On Oct. 16, the Legislative Yuan's Home and Nations Committee (內政及民族委員會) reviewed and passed the Offshore Islands Development Law (離島建設條例). Now it has to be scrutinized by the legislature itself. Some of the draft amendments that aim to expand the range of people who are allowed to travel between the two sides also passed their initial reading. These amendments all reside under the small three links and the Gambling Law (博弈條款).
The Offshore Islands Development Law is still only in the initial reading stage and this legislative session coincides with the legislative election. It is therefore not at all certain whether the bill will pass smoothly when the elections are over.
After the Fifth Legislative Yuan begins its tenure next year, the resulting redistribution of seats is also a factor that could affect the development of this issue. The Legislative Yuan's response to the bill is even more noteworthy -- and so is the effect it could have on the workings of the constitutional system following the elections.
The Executive Yuan's response to the bill has been to oppose and regret it. In the future there will be negotiations between the caucuses of the Legislative Yuan in an effort to salvage the situation. The ruling party's approach to policy issues can only be to show "hope" and not to "direct," which used to be an unheard of phenomenon. In the current political situation, however, beginning with the 84-working-hours-per-fortnight bill in May last year, this situation has not only become the norm, but at every turn the ruling party has simplified the problem by blaming the opposition for obstruction and for bullying A-bian (阿扁). Is it really true that there are no other reasons whatsoever? We would do better to look at the problem from the constitutional basis on which President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) won the election.
In my evaluation I will put aside the academic dispute over whether Taiwan tends toward a presidential system or a semi-presidential Cabinet system. The Legislative Yuan is restricted by the Constitution and other related legislation to the point where it is not allowed to propose increases in expenditure in response to the Executive Yuan's budget proposal. The constitutional role of the Legislative Yuan may therefore not be as big, as for example, the British parliament's which, apart from not being able to allow men to become women and women to become men, is allowed anything else. Special conditions have to exist, however, if the Legislative Yuan is to become a rubber stamp for the suggestions and policies of the president and the Executive Yuan. This can only happen if the president is able to lead the multiparty (alliance) in the legislature.
According to rules clearly laid out in the Constitution, the president does not need the approval of the legislature when appointing the premier (the head of the Executive Yuan), strengthening the president's power to direct any personnel appointments in the Executive Yuan. Regarding the development of the Executive Yuan's policy-making powers, however, any draft law that needs to pass through legal or budgetary implementation proceedings must be supported by the legislature -- unless it is a direct executive order, such as the drafting of standards for investigating corruption. But what if the legislature does not agree, especially with a president from a minority party that doesn't understand powersharing and who insists on keeping the majority parties in opposition?
On what grounds does the president demand the full cooperation of the opposition alliance, pray tell? If the opposition alliance wholly cooperates with the president, then the basic spirit of the separation and balancing of powers inherent in the democratic constitution is nullified and the goal of protecting the interests of the people also becomes empty talk.
On the contrary, legislators are under pressure to respond to the expectations of the electorate. Given the premise that the Constitution does not prohibit a majority of legislators from taking the legislative initiative, such a majority can require of the Executive Yuan to implement its policies according to the law. If the Executive Yuan agrees, then there will be no disputes. If, however, the Executive Yuan cannot -- or does not want to -- accept this, does the Constitution endow the president or the Executive Yuan with any power mechanisms to oppose this situation? The answer is no.
Following the constitutional amendments in 1997, Article 3 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China states: "Should more than half of the total number of Legislative Yuan members uphold the original bill, the president of the Executive Yuan shall immediately accept the said bill."
When the president does not obtain the support of a majority of the Legislative Yuan and wants to use the Executive Yuan to oppose the result of the Legislative Yuan's majority decision, he will not be able to do so. If the president at this moment still does not want to give up his powers, it will be more or less impossible to avoid an unstable political situation. Even if opposition political parties consider the effect their party's reputation will have on votes and therefore refrain from mutually destructive dirty tricks, what should the answer be to the following question: which really is the ruling party?
If Chen can accept the importance of the Legislative Yuan in the constitutional system -- and if he can reach a true understanding of the people's longing for political stability and is willing to act on this longing -- we will be able to hope that the DPP wins a majority of seats in the legislative elections. Then we can start to hope that the legislature will, after the elections, be able to successfully organize and support a majority alliance centered around Chen.
Suei Duh-ching is an associate professor at the Sun Yat-sen Graduate Institute of Social Science and Humanities, National Chengchi University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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