A fourth communique is needed

It remains very unclear just what motivated a public suggestion last week that the US consider negotiating a fourth communique with China. A very China-friendly former US president, Bill Clinton, publicly had his administration turn down the idea toward the end of his term in office. In an article written by Richard Holbrooke, former US ambassador to the UN, Holbrooke attributes the idea to the opportunity to better relations with China brought on by the new war on terrorism.

China not exactly in the forefront of this war, neither ideologically or geographically, and there have been several other reasons given by experts in subsequent articles why this is not any better an idea now than it was during the last government. I'll add a few more.

One for considering a new documentation for the US relationship with China, Holbrooke argued, includes the enormous changes that have taken place since the era when the three communiques were written. In the process of all these changes, however, the ambiguity of the present documents, rules and laws that comprise the relationship often allowed the flexibility needed to avoid crises.

When the US announced it was willing to sell F-16s to Taiwan, the communique notwithstanding, for example, it was "interpreted" to be no change in policy. It was based on an "understanding" in the negotiation of the communiques about arms that were no longer available.

Ambiguity its downside, of course and even the Taiwan Relations Act has its share of it. Whenever a threat exists to Taiwan, under the act the US executive branch must consult with Congress in deciding what to do about it. So how does the executive branch avoid the unwanted participation in the decision? Don't ever use the word "threat" in reporting to Congress, i.e. no consultation. But this is not something a fourth communique could address, as it is an internal US affair.

Another that would continue despite any future communique is what may be called the policy-statement creep. Senator John Glenn, a participant in writing the act, made a speech on the Senate floor in July of 1982 when the communique was about to be revealed, charging the State Department with deceit.

Since 1972, he said, the department claimed continuously there had been no change in our China policy. In 1972, he went on, the US declared that it acknowledged that the Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintained there was but one China and that Taiwan was a part of China. While we would not challenge that statement, we would remain neutral on the subject.

In the 1979 communique, however, the US acknowledged "the Chinese position that there is but one China" moving the US closer to the Chinese interpretation. He then went on to complain that the administration was moving even closer to the Chinese position in the then forthcoming third communique.

This same phenomenon occurred as Clinton moved from the 1996 missile crisis to the "three nos," and then after strong domestic complaints, seemed to move in another direction by declaring the "three pillars" of US China policy and then to the "assent of the people of Taiwan" requirement. The three pillars: one-China policy, dialogue and peaceful resolution, were in fact simply the US' one-China policy since 1972, now divided into three parts.

Another of US China policy that a fourth communique would be unlikely to change is the wide scope of our disagreements. I recall having to take Maureen Reagan to make a courtesy call on then vice premier Li Peng (李鵬). Before doing so, I called the late Gaston Sigur, who was then assistant secretary of state, as her briefing paper was much too brief.

After some thought, Gaston said that given the short time we had, his best advice was to tell Reagan that she could talk about anything she wanted to, but to warn her not to talk about any subject too deeply. Scratch below the surface of any issue, he said, and you will find controversy. That advice would not be too far off even today.

Would fourth communique continue to avoid stating the US position on Taiwan's sovereignty, which is that the sovereignty issue is still to be determined? Since China will not accept that, it seems that position is simply not mentioned. Will a "one China" be defined? It now has a different meaning to different people. Will it state the difference between a one-China "principle" (China) and a one-China "policy" (the US)? Not likely. So would yet another communique provide clarity or would it simply continue ambiguity? If the latter is the likely result, who needs it?

Then is an interesting pattern that becomes apparent in considering why the subject is being brought up now. The 1972 communique came while Vietnam was still very much a distraction for Congress and the American public. The 1979 communique came while the difficult issue of the Panama Canal Treaty had drawn Congressional attention. The 1982 communique was negotiated when the first sign of a crack in the Iron Curtain was drawing everyone's attention. Is the war on terrorism now seen as a similar useful distraction?

Perhaps most pertinent question is would a fourth communique even matter? When it is felt necessary, nations have always decided on what needs to be done and then provided a public reason for doing so, with or without having some document that seems to say otherwise.

On the other hand, if the purpose of another communique is just to make China happy, which usually comes at the US' expense, let's forget it. A new communique that seems to bolster a country that has different objectives than America can only diminish the US' ability to be a leader in safeguarding democracy and stability in the region.

Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed here are his own.