From the Pakistani perspec-tive, nuclear deterrence is viewed as a guarantee against a potential Indian aggression aimed at dismantling it. For Islamabad, this proposition is bereft of paranoia. After all, argue Pakistani strategists, India was largely responsible for dismantling its eastern wing in 1971.
In the final analysis, the supposed irrelevance of nuclear deterrence strategy that Bush advocates may only be true for the US, for its power potentials -- conventional as well as nuc-lear -- are awesome indeed. No other nuclear power, but especially those of Southern Asia, either concurs with it, or is going to take measures to decelerate the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence.
Perhaps a better option for the sole superpower is to retake its moral lead in nuclear nonproliferation by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, articulating an advocacy for the urgent conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, insisting that both India and Pakistan join these arrangements and, most important, reexamining the relevance of the NMD and TMD to the overall prospects of eventual global nuclear disarmament. China would respond positively if meaningful steps were taken on the last point.
Ehsan Ahrari is professor of national security and strategy at the Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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