It was with some trepidation that Koreans on both sides of the DMZ watched the US President George W. Bush administration come to power given the more "hard-line" position many Congressional Republicans had taken over the years regarding North Korea. However, the outcome of the administration's finally-completed Korea policy is, on the whole, quite balanced and not significantly different in terms of overall objectives from those pursued by the administration of former US president Bill Clinton.
The new policy was announced by Bush in early June this year, just prior to the Washington visit of Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Han Seung-soo and further spelled out by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly in congressional testimony later that month.
However, even before the policy review was completed, comments by senior administration officials, including the president himself, strongly suggested that we would see more continuity than change in Washington's dealings on peninsula issues (including American humanitarian assistance to the North, which continued even during the review process).
The US policy review, in many respects, merely confirmed what Bush had told North Korean President Kim Jong-il three months earlier; namely that Washington will continue to support the Sunshine Policy, the Agreed Framework, and the Trilateral Coordination Oversight Group process with Seoul and Tokyo. Bush also indicated his willingness to resume Washington's dialogue with Pyongyang on a broad range of issues, including missiles.
More talk
The main difference in approach seems to be a US desire for a more comprehensive dialogue. As Secretary Kelly spelled out during his House testimony, "the president has directed us to undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda, including improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, a verifiable end to North Korea's missile production and export programs, and a less threatening conventional military posture."
Unlike the past administration, which favored a "step-by-step approach," Washington now plans to take a "comprehensive approach," to address the many elements that comprise peninsula and regional security and will try to make progress simultaneously on as many issues as possible -- provided, of course, that Pyongyang is willing to cooperate.
This broad approach is quite understandable, given that one of the primary complaints logged against the Clinton administration in its dealings with Pyongyang (by many South Koreans and Americans regardless of political affiliation) was that it seemed to approach the peninsula as a non-proliferation problem rather than as a regional security problem with an important proliferation dimension. Halting proliferation is not an end in itself, but a means toward the broader goal of creating a peaceful, more stable peninsula where, prior to unification (which all seem to agree is a long way off), North and South can peacefully coexist.
The Bush administration has indicated that it will try to persuade the North to reduce its massive conventional forces and otherwise engage in military confidence-building measures to achieve "a less threatening conventional military posture." This was a goal of the Clinton administration as well -- it was to be a topic in the Four-Party Talks, but Pyongyang has refused, since August 1999, to resume this dialogue.
It appears equally unlikely that Pyongyang will put its conventional forces on the table during future discussions with the US, at least in the initial stages, but it is fully appropriate for the US (and South Korea) to focus on this issue. Of note, the need for mutual force reductions and peninsula confidence building measures was acknowledged during former US president Jimmy Carter's 1994 dialogue with then North Korean president Kim Il-sung. More importantly, peninsula CBMs were at the heart of the 1991/92 North-South Korea Basic Agreement, so this is hardly a new issue.
The press has also been full of speculation about American desires to change the terms of the Agreed Framework. But the Bush administration is firmly on record supporting the current agreement as long as Pyongyang also honors its commitments (which it has thus far done).
However, the real moment of truth for Pyongyang and for the Agreed Framework in general is the requirement for the North to come into full compliance with the IAEA prior to the delivery of any sensitive components of the promised light water reactors (LWRs). This requires detailed inspection to determine past accountability, a process which some speculate could take two to four years.
IAEA approval
Thus far, Pyongyang has not allowed the IAEA to begin this task -- the IAEA's most recent attempt, in May this year, was once again rejected by Pyongyang. Thus, North Korea has only itself to blame if additional delays occur in the completion of this project.
In the meantime, the US and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) are honoring their part of the bargain. Construction activity continues on the LWR site (even though striking North Korean workers had to be replaced with Uzbek laborers) and KEDO continues to provide North Korea with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually as compensation for shutting down its Yongbyon reactor. These deliveries are scheduled to continue until the first LWR becomes operational, making North Korean demands for compensation if the project is delayed doubly inappropriate: first because they are already being compensated through the heavy fuel oil deliveries and second because they have been at least as much at fault for delays experienced thus far.
Meanwhile, high-level North-South talks, suspended by Pyongyang in March this year, have yet to be reinstituted. Many speculated at the time that the North's decision was in response to the Bush administration's "time out" -- Kim Jong-il is reported to have said in May that he was waiting for the Bush administration to complete its Korean Peninsula policy review before setting a date for his visit to Seoul.
However, the US willingness to resume dialogue has not been met with North Korea's willingness finally to set a date for Kim's long-overdue return visit. Nor has Pyongyang resumed its high-level dialogue with Seoul, raising questions as to whether Bush's policy review was the reason or merely a convenient excuse behind the lull in North-South dialogue.
In the final analysis, it will be North Korea's actions, and in particular Pyongyang's willingness (or lack thereof) to continue its dialogue with Seoul, that will be the principle determinant of US policy on the Peninsula.
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS , a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
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