A few things about the `open political market'
Not a resurrection of trust territories or the unequal treaties of the 19th century, but a principled -- equality and reciprocity --
approach to good governance. It is a political BOT (build-operate-transfer) project, which turns a commercial concept into a political undertaking.
PHOTO: GEORGE TSORNG, TAIPEI TIMES
In an open political market, people can pursue the development of their country with the help of foreign governments.
There are three different levels of opening as regards a political market:
First, foreign passport holders can participate in Taiwan's political affairs like the nation's citizens;
Second, foreign political parties can participate in Taiwan's political process;
Thirdly, the most sophisticated form of opening involves transferring and entrusting the governance of Taiwan to a competent foreign government.
Through referenda and signing treaties with foreign governments, the part or all of Taiwan's executive power could be entrusted to a foreign government, but the people of would Taiwan retain legislative power.
The point of opening the political market is to pursue the greatest happiness and well-being of people.
In an open political market, people will not have to leave their country to seek a better life due to the incompetence of their own government. Instead, people can ask their government to make way for a more competent government, no matter where that government is from.
Instead of people moving to places with good government, an open political proposes moving good government to where the disenchanted and disenfranchised live.
To open the political market, however, does not mean the surrender of sovereignty.
People can still preserve their own national identity. In an open political market, multiple and overlapping identities help facilitate the genuine opening of cultural markets and create a basis on which human civilizations can truly interact and engage with with one another, which will be conducive to world peace.
Taipei Times: Can you briefly explain how you came up with the idea of "opening the political market?"
Chang Ya-chung (張亞中): In traditional political thinking, people, government and state are all considered parts of a single whole. This type of political thinking is closed by nature.
At the beginning of the 20th century, people strove for the right to self-determination. Self-determination means people would rather live in a hell of their own creation than live in another's heaven. This became a trend and now there are over 180 states around the world.
However, at the end of the last century, many people would rather to live in another's heaven than to live in their own hell. That is why we have seen migration on such a massive scale.
A very important question thus needs to be asked: Do we just want our own government, or do we want a good government?
We often say during elections that we must choose the lesser of two evils. But why can't we have other options? The answer is because our political market is closed.
There are two main themes of discourse subsumed in the "open political market" thesis. First, closed political thinking cannot achieve genuine freedom and peace for mankind. What Karl Popper implied by "the open society" in his book The Open Society and Its Enemies is actually a democratic society, which should be open.
At the end of the 20th century, the idea of "the open society" prevailed in the developed world. But open societies have boundaries. That is, an open society is only open within its own geographic boundaries. Within that society, people abide by democratic rules. Yet beyond those boundaries, people often still resort to war and violent confrontation.
The other key theme of the last century was the opening economic markets. The outlines of this theme can be traced from the establishment of the GATT in 1947 to the WTO in 1995 and that organization's rapid expansion.
But I think the opening of societies and economic markets isn't enough because the state still plays a very important role. Clashes over national interests make confrontation between states inevitable. We should note, however, that national identities, and all other identities, for that matter, are merely facades.
TT: You argue in two of your previous books, On sovereignty between mainland China and Taiwan (兩岸主權論) and On Integration across the Taiwan Strait (兩岸統合論), that current cross-strait relations should be defined as "One China, Two Chinese Countries" (一中兩國), which posits that the sides integrate their social and economic relations closely, yet maintain separate political identities, and seek a settlement of the cross-strait dispute on that basis.
In your upcoming book Open the political market: Entrusting Taiwan to the world (開放政治市場: 全球治理台灣) you now argue that by opening its political market, Taiwan would be able to set aside the unification-independence dispute. What is the logic behind this change in your thinking?
Chang: Those two books are policy-oriented and targeted at resolving Taiwan's predicament vis-a-vis China. The solutions proposed in my previous works are pragmatic and could be expected to work if adopted.
But the thesis of my latest book -- "opening of the political market" -- is an intellectual exercise, which is written not just with Taiwan in mind but the world as a whole.
Why do we have to choose among a handful of political parties when we want a better government? Why do people need to leave their country when their government fails to perform its function? If I can get a better life in a foreign country, then why can't I have that government as my government where I live right now?
I hope this idea will become a mainstream political theme in the 21st century and fundamentally change the modus operandi of social movements.
