North Korea prepared to go halfway in struggle against terror

By Ronald Meinardus

Saturday, Nov 10, 2001, Page 9

`There are indications of a hardening of US foreign policy, and one may presume this will also influence Washington's future dealings with North Korea.'

The message conveyed in the newspaper interview was crystal-clear: "The North Koreans are missing an opportunity to play a responsible role by not joining us," said the US Ambassador to South Korea, Thomas Hubbard. "We'd like to see North Korea join in concrete, international actions to stamp out terrorism."

So far, the North Koreans are not as forthcoming in the campaign against terrorism as Washington would like. While Pyongyang has expressed in clear terms its rejection of terrorism after the Sept. 11 outrage, and repeated its position more than once, it has also left no doubt that it opposes the strikes against Afghanistan: "Extending the military action to other countries allegedly to eradicate the root cause of terrorism is contrary to the purpose of the anti-terrorist struggle and it may cause grave consequences," a commentary in the newspaper Rodong Shinmun said.

What is the US expecting from North Korea? An answer was given by Jack Prichard, Washington's special envoy, who asked Pyongyang to share intelligence regarding terrorist networks. This is in line with what the US is asking from other "rogue" states, such as Libya, the Sudan or Syria, who seem to be more cooperative than North Korea.

According to media reports, a senior official of the Central Intelligence Agency has recently visited Damascus for meetings with Syrian intelligence officers. These encounters signal a significant shift in relations between the estranged countries. Considering the state of US-North Korean affairs, such exchanges between Washington and Pyongyang would be tantamount to a diplomatic revolution.

It would be inaccurate to assume the North Korean regime has not reacted at all. A few days ago, Pyongyang announced it would soon ratify an international treaty aimed at blocking the flow of money to terrorist organizations.

Notably, this declaration of intent was publicized during the visit of a high-ranking delegation of the EU to North Korea. "It seems to indicate that they are very keenly aware of the importance and the need to be responsive" regarding the global campaign against terrorism, a senior European diplomat commented.

Over the weekend, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman backed up the announcement, adding that the regime would sign a further UN treaty, an international convention against the taking of hostages.

Should this rhetoric be followed by action, Pyongyang would meet an important requirement put forth by Washington for removal from the list of states sponsoring terrorism.

One further condition is the deportation of four Japanese Red Army members, who have found refuge in the North after hijacking an airplane to Pyongyang in 1970. This, more than verbal declarations, may well be called the acid test of Pyongyang's position in the campaign against terrorism.

It is no coincidence that Pyongyang chose the EU delegation's visit to make public the decision to ratify the "International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism," sidelining the US and the South Koreans. Less than a month ago, Seoul proposed to Pyongyang a joint Korean declaration against terrorism, only to be told by the North Koreans that this issue has nothing to do with inter-Korean affairs.

As far as we are aware, there has been no North Korean reaction yet to Washington's overture regarding cooperation in the anti-terror-campaign.

In a sense, therefore, Europe's diplomatic interaction with Pyongyang has produced the only tangible result in mobilizing North Korean support for the international campaign.

The Europeans are well aware of the limitations of this achievement. Following 10 hours of meetings with officials and ministers in Pyongyang, the head of the EU-Delegation declared: "We said [to the North Koreans] this statement was helpful but that we needed deeds."

While promoting relations with the EU has become a cornerstone of Pyongyang's foreign policy, coming to terms with the US remains the undisputed priority.

Clearly, the international order taking shape following Sept. 11 complicates this endeavor. In the effort to build a powerful international coalition against terrorism, Washington has rearranged its entire foreign policy. Issues that were high priority have been degraded, and have become less urgent. North Korea is one of these issues, as the peninsula has moved out of the center of Washington's political and military preoccupation.

Furthermore, there are indications of a hardening of US foreign policy, and one may presume this will also influence Washington's future dealings with North Korea. A recent sequence of official US statements on North Korea confirms this assumption. Not surprisingly, the audience in Pyongyang -- at which the statements were directed -- was not delighted.

Speaking to Asian journalists on the eve of the APEC-summit, US President George W. Bush warned Pyongyang it should not take advantage of the US preoccupation with Afghanistan to threaten the South: "North Korea should not in any way, shape or form think that because we happen to be engaged in Afghanistan we will not be prepared and ready to fulfil our end of the agreement with the South Korean government," the president said.

This undisguised warning was followed up by the US Ambassador to Seoul, who in unambiguous terms raised the issue of North Korean conventional weapons. "The reduction of North Korea's military threat is not only a concern for South Korea. It is also a concern for the US," the diplomat said.

For the North Koreans, this is like a red rag to a bull. They have always categorically rejected discussing their conventional arms with the US.

It did not take long, and North Korea's guided media lashed out at the US with polemic reminiscent of the coldest days of the Cold War. Attacking what it called Washington's "vicious hostile policy,"

Pyongyang denounced the intention to include conventional weapons in future bilateral talks as "a brigandish demand intended to unilaterally disarm" the country.

Those dealing with North Korea have long become accustomed to such aggressive language, as it is just as much a trademark of the regime's diplomacy as its unpredictability.

Even seasoned North Korea-watchers are at a loss when asked to read the minds of the Pyongyang leadership. Given the international setting, my guess would be that it may take a long time -- probably months, not weeks -- before Washington and Pyongyang find a formula for a fresh beginning for their negotiations.

Seen from Seoul, this is a distressing perspective. Stalemates in US-North Korean relations tend to have adverse effects on inter-Korean affairs, in spite of repeated North Korean rhetoric that it is up to the Koreans alone to find solutions to their national problems.

Therefore, not much should be expected regarding the immediate future of North-South-relations. With Pyongyang returning to the old practice of playing cat and mouse with the South, this time using the technical issue of the venue of future inter-Korean meetings as an object of political blackmail, the optimism generated during the Cabinet-level talks of last month has quickly evaporated.

Explains one South Korean commentator: "Kim Jong-il takes out his frustration with the Bush Administration on Seoul." Meanwhile, President Kim Dae-jung has made it clear he does not intend to change his tactics in the final months of his term.

"We often face pains and impasses in dealing with North Korea, but there can be no alternative to the Sunshine policy. I am sure we will succeed if we continue with patience."

According to recent opinion polls, the South Korean public is increasingly losing patience. Probably just as distressing for the president as the mounting opposition at home is Pyongyang's posture: Kim Jong-il is not showing the slightest indication that he wishes Seoul's Sunshine policy to produce tangible results.

Ronald Meinardus is the resident representative of the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation in Seoul and a commentator on Korean affairs.