On May 21 Beijing invited Taipei to talk about postal, commercial and transportation links across the Taiwan Strait through authorized businessmen. Yet on May 20, 2000, the world was asking whether there would be a war, with the DPP's Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) being sworn in as president. The party had advocated Taiwan's independence, against which Beijing had threatened military attack. Curiously, two years of calm in the Strait followed. What has happened? Where will Beijing and Taipei go from here?
Armed conflict failed to materialize because Beijing was pragmatic and Washington demonstrated its resolve in maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait. The critical contribution, how-ever, was Chen's prudent and practical policy toward China.
First, Chen has continued to express goodwill toward Beijing. He promised at his inauguration that "during my term, I will not declare independence." In his 2001 Lunar New Year speech, Chen asked: "Why can't we strive for economic and cultural integration -- to pursue a new cross-strait structure of political integration and permanent peace?" His integration approach even raised the eyebrows of some independence advocates around him.
Second, Chen has promoted a policy of exchange across the Strait. In November 2000, he lifted the ban on Chinese journalists being stationed in Taiwan. In January last year, he allowed and arranged for the "small three links" between the offshore islands and Fujian Province. This transformed Kinmen and Matsu, the site of intensive shelling in 1958, into a symbol of peace. Chen also significantly relaxed controls over mainland-bound investment earlier this year.
Third, Chen has exercised utmost restraint to avoid provoking Beijing. He has often reined in criticism of Beijing within his party. For example, when Beijing released its third Defense White Paper in October 2000, Taipei for the first time refrained from questioning it.
Mere calm in the Strait is insufficient. Chen realized that, and has repeatedly appealed for the resumption of cross-strait consultations, suspended since 1999 by Beijing. On June 20, 2000 just a month into his presidency, he publicly invited Beijing's leader, Jiang Zemin (江澤民), to meet with him anywhere and without pre-conditions. In November last year, he expressed a yearning to find his family roots in China. In early May this year, Chen again invited Beijing leaders over, this time for tea.
Chen's multifarious efforts to engage Beijing have not produced any quick results. Two blind spots in Beijing's perception seem to have blocked its leaders from breaking through a self-imposed impasse of refusing to talk to Taipei until Taiwan accepts Bei-jing's "one China" principle in whatever form it is defined by Beijing.
First, Beijing's intransigence has actually nurtured pro-
independence sentiment in Taiwan. After Taipei lifted the ban on Taiwanese visiting China in 1987, a "mainland fever" swept the nation. Whenever an earthquake, flood or drought struck China, Taiwanese donated generously to disaster relief efforts. But a series of actions by Beijing disappointed the Taiwanese, chilled the fever and gradually reduced the donations to nil.
These actions included the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen massacre and the March 1996 test firing of missiles during Taiwan's
presidential election campaign. Following the missile tests, an opinion poll found that those who supported Taiwan's independence (20.5 percent) for the first time outnumbered those who supported for unification with China (18.8 percent). Conversely, whenever Beijing softened its posture on Taiwan, the pro-unification percentage would immediately edge up.
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