China has expressed public support of the US in its ongoing "war" on transnational terrorism. However, it is clearly worried about the long-term implications for its strategic interests in Central Asia.
Beijing is keenly watching the presence of American forces in Uzbekistan. When Russian President Vladimir Putin gave his green signal to US President George W. Bush for the use of Uzbek or even the Tajik territory, his country was expecting a variety of payoffs from the US. Most significantly, the Kremlin wanted Washington's acquiescence as it is poised to brutally crush the Chechen separatists in the name of fighting its own war against terrorism.
China will also benefit, especially if the US is successful in uprooting the al-Qaeda terrorist network that is also allegedly linked with the Uighur separatist movement in Xinjiang (
President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan named his own price by seeking (and presumably receiving) security guarantees from the Bush Administration against a potential attack by the Taliban forces for allowing the US the use of his territory for military operations against Afghanistan.
Therein lies the rub from the Chinese perspective. What secret guarantees has the US proffered Uzbekistan? Do those guarantees include a long-term, if not permanent, US military presence in that country? What if Uzbekistan signs a long-range defense agreement, whereby the US agrees to sell it offensive weapons? How would such a development alter the power balance in Central Asia; and how would it affect China's own aspirations to negotiate military partnership with Uzbekistan or other Central Asian republics?
Chinese President Jiang Zemin (江澤民) looked for answers to these questions when he met Bush in Shanghai during the Oct. 20 to Oct. 21 APEC meeting. But, according to background reports of their meeting, he did not get much in the form of response to his concerns.
Russian and Chinese stakes related to America's military actions in Afghanistan are vastly different. Prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the US, Russia's war with Chechnya was going badly. Events of that day opened a wide window of opportunity for its all-out offensive against the Chechens, especially if Washington was to remain uncritical of it.
China, on the contrary -- given its own continuing heavy-handed suppression of the Uighur separatists -- does not envision high payoffs stemming from the US force presence in its neighborhood. Besides, China cannot ignore the fact that the real motive of America's air strikes on Afghanistan is that it wants to re-establish its dominance (China prefers the word "hegemony") in the Muslim countries, where Islamic forces threaten the very stability of a number of regimes. By attempting to uproot the al-Qaeda terrorist organization in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration hopes to at least seriously weaken China's influence in the Persian Gulf region.
Even though Central Asia is not the chief focus of America's military actions for now, the presence of its forces in Uzbekistan is also aimed at signaling to Islamic groups of that area that their days of activism are numbered. Whether such a signal is even worth the effort of the lone superpower -- since it will be lost on the Islamic forces in Central Asia, for their activism thrives on the unimpeded ineptness of the tyrannical regimes of Central Asian republics to improve the quality of life for their own people -- is not of great interest to China.
Beijing's chief concern is that a potential long-term American presence will negatively influence its fledgling sphere of influence in Central Asia. Besides, the strategic tensions that were continuing between China and the US before the Sept. 11 tragedies will not only re-emerge, but also resurge, once America's preoccupation with terrorism dissipates.
Then, policies of both these great powers will, once again, be driven by the fact that China is a rising power and the US still views it as a challenge to its own dominance in the Asia Pacific region and elsewhere. According to Washington-based China-watchers, the US-China tensions relating to the latter's continuing supply of missile technology to Iran and Pakistan are still alive.
In the meantime, Central and South Asia remain areas of high interest to China, especially since it has already invested billions of dollars there and is worried about the long-term implications of continuing military hostilities in those regions to its economic interests.
Leaders in Beijing have been overly sensitive about the crucial linkages between the economic interests of their country and its ability to dominate its immediate neighborhood. At least in the near future, China, like Russia, will show its willingness to cooperate with the US in its fight against international terrorism.
However, once (or if) the US starts to use its presence in Uzbek territory as a launching pad to establish dominance in Central Asia, then this facade of cooperation and goodwill will dissipate, and the pursuit of diverging national interests will again start to drive China and the US away from each other.
Ehsan Ahrari is a US-based strategic analyst.
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