When we say "policy" as in "our policy toward Taiwan," it covers a variety of issues that differ in importance and origin. For example, we have a fundamentally important policy to lend support to Taiwan in defending itself and another less important policy that limits our contacts with the leadership on Taiwan, or who among them may transit through our country and how. Both are called "policies."
We find policies in written form, like the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the three communiques, the "six assurances" or the Taiwan Policy Review. We find others, not necessarily a permanent policy, nor even supported by the US Congress, in public statements by the president. Still others, more questionable in this regard, are secret statements not revealed to Congress or the public.
In the US-Taiwan relationship, we have a smorgasbord of policies that cause confusion on the one hand and permit flexibility on the other. Given the rapid changes that are taking place, both worldwide and in the region, and the uncertainty that this brings to our relations with both China and Taiwan, the advantages of flexibility over clarity are clear. But this is not an argument for inaction in adjusting to changing circumstances. When needed, changes should be made to policy, in writing, and with clear requirements for implementation. But amending the TRA, as some suggest, would be unwise. It is too fundamental to risk opening it to uncertain changes that could result.
There are three broad areas of change that need addressing. First, Taiwan's economy is internationally significant. Globalization of economies means interaction between them on a much higher scale. Taiwan's ability to engage with international organizations is critical to its survival and should be important to the organizations as well.
Second, Taiwan's security requirements have profoundly changed, but its military isolation over the years has made catching up all the more difficult. The process has begun, but the transformation to an adequate defense capability in a world of missiles and information and electronic warfare will be a major undertaking and will take much more time and resources. It will take increased efforts by the US as well if we are to meet the commitments made in the TRA.
Third, the democratization of Taiwan changes the character of the relationship with the people of Taiwan. It is now conducted with legitimately elected leaders. No small part of this change in relationship is in how it is conducted. In the past, the rules of conduct were unilaterally decided by the US based more on how the PRC perceived them than on our own interest in conducting an effective relationship with the people of Taiwan.
These three fundamental changes impact very clearly on the US-Taiwan relationship. The TRA has something to say on each one of them, especially on security matters. For many years, progress on making the needed adjustments to policy as these changes developed has been slow. More recently the pace and effort in adjusting to new realities has much improved, in particular with the security relationship.
Taiwan needs some form of participation in international organizations if its economy is to remain competitive. Given our many interests in Taiwan, including economic, it is in our interest as well that Taiwan be included in some way. We could use more energy in "assuring Taiwan's voice is heard" in international organizations, as promised in our Taiwan Policy Review. We have taken a step in publicly supporting Taiwan's entrance into the WHO, but a more robust effort could be made.
In meeting our commitments on security under the TRA, there has been considerable work already done to strengthen the capability to meet potential threats to Taiwan. The more rigorous activity by the US came as a result of a congressionally-mandated report done some years ago on the balance of forces in the Taiwan Strait. It demonstrated how useful that approach is in focusing congressional oversight and should be an annual requirement. An annual report from the State Department should be resurrected, but made a separate report.
There has also been more public respect shown by the administration to a "democratic Taiwan" -- important to demonstrate to the world our special support for fellow democracies. The guidelines on how to conduct the US-Taiwan relationship has always been an internal government matter and probably should remain so. Making adjustments to it in public would make it more difficult to change as needed, but leaving it known only to the implementers invites rules that are not always in our best interest. Though there has been some change in these guidelines, they have not kept pace with the considerable change democracy has brought to Taiwan. Experience has shown that the Congress should be kept informed, as a formal requirement, to better oversee the implementation of the TRA and our Taiwan policy in general.
In addition, the "six assur-ances" are now more openly acknowledged by senior US officials and clearly are well known in Beijing as part of our policy toward Taiwan. Making them into law would only be codifying what already exists, but would make clear these commitments could only be changed with the approval of the Congress.
In the process of exchanges between the US and Taiwan caucuses, thoughts might be passed on regarding some measures the US would like to see Taiwan pursue -- including more liberalized trade and services and programs that could highlight Tai-wan's democracy as an example to many countries.
Similarly, though Taiwan already has some aid projects and Peace Corps-type programs, more would not only benefit Taiwan, but could support the programs of other democracies around the world in their efforts to provide economic aid and promote demo-cracy. Innovative initiatives that avoid the constraints put on Taiwan's international participation is needed but should be clearly a human rights and human-itarian effort, not primarily a means of gaining political support.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The article is a summary of a paper presented at the symposium for the Taiwan Caucus in Washington. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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