While leading senior media representatives on a tour of Tatan islet recently, President Chen Shui-bian (
If the public believes this is a turning point for the two sides of the Strait to open up a new chapter in their relationship, it may be mistaken. In fact, although Tai-wan and China are deadlocked in a "cold peace," neither side has ever stopped making spoken assurances of goodwill.
The Chinese leaders and their Taiwan Affairs bureaucracy have also invited Taiwan's leaders to visit China on many occasions and they have expressed their desire to implement the three links as soon as possible. But the cross-strait relationship hasn't improved. The heart of the matter still lies in the "one China"
problem.
China insists that as long as talks take place under the premise that only one China exists, anything can be discussed and all conditions are negotiable. Taiwan emphasizes that as long as the very issue of "one China" isn't broached, anything can be discussed. Any official words from either side of the Strait about improving relations can therefore be considered cheap talk if they don't relate to a compromise on the "one China" problem.
In game theory analysis, such talk has no binding power or real implications because no actual follow-up action will result from it. When each side makes its statements, it has judged in ad-vance that the other side will not respond positively, thus reducing the political risk of having an insincere proposal met with acceptance.
In terms of timing, China's primary political agenda this autumn will be the Beidaihe meetings and the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. This doesn't fit in well with the schedule proposed by Taiwan. Especially given that the "one China" problem was not touched upon, exchanges between political
parties can't possibly result from Chen's offer.
Since the purpose of Chen's statement was not to seek a breakthrough in relations, the real target of his appeal must have been the domestic electorate. As the 2004 presidential election draws closer, we can predict that the government won't compromise on the "one China" problem, but statements calling for a more proactive policy to open up direct links, contacts between political parties and even visits between leaders on each side will be aired intermittently.
The responsibility for the failure of these goodwill measures will lie squarely on China's shoulders. This strategy of "an uncompromising stance with a flexible attitude" will become the keynote of Taiwan's efforts to handle cross-strait relations in the foreseeable future.
The government has the right to weigh its own policy on how to address the "one China" dispute and cross-strait relations. Taiwan does not necessarily need to submit to indignity in exchange for dialogue. Nor must we necessarily expand interaction and exchanges between the two sides of the Strait.
If the people are unsatisfied with the ruling party's policies, they can wait for the next election to make their opinions known. But the government shouldn't give people false hopes. Still more importantly, it shouldn't use cross-strait relations as political capital at election time.
The ups and downs in cross-strait relations over the past ten years appear to contain a discernible pattern. When no elections were being held, everything was tranquil, but the larger an important election loomed on the horizon, the greater the storm that arose.
The 1996 missile-test crisis and then president Lee Teng-hui's (
Emile Sheng is an assistant professor of politics at Soochow University.
Translated by Ethan Harkness
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