Baltics eye joining NATO

By Mart Laar

Sunday, Nov 18, 2001, Page 9

ILLUSTRATION: MOUNTAIN PEOPLE

The meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President George W. Bush in Texas demonstrates that relations between those two great powers are on a new track. But the issue of NATO expansion still needs to be addressed.

Small nations like Estonia have never been able to treat defense as a secondary concern. Throughout the ages they have sought suitable niches in the international order in order to survive. Going it alone invariably caused disaster. Estonia's priority today is to secure its sovereignty via an alliance with like-minded nations.

Throughout the 20th century Estonia tried to achieve a similar goal but, alas, with practically no beneficial results. Our attempt to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union before World War II was a costly mistake that resulted in decades of occupation, many thousands of lost and wasted lives, and retarded economic development.

Ten years ago we secured a fresh chance to restore independence. Estonia did not need to ponder long about the options it faced. A sense of belonging to Europe, to Western civilization, always dominated the Estonian mind. So the priorities of our foreign policy -- membership in the EU and NATO -- are natural choices.

Indeed, EU and NATO membership are complementary, not contradictory, goals. In the words of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, the EU and NATO are "two halves of the same walnut." Our lack of membership in these organizations resulted from the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (the Hitler-Stalin Pact) of 1939 and because of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic nations. It was never the free choice of the Estonian people. Had history taken a different turn, we might have been among the first members of both structures.

Yet our desire to join NATO raises eyebrows. Why do the Baltic nations seek membership in the Atlantic alliance? The reason is the same as why no NATO member has ever opted to leave: NATO is the bedrock of their security.

Although all the Baltic states are now integrated into the international community, our security still raises concern. So we seek enhanced regional security and stability and see NATO as the most effective means to deliver these. Moreover, NATO has an economic dimension beyond its security role. NATO membership would improve our "risk rating" among investors, which is what happened in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic when they joined the alliance.

Despite these benefits, some claim that NATO enlargement into the Baltic would draw new lines of division in Europe. But this implies that the old divisions should stay in place. Moreover, no line is being drawn. NATO membership is the free choice of aspiring members to seek, and of current members to accept. Others may aspire; others may join.

Still, skeptics say that NATO membership is unnecessary, that future membership in the EU should suffice. Of course, EU membership may provide a degree of security because any security challenge that confronts the EU will engage NATO. The EU, however, is not for collective defense. Aligning the two memberships as closely as possible will enhance clarity and security. An option suggested as a substitute for NATO membership is for the Baltic countries to become neutrals, like Finland and Sweden. But in today's Europe, traditional neutrality does not exist. What precisely are we to be neutral about? Forced neutrality risks turning the Baltics into a cordon sanitaire, a potentially disputed territory, or a mere zone of influence in which the Baltic nations are incorporated against their will.

If neutrality and EU membership are not viable security options, some say that we should seek guarantees that fall short of NATO membership. Superficially, this sounds fine and may even offer a free ride in terms of security. Such guarantees, however, would turn the Baltic nations from the subjects of international relations into the objects of these relations.

As an historian I know the inherent risks of this option. In the last century Estonians believed in security guarantees and the Finns did not. Finland lost a bloody war with the Soviet Union, but retained independence. We chose peace but lost our sovereignty. Comparing the human losses of Finland and Estonia throughout the 20th century, it is clear that trying to avoid conflict and accepting paper guarantees imposed greater losses in percentage terms on us than on Finland.

This is why our belief in collective security is acute; it is why we understand the need to be not only "consumers" of security but providers as well. For years, Estonia has participated in peacekeeping operations and although our contribution is small in numbers, in percentage-terms it is bigger than that of most countries. So we are part of "security providing" in Europe even before we are part of "security consumption."

Even if the question of "whether" the Baltics should be part of NATO is answered in the affirmative, there remains the question as to "when" this should happen. NATO's summit in Prague next February will be a defining moment. Some may argue that so controversial an issue should be stripped from NATO's agenda in these uncertain times. That may seem pragmatic. But that would be like postponing a visit to the dentist. The problems will only worsen. Membership in an alliance is the most important of a nation's sovereign decisions. It cannot be subject to a third party veto or geopolitical factors. To deny a country the freedom to choose its alliances on the basis of geography and history creates a security vacuum. In Europe this means a zone of instability.

NATO expansion into the Baltics will require resolve and political will by the alliance's members. On our side it will mean doing our homework so as to be prepared for membership. As part of the alliance, the Baltic nations will provide living proof that NATO is not about war and aggression, but about peace, democracy and stability.

Mart Larr is Prime Minister of Estonia.

?Copyright: Project Syndicate