With the summit between US President George W. Bush and Chinese President Jiang Zemin (
As of this writing, I count about seven such seminars in the Washington area alone. At the same time, Beijing is beginning its public relations efforts with a "new" policy toward Taiwan and Taiwan continues its assurances that its policy toward Beijing remains unchanged. Reality is that in both cases, these policies are just the reverse.
In a recent article, Bonnie Glazer tells us that her informants in the Chinese government say Beijing will now pursue a new policy of pressing Washington to control Taiwan's indepen-dence tendencies, while strength-ening its military capabilities at the same time ("Beijing pursuing a new policy toward Taiwan," Sept. 3, page 8). That China wants to weaken US support for Taiwan while building a more credible military option is not new. It would be more accurate for them to say they will attempt to follow the same policy that succeeded with the last administration.
In its preparations for the summit, Beijing will likely press very hard to exact a public statement from the US that it shares some of Beijing's concerns about Taiwan. They are likely to argue that they have a common interest in avoiding a formal declaration of Taiwan independence as it could lead to war. There will also be efforts to extract a better (for them) interpretation of US commitments. And they will take every opportunity to paint the Taiwan leadership as troublemakers out to undermine both nations.
If there is any change in Chinese behavior following the recent trend in Taiwan's policies, it is in its relatively mild reaction to them. Perhaps there is a reluctance to threaten the still growing economic interchange between China and Taiwan. The opportunities this presents Beijing for drawing Taiwan even closer into its orbit may outweigh the satisfaction of showing its muscle. Or perhaps it is the uncertainty of the forthcoming succession. Or both.
Taiwan, on the other hand, has made a considerable commitment in opening its economy to interchange with China, overriding the substantial reluctance by many Taiwanese who fear China's influence. The new government has given a multitude of assurances on cross-strait policies, and continuously pressed for cross-strait dialogue. In early August, however, Taiwan appeared to change its course.
First there was the complaint that Taiwan had conceded much in cross-strait relations without any return from China. President Chen Shui-bian (陳 水扁) suggested that Taiwan might have to "go its own way."
Then on Aug. 3, Chen said it must be clearly understood that there are "two countries on each side" of the Taiwan Strait and also called for referendum legislation to be passed. The opposition erupted, and the domestic and international media joined in, catching both Beijing and Washington by surprise.
The timing may have been a surprise, but the statements should not have been. Concessions have been made by Taiwan, but not returned by Beijing. Perhaps we have become too accustomed to that behavior, but this was stirring up the majority of voters in Taiwan who were not benefiting from the concessions given.
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