Little more than a decade ago, I witnessed the blossoming of democracy in Taiwan. During that time there was plenty of struggle, plenty of noise -- the noise of freedom, although many didn't see it that way -- but no blood on the streets. As I discussed Tai-wanese politics with a friend a few days ago, he mulled over his thoughts about Taiwan's peaceful revolution, and admitted that perhaps it had come too easily. The high price other people have paid for their freedom made them more careful and determined to keep it, he said.
I understand his concern, as threats to Taiwan not only come from across the Taiwan Strait these days, but seem to come from within Taiwan as well. Voters have consistently defied pressures from abroad in the past, but may soon be challenged again.
In the early 1990's, as the pace of democratization in Taiwan quickened, the US was slow in welcoming it in any substantive way. It wasn't that the government didn't know what was taking place. I can confirm that it did. But accepting it meant that change was necessary, and, at that time, the government was not prepared to change. The results of the Taiwan Policy Review of 1994 testify to this. US relations in the Pacific then were very heavily focused on trade issues, often to the detriment of allies and friends, including Taiwan.
Among that many other trade issues, one can recall the Pelly Amendment (regarding trade in Rhino horns), for which Taiwan alone, very publicly and unfairly, was singled out. Bystanders, including China, could easily have drawn the conclusion that Taiwan's growing democracy didn't really matter. And Taiwan's voters could have made the judgement that their political leadership, in the difficult struggle to establish permanent democratic processes, was not being very effective in gaining support from its principal foreign friend.
Taiwan's peaceful, legitimate transfer of power last year turned out to be the line beyond which the US was no longer able to avoid addressing the necessary changes needed to conduct its relationship with democratic Taiwan. One could begin to see this even in the last few months of the previous US administration, and much more clearly with the new one sworn in this year in Washington. The biggest change, and a very crucial one, is that Taiwan was now not seen as a troublemaker. With time, perhaps, even those who hold the opposite view will come to understand that since it gave up its claim to the mainland of China, it has never been in Taiwan's interest to be a troublemaker.
Today we hear the US administration suggesting to China that it should engage in dialogue with the legitimately elected leadership in Taiwan, and that there should be no preconditions for doing so. It has offered to license the sale of submarines to Taiwan, and agreed to unofficial meetings with Taiwan's national security specialists in the US. Future changes may not be as spectacular, but it does seem clear that decisions are being made that are not simply based on past precedents. There seems to be a willingness to take a more balanced look and judge whether policies and decisions make sense and are in our interests, not just whether they annoy the PRC.
In Taiwan, in the next few weeks, all the candidates and party alignments -- or lack thereof -- for the year-end Legislative Yuan elections, will become clearer. There will be a last session of the present Legislative Yuan, and campaigning will shift into high gear. There seems to be a consensus among observers that no single party will gain a clear majority in the next Yuan. There is little consensus, however, on who will align with whom, before or after the election, and what effect each option will have on the results. Added to all this uncertainty is the conventional wisdom that voters generally choose their legislators on personalities, not so much on party.
In spite of the appearance of being a political circus, how the new legislature shapes up will be of the utmost importance to Taiwan's future. Will the Executive Yuan and the new Legislative Yuan be able to overcome the constitutional problems that the present government has faced? Will badly-needed legislation be allowed to pass? Who will be in charge?
But these are normal domestic challenges. Judging from the present public debate, however, a more disturbing element of the forthcoming campaign seems to be developing: that the dominant issue could become the cross-strait relationship. That subject has been an underlying issue in all previous elections, but usually purely domestic matters have predominated.
If indeed cross-strait relations become the top issue, the questions this raises are of immense importance. If that issue dominates the debate, will ethnic positions become more polarized? Will this encourage more interference by the PRC in domestic politics? Will this in effect become tantamount to a referendum? Is Taiwan ready for this?
These questions, of course, are for the people to decide. Other events during this campaign time frame will be taking place that may have some impact on the judgements that people -- and leaders -- make; membership in the WTO and the APEC meeting in October, for example. Among all of these considerations, one should be the fundamental policy toward Taiwan as it is presented by the new American government: that the US will not support any unilateral effort to determine the political status of Taiwan; that whatever is decided must be peaceful; and that as a democracy there must be the assent of the people of Taiwan.
Consider that last important element of America's policy. If Taiwan's political status is mixed in with a number of domestic issues in a general election, to what degree will the results be understood to be an assent to or a revocation of any cross-strait arrangements debated in the campaign?
The voters of Taiwan, over this last decade of its new democracy, have voted in a very responsible manner. But the intricacies of mixing this volatile issue with many others would place a very heavy burden on the electorate. Are they ready for it? Are the campaigners ready to debate this issue responsibly? In making a judgement on what it should do with regard to its commitment on the need for the "assent of the people of Taiwan," what should the US decide? Or, after reflection, would it be better to debate the cross-strait issue in a different way?
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group.The views expressed in this article are his own.
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