While leading senior media representatives on a tour of Tatan islet recently, President Chen Shui-bian (
If the public believes this is a turning point for the two sides of the Strait to open up a new chapter in their relationship, it may be mistaken. In fact, although Tai-wan and China are deadlocked in a "cold peace," neither side has ever stopped making spoken assurances of goodwill.
The Chinese leaders and their Taiwan Affairs bureaucracy have also invited Taiwan's leaders to visit China on many occasions and they have expressed their desire to implement the three links as soon as possible. But the cross-strait relationship hasn't improved. The heart of the matter still lies in the "one China"
problem.
China insists that as long as talks take place under the premise that only one China exists, anything can be discussed and all conditions are negotiable. Taiwan emphasizes that as long as the very issue of "one China" isn't broached, anything can be discussed. Any official words from either side of the Strait about improving relations can therefore be considered cheap talk if they don't relate to a compromise on the "one China" problem.
In game theory analysis, such talk has no binding power or real implications because no actual follow-up action will result from it. When each side makes its statements, it has judged in ad-vance that the other side will not respond positively, thus reducing the political risk of having an insincere proposal met with acceptance.
In terms of timing, China's primary political agenda this autumn will be the Beidaihe meetings and the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. This doesn't fit in well with the schedule proposed by Taiwan. Especially given that the "one China" problem was not touched upon, exchanges between political
parties can't possibly result from Chen's offer.
Since the purpose of Chen's statement was not to seek a breakthrough in relations, the real target of his appeal must have been the domestic electorate. As the 2004 presidential election draws closer, we can predict that the government won't compromise on the "one China" problem, but statements calling for a more proactive policy to open up direct links, contacts between political parties and even visits between leaders on each side will be aired intermittently.
The responsibility for the failure of these goodwill measures will lie squarely on China's shoulders. This strategy of "an uncompromising stance with a flexible attitude" will become the keynote of Taiwan's efforts to handle cross-strait relations in the foreseeable future.
The government has the right to weigh its own policy on how to address the "one China" dispute and cross-strait relations. Taiwan does not necessarily need to submit to indignity in exchange for dialogue. Nor must we necessarily expand interaction and exchanges between the two sides of the Strait.
If the people are unsatisfied with the ruling party's policies, they can wait for the next election to make their opinions known. But the government shouldn't give people false hopes. Still more importantly, it shouldn't use cross-strait relations as political capital at election time.
The ups and downs in cross-strait relations over the past ten years appear to contain a discernible pattern. When no elections were being held, everything was tranquil, but the larger an important election loomed on the horizon, the greater the storm that arose.
The 1996 missile-test crisis and then president Lee Teng-hui's (
Emile Sheng is an assistant professor of politics at Soochow University.
Translated by Ethan Harkness
Congressman Mike Gallagher (R-WI) and Congressman Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) led a bipartisan delegation to Taiwan in late February. During their various meetings with Taiwan’s leaders, this delegation never missed an opportunity to emphasize the strength of their cross-party consensus on issues relating to Taiwan and China. Gallagher and Krishnamoorthi are leaders of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Their instruction upon taking the reins of the committee was to preserve China issues as a last bastion of bipartisanship in an otherwise deeply divided Washington. They have largely upheld their pledge. But in doing so, they have performed the
It is well known that Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) ambition is to rejuvenate the Chinese nation by unification of Taiwan, either peacefully or by force. The peaceful option has virtually gone out of the window with the last presidential elections in Taiwan. Taiwanese, especially the youth, are resolved not to be part of China. With time, this resolve has grown politically stronger. It leaves China with reunification by force as the default option. Everyone tells me how and when mighty China would invade and overpower tiny Taiwan. However, I have rarely been told that Taiwan could be defended to
It should have been Maestro’s night. It is hard to envision a film more Oscar-friendly than Bradley Cooper’s exploration of the life and loves of famed conductor and composer Leonard Bernstein. It was a prestige biopic, a longtime route to acting trophies and more (see Darkest Hour, Lincoln, and Milk). The film was a music biopic, a subgenre with an even richer history of award-winning films such as Ray, Walk the Line and Bohemian Rhapsody. What is more, it was the passion project of cowriter, producer, director and actor Bradley Cooper. That is the kind of multitasking -for-his-art overachievement that Oscar
Chinese villages are being built in the disputed zone between Bhutan and China. Last month, Chinese settlers, holding photographs of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), moved into their new homes on land that was not Xi’s to give. These residents are part of the Chinese government’s resettlement program, relocating Tibetan families into the territory China claims. China shares land borders with 15 countries and sea borders with eight, and is involved in many disputes. Land disputes include the ones with Bhutan (Doklam plateau), India (Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin) and Nepal (near Dolakha and Solukhumbu districts). Maritime disputes in the South China