For Taiwan, my ideas of "One China, Two Chinese Countries" and "On Integration across the Taiwan Strait" have been borrowed by politicians. But they just talk about the parts that serve their interests without adopting an overall interpretation of the essence of the solutions proposed.
These two solutions require the government to carry them out. However, the idea conveyed in my latest book -- "opening the political market" -- to a certain degree implies my lack of confidence in our government and politicians.
With this revolutionary idea, my aim is to address political problems from the peoples' perspective, not from the government's. I wish to use my own power and resources to initiate a social movement because this idea addresses public opinion directly.
If we really want to solve the cross-strait problem and turn Taiwan into a world-class country, then I think "opening the political market," in a sense, could definitely help achieve this.
TT: When talking about opening Taiwan's political market to foreign governance, one cannot help but think of China's response. China has unambiguously listed "foreign intervention" in Taiwan as one of the circumstances under which it would use force against Taiwan. How do you think they would respond if Taiwan opened its political market?
Chang: To me, this question implies that if one country does not have the "China problem," then it can adopt this idea.
So, the China problem does not nullify my idea because even if it can't be accepted in Taiwan, it could be accepted in another country.
For example, the people of Quebec could choose to be governed by the French government without becoming independent from Canada.
If you think of the government as one large anomalous public servant, why not hand the job to whoever is the most competent to do the job right?
This idea is different from transforming the existing state into a foreign colony or trust territory.
First, opening the political market does not mean the abandonment of the state, though the notion of state itself can also be challenged as demonstrated in the globalization debates currently raging. The existence of the state in the 21st century is still valuable in its own right.
The key is not to destroy people's identity but to demonstrate the possibility of constructing multiple, overlapping identities. So, a national identity does not need to be challenged. I am still the citizen of this state, though I entrust administrative perrogative to a foreign government.
Second, we can think about whether Taiwan's opening of its political market is in the interests of China.
If China is really a nationalistic state as people tend to believe, then why didn't it retrieve Hong Kong in 1949? They repeatedly said they it didn't recognize the unequal treaty that created the colony.
But it waited until 1997 because in 1949 it believed that the status of Hong Kong, serving as a window to the West, was a benefit to the nation's development.
If Taiwan indeed opens its political market to foreign governance, then the independence of Taiwan would no longer be a matter of concern since all the major countries have diplomatic relations with China, and they acknowledge or recognize the so-called "one China principle." And, imagine the multilingual talents Taiwan could cultivate under such a system. This would be in the interest of China's future development.
The legitimacy of states was established and consolidated over the last 400 years or so, and reached its nexus in 1945. International law as we know it was developed during the course of the consolidation of the nation-state system. Hence the principle of non-interference in sovereign states' domestic affairs.
The principle of non-interference has been used as a pretext by oppressive governments to shun foreign intervention. Now, many people in the Third World live miserably under oppressive and corrupt governments precisely because their political markets are closed.
TT: Is "the opening of political market" inspired in any way by the so-called "51 Club," which calls for Taiwan's annexation by and integration into the US as the 51st state?
Chang: They are completely different. The 51 Club-type of idea involves the surrender of sovereignty and a change of national identity. The US will not accept this because of China. But this type of idea reflects people's lack of confidence in their own government.
Actually my idea draws inspiration from feminism. Politicians talk about "security" and "interests." But from a post-modern perspective, whose "security" and "interests" are we talking about?
TT: To follow the Quebec example, how could the people of Quebec be ruled by the French government? How could your idea be practically applied?
Chang: The model that I propose in my book is open for discussion. But as a new political thought, it is intended to stir enlightening debate.
In the 20th century, the government and the state were inseparable, but the significance of my political thought is that government can be separated from the state. As for how a government could be separated from the state and how a government would function after the separation is open for discussion.
TT: Your thinking has perhaps more relevance to what is currently happening in Argentina?
Chang: Exactly. Ecuador, for example, has adopted the US dollar as its currency. Some other Latin American countries, Argentina included, are considering following suit. Currency is one important symbol of a state's sovereignty.
Why would these countries want to give up their own currency and opt for the US dollar? Because they believe in the stability of the US dollar. Because they believe in the competence of the US government.
The chaos in Argentina is just another painful example of how millions suffer under incompetent and corrupt governments.
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