Taiwan is no longer a passive element in US strategy. That, at least, seems to be the message behind the recent visit to the US by Minister of National Defense Tang Yao-ming (湯曜明). It wasn't a hush-hush affair, as Tang met high-level officials of the US defense department. And Taipei is being encouraged to speed up its defense modernization. In other words, the US is no longer squeamish about weapons sales to Taiwan.
This is in sharp contrast to the defensive posture of the administration of former US president Bill Clinton, which tried hard to mollify Beijing on the Taiwan ques-tion. In fact, it used considerable political pressure on Taipei to avoid offending China. Only dur-ing the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, during Taiwan's first presidential election, did the Clinton administration assert itself against China by sending in two warships as a deterrence against an actual Chinese invasion.
That crisis was manufactured by China to test the limits of US resolve on Taiwan. In the event, it didn't falter and Beijing scaled down its brinkmanship. But its missiles are still targeted at Tai-wan in increasing numbers. The difference between now and then is that the administration of US President George W. Bush has left no room for ambiguity about its commitment to defend Taiwan under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.
Bush has said that the US would "do whatever it takes to defend Taiwan." And the recently leaked Nuclear Posture Review would suggest Taiwan's inclusion under the US missile defense umbrella, incorporating the possible use of nuclear weapons in a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The review lists China among seven states as possible US nuclear targets. Taiwan is now part of such a contingent situation.
The question is: why has Bei-jing not reacted as wildly as it did in 1995 and 1996, following former president Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) private US visit and Taiwan's presidential election? At that time it created a dangerous military crisis. Obviously, this has much to do with the Bush administration's firm commitment. But it doesn't mean that Beijing will simply accept the new US dictum. It will bide its time for opportunities.
There is a sense in China that the future is on its side. Its size, its population, the growth of its eco-nomy, diplomatic weight and military might will all combine in due course to "tilt the balance of power in Beijing's favor." In the meantime, the US will need China's cooperation in its global anti-terrorism campaign and to help enforce nuclear non-proliferation. China simply can't be ignored. As for Taiwan, where there is scope for military con-flict, Beijing will seek to avoid it through political means.
China takes a long-term view. While Beijing would like to exercise global power and play a role on par with that of the US, it isn't willing to force the issue right now. It can wait because these things will happen in any case over a period of time. While the power and reach of the US is real and scary, Beijing seems to regard it as an impatient and impulsive giant bound to trip up sooner or later. It might be over-extending and over-reaching itself all over the place. And if China simply maintains its steady pace and treads carefully, it might emerge as the ultimate winner and the new Middle Kingdom.
But there are major qualifications to this view.
RSS