On May 21, Chen Yunlin (陳雲林), head of China's Taiwan Affairs Office, stated that Beijing would not raise the "one China" principle or the "1992 consensus," nor would it describe direct links as a domestic matter. Chen also expressed the hope that Taiwan would authorize non-government entities to negotiate direct links with China as soon as possible. Chen's statements created widespread bewilderment in Taiwan, with some people even commenting that these conditions were "simply too relaxed."
Equally puzzling was the reaction of Taiwan's opposition. In the past, the opposition has repeatedly berated the government for not making progress on direct links, saying that Beijing's offer -- that negotiations on the matter would be possible as long as Taiwan accepted the "one China" principle -- was "full of goodwill." Now, however, the opposition says that Chen's statement that Beijing wouldn't raise the issue of "one China" is likewise full of goodwill.
This is really strange. Some-how, according to the opposition, raising the issue of "one China" -- and not raising the issue -- are both expressions of goodwill. It seems that anytime Beijing brings something up, it becomes a goodwill gesture, regardless of the inconsistency of the message. By contrast, anything brought up by the Taiwan government is "insincere." This is what the opposition said when President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) gave his speech on Tatan island. Perhaps the opposition thinks that the way to warm cross-strait relations, create peace and promote direct links is to accommodate Beijing by every means possible. It appears, however, that this is not the way things really are.
The simplest way to handle the direct-links issue has always been for governments on both sides of the Strait to "separate economics from politics," and base negotiations on economic realities. The problem is that both sides have their fair share of ideological baggage, cluttering the road of already complex trade negotiations with a huge pile of political boulders.
In the past, the KMT was the problem. Beijing originally hoped that official negotiations could be held. At that time, Taiwan was afraid this would be tantamount to recognizing the legitimacy of Beijing's authority. It was Taiwan's refusal to come to the table that prompted the creation of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF, 海基會), a strange agency that is non-government in name, but official in substance.
Now, however, not only has Beijing changed from its former position, it has also piled up numerous political preconditions that must be met before it will be willing to send officials to the negotiating table. Beijing has even flatly refused to participate in semi-official talks with the SEF, contending that only a "purely non-government" arrangement is acceptable. No wonder it's so difficult to get cross-strait negotiations going.
The principle that "the Taiwan issue must be viewed from the strategic high point" -- which was set by former China president Yang Shangkun (
Strategic configurations do change, however. A February article in the Washington Post pointed out the differences between China's hard-liners and pragmatists. Even if these two factions' objectives are the same, their methods differ. The pragmatists advocate that economics should be divorced from politics as much as possible. For now, the pragmatists clearly have the upper hand. Unfortunately, Taiwan's opposition members seem to think Beijing remains rigid and unyielding. They stubbornly cling to Beijing's past pre-conditions, demanding that the Taiwan government accept these pre-conditions. This has resulted in a string of ridiculous performances.
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