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North Korean gestures insufficient

`Pyongyang's action not only demonstrates its tendency for brinkmanship politics, but also its inability to recognize when the brink has been reached.'

North Korea's surprise offer to resume high-level dialogue with the South, announced via a

Sept. 2 Radio Pyongyang broadcast, is subject to many interpretations -- here's mine.

It is no coincidence that the North Korean offer -- attributed to Im Dong-ok of the North's Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland and directed to the South's beleaguered Unification Minister Lim Dong-won -- came on the eve of Chinese President Jiang Zemin's (江澤民) first visit to Pyongyang and, more importantly, the night before Lim faced a no-confidence vote in the South Korean legislature. (Lim, a chief architect of the South's "sunshine" policy, was the behind-the-scenes negotiator of South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's historic visit to Pyongyang last year.)

On the one hand, Pyongyang's announcement sets the stage for Jiang's visit, since the Chinese leader has been outspoken in his support for the South's policy of engagement with the North. The Chinese Foreign Ministry had indicated that Jiang would call for a resumption of North-South dialogue during his visit.

Had Kim Jong-il really wanted to enhance his Chinese colleague's international credentials, however, the announcement would have come during and right after the Jiang visit. Doing it in advance makes it seem more like a North Korean decision rather than a kowtow; it demonstrates that Kim Jong-il remains his own man.

However, the most likely reason for the timing reflects a (belated) recognition by Kim Jong-il on just how fragile the South's "sunshine" policy has become. Kim Dae-jung has been under increasing domestic criticism for his seemingly one-way relationship with the North. This was underscored when the ruling Millennium Democratic Party's coalition partner, the United Liberal Democrats, announced that it would join with opposition forces and support the no-confidence vote against Lim, which all saw as a no-confidence vote against the "sunshine" policy as well.

Pyongyang's action not only demonstrates its tendency for brinkmanship politics, but also its inability to recognize when the brink has been reached. Had the offer to resume talks been made a week or two ago, it would have likely deflated the no-confidence effort. By waiting until the night before, Pyongyang's action was seen as a crass attempt to influence South Korean domestic politics and thus proved counterproductive -- the no-confidence vote was approved by a 149-118 vote.

While the vote is non-binding and Pyongyang's willingness to resume talks, if seen to fruition, will help justify Kim Dae-jung's expected continued (and in my view, well-deserved) support for the visionary Lim, it nonetheless sends a strong message to Kim Jong-il (and to North Korea) that "enough is enough." If the North is not prepared to be more forthcoming, in deeds as well as in words, then future supportive gestures (and handouts) from Seoul appear increasingly unlikely.

The resumption of high-level dialogue, unilaterally suspended by Pyongyang in March, is certainly welcome. The offer should be accepted by Seoul and praised by Washington. But it is hardly sufficient.

More important will be a recognition by Pyongyang that Seoul is the appropriate interlocutor when it comes to discussing peace on the Peninsula -- the North continues to insist that such talks can only be held with Washington, even as it continues to refuse Secretary of State Powell's offer to resume US-North Korean negotiation "any time and anywhere, without preconditions."

The real test of North Korea's sincerity will be Kim Jong-il's willingness to set a date for his promised visit to the South and his willingness to sign a North-South Declaration of Peace (not to be confused with a still to be negotiated formal Peace Treaty) during his visit. Kim Dae-jung should specifically address this expectation, not as a precondition to the resumption of other dialogue, but as the only real litmus test of Kim Jong-il's sincerity ... and both Washington and Beijing should echo this call.

Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research insti-tute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
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