President George W. Bush's labeling of the concept of nuclear deterrence as a tired and stale strategy, and a relic of the Cold War era has initiated a new debate in the US on the relevance of nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War years. Since American strategic thinkers -- such as Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schil-ling, Kenneth Boulding, Herman Kahn and the father of this theory, Bernard Brodie -- played such a pioneering and pivotal role in the evolution of nuclear strategic theory, which, in turn, largely guided the US' nuclear buildup throughout the Cold War years, students of this strategy all over the world are closely following the debate.
It is not likely, however, that nations of Southern Asia will be in a hurry to accept the highly contentious proposition of the Bush administration regarding the staleness or irrelevance of nuclear deterrence. Neither, for that matter, would Israel, whose possession of a nuclear arsenal is one the worst kept secrets anywhere.
While Bush's downgrading of deterrence strategy remains highly questionable among the declared nuclear powers, a recently declassified paper of the US Strategic Command amplifies for them the hollowness of the administration's position on this issue. A very important point in this paper states that the best way to deter the post-Cold War aggressors from using nuclear weapons is by the US having "a capability to create a fear of national extinction ... without having to inflict massive civilian casualties." That fear, the paper states, should be "extinction of either the adversary's leaders themselves or their national independence, or both." It goes on to note that this "essential sense of fear is the working force of deterrence."
For all nuclear powers, this last statement is not only very crucial, but it is also a rationale for continuing the modernization of their respective nuclear forces. Applying this reality to Southern Asia, one can understand why the nuclear race is not likely to decelerate any time soon.
Since the initiation of the Bush presidency, China has perceived no reason to let up on its own nuclear research, development and force modernization. Viewed from Beijing, the US is not only bent upon developing national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD) op-tions, but it is also likely to in-clude Taiwan in the latter proposed system, along with Japan and South Korea. Even without the potential inclusion of Taiwan, the TMD appears ominous to China, for it is perceived as a major step in the seeming resurgence of militarism in Japan. The possible inclusion of Taiwan in the proposed TMD system, from the Chinese point of view, will push reunification with that island into the distant future.
Such a scenario is highly un-acceptable to the PRC. On top of it, Bush has threatened to take "whatever action is necessary," if China invades Taiwan.
Moving on to the subcontinent, the nuclear arms race there is also alive and well. Viewed from New Delhi, China's force buildup, if not ominous, is certainly seen as a good reason for continuing India's nuclear modernization. Moreover, India has also to worry about the continuing Pakistani nuclear program. Pakistan is a country that has categorically rejected India's offer of "no first use" of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has also kept alive the potential military solution -- albeit unrealistically, given India's tremendous advantage in conventional forces -- of the Kashmir dispute, and has intensified the religious aspect of this conflict, to keep India off balance.
From the Pakistani perspec-tive, nuclear deterrence is viewed as a guarantee against a potential Indian aggression aimed at dismantling it. For Islamabad, this proposition is bereft of paranoia. After all, argue Pakistani strategists, India was largely responsible for dismantling its eastern wing in 1971.
In the final analysis, the supposed irrelevance of nuclear deterrence strategy that Bush advocates may only be true for the US, for its power potentials -- conventional as well as nuc-lear -- are awesome indeed. No other nuclear power, but especially those of Southern Asia, either concurs with it, or is going to take measures to decelerate the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence.
Perhaps a better option for the sole superpower is to retake its moral lead in nuclear nonproliferation by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, articulating an advocacy for the urgent conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, insisting that both India and Pakistan join these arrangements and, most important, reexamining the relevance of the NMD and TMD to the overall prospects of eventual global nuclear disarmament. China would respond positively if meaningful steps were taken on the last point.
Ehsan Ahrari is professor of national security and strategy at the Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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