The most important of China's foreign relations is its relationship with the US. With that in mind, let us review the conduct of Presi-dent Jiang Zemin's (江澤民) anointed successor, Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), whose role in certain key foreign-policy events has inevitably been the focus of so much attention.
In the early hours of May 8, 1999, when the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was bombed, soldiers immediately gathered together to call for "the defeat of US imperialism" and university students under the coordination of the Chinese Communist Party demon-strated by attacking the US embassy in Beijing.
On May 9, Hu gave a televised speech in which he rebuked the US and urged the public not to act rashly but instead protect foreign diplomatic institutions and personnel and foreign residents in accordance with international law and standards as well as China's own law. With nationalistic sentiment riding high and the media doing its utmost to fan the flames, Hu's remarks didn't make him terribly popular. Moreover, he offended the military. It was fortunate for him that the resentment he inspired was kept in check, otherwise he would have become Jiang's sacrificial lamb.
On April 1 last year, when a collision occurred between two military aircraft belonging to the US and China, strong anti-US sentiment once again erupted at all levels of Chinese society. The fate of the 24 detained US crew members became the focus of US-China negotiations. On April 4, Jiang departed on a tour of South America leaving a scorching hot potato in Hu's hands once again. If the matter were handled well, Jiang would take the credit. If handled poorly, Hu would have trouble escaping the blame. It appeared that Jiang was still in complete control while overseas, but in fact all practical matters were handled by Hu.
China was uncompromising on the issue. As Jiang left Beijing, he openly stated that the US
government must apologize, but, although it didn't do so, the Chinese stance suddenly softened as Easter approached and the US crew members were released.
The entire outside world thought this was Jiang's doing. But Douglas Paal, the director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington, pointed out in a lecture on April 6 that the highest echelon of the Communist Party had formed a working group -- headed by Hu -- to handle the incident. Hu hoped to settle the matter before Jiang returned and thus raise his own prestige.
The Hong Kong newspaper The Sun quoted a Beijing source on April 16 as saying Hu had personally taken charge of the collision incident. On April 11, China's attitude suddenly softened and there was a rush to return the US crew members before Easter. China's release of its captives was harshly criticized by some on the Internet as "selling out the country."
Of course, in the end Jiang had to approve the release of the captives, but after returning to Beijing, he donned a Mao suit on April 20 and received the family of the pilot Wang Wei (王偉), who had been lost in the collision. Other Standing Committee members of the Politburo who attended the reception included Li Peng (李鵬), Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基) and Wei Jianxing (尉健行). Li Lanqing (李嵐清) was overseas at the time, but it is most intriguing to note that neither Hu nor Li Ruihuan (李瑞環), who usually doesn't get along well with Jiang, appeared.
Later, overseas media reported that China had established a working group under Hu's charge for the express purpose of handling US-China relations. If this is true, it clearly shows that Hu was angling for a foreign affairs position and was not alone in his maneuvers. There must be other Standing Committee members of the Politburo propping him up to reduce Jiang's authority. Since Sept. 11, Beijing has changed its attitude toward the US, reversing its anti-US rhetoric. This seems to indicate a transformation in China's foreign policy and a revival of the policy of "avoiding head-on confrontation" from the Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) era. Relations with the US have therefore warmed. Hu's profile is still very low, however, and he hasn't directly confronted Jiang for fear of trouble.
Meanwhile, Jiang took advantage of the APEC summit meeting to earn political capital for himself and Zeng Qinghong (曾慶紅). Now Jiang wants to use US President George W. Bush's trip and his own upcoming visit to the US to create an atmosphere in which the US trusts only Jiang, giving himself a reason to hold onto his position as party general-secretary or chairman of the Central Military Commission at the Communist Party's 16th National Congress.
For this purpose, he must also suppress Hu. There have been two incidents in which he has done that recently. One occurred during the events of Jan. 24 to commemorate Jiang's "Eight Points" speech. Since Hu was present (and thus implicitly endorsed the proceedings), Jiang took the opportunity to denounce Qian's (
Another occurred in December when the China Youth Daily acted on Hu's orders and reprinted an essay posted on the Internet by the author known as "Thatched Hut Hermit" (草庵居士). After two installments, its publication was discontinued following an order from Zeng. The reason was that in the name of introducing the US economy, the essay criticized China's system of economic management. The head of the Communist Party's Central Financial and Economic Leading Group (中共中央財經領導小組) is Jiang, not Zhu. Criticism of China's economy was taken as criticism of Jiang.
Hu is a member of the Politburo's Standing Committee and Zeng is merely an alternate member. Naturally, the fact that Zeng dared to offend a superior means that Jiang was supporting him.
In view of these facts, as Hu noted on his recent visit to Europe, it really is too early to predict the final line-up of leaders after the 16th National Congress. China's policy toward the US could change. The US should avoid being used by Jiang in his own internal power struggles. The US should do its best to communicate with relatively "enlightened forces" in Beijing.
Only if US-China relations develop in a stable manner can peace in the Taiwan Strait and victory in the global war on terror be ensured. Bush's recent "axis of evil" statement fell just short of mentioning that Jiang is a behind-the-scenes backer of this axis.
We will have to wait and see what influence the meetings between Bush and Jiang will have on future US-China relations.
Paul Lin is a political commentator based in New York.
Translated by Ethan Harkness
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