of the US' commitments prevailed that permitted the sale of F-16s.

The 1996 missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait changed our interpretation of what we can do or should not do with regard to arms sales. In the past administration, some changes began, but the priority was on the political expansion of our relationship with China, with security a secondary consideration.

Despite this attitude, there were efforts, particularly in the Department of Defense, that began the movement to modernize the military relationship with Taiwan. This was an effort to meet the need, almost non-existent during the missile crisis, to communicate and coordinate with each other, and to permit the US military to better meet the requirements of the TRA for maintaining adequate resources in the area in the event the US decided to help Taiwan defend itself.

With the present administration, the TRA requirements are taken much more seriously. This includes the necessity of providing modern equipment, the training, coordination and the communications for Taiwan's self-defense.

The US could not meet its responsibilities of modernizing the military relationship without permitting the sale of missiles, submarines, communications equipment, radar and high-tech equipment that is the basis of modern military defense. And with the equipment and the means of using them, coordination and communications between the two militaries is in the interest of both countries.

There are now some China experts in the US who see one element of this new military relationship as provocative to Beijing, and push the idea that it crosses the "red line" beyond which China would strongly react. This element of the security relationship has been given the tongue-twisting name of "interoperability." We in the US have often overreacted to what we think Beijing considers provocative, however, and I believe this could be one such instance.

Interoperability could come in all sizes, and in all degrees of visibility. Cooperation, coordination and communications don't come in clearly defined doses; they can be custom built to suit the circumstances.

Calling interoperability the equivalent of a defense treaty, as some do, is an exaggeration that could do harm in maintaining both Taiwan's ability to defend itself and our flexibility in choosing options for defending our own interests in the region.

So from the Congressional standpoint, there is a good reason for introducing section 1206 in the recently enacted legislation. Bush, in signing the act into law, chose his words very carefully. He put up the necessary challenge against congressional encroachment in foreign policy, but left open the issue of whether it is a reiteration of present policy or policy to come.

He made clear (doubtless urged by Beijing's displeasure) "that US policy remains unchanged." That is becoming a ritual requirement even though the US' "one China" and the "one China" used by Beijing are not the same.

But more importantly, Bush added, "To the extent that this section could be read to purport to change US policy, it impermissibly interferes with the president's constitutional authority." That left it quite open whether what section 1206 said in any way differed from present US policy.

Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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