One country, two systems a mirage

Under the National Defense Law (國防法) promulgated in January 2000, the defense of the ROC must involve defense of the entire nation, both military and civil, as well as political, economic, psychological and technological matters that directly or indirectly help achieve this goal. In order to turn the concept of defense of the entire nation into concrete, operational policy, four components should be noted: military, economic, social and civil and psychological. Defense of the entire nation must be centered around people and propped up by military defense. It is an "all-round" (全方位) defense.

Overall defense is defensive in nature, under which the state will only take action if attacked. Tai-wan possesses retaliatory military power, which is a bargaining chip in in its defense. The concept of "offshore full-scale engagement" (決戰境外), intended to keep military conflict away from Taiwan, highlights the government's re-solve to conduct a defensive defense. The quality of national defense strategies and of advanced weaponry systems, however, is less important than psychological defense.

Singapore's senior minister Lee Kuan Yew (李光耀) once said that psychological defense aims at uniting a community that can share the same feelings and make joint responses on certain issues. Community members should also have defensive attitudes to protect their own nation, flag, president and future.

Psychological defense is closely related to such concepts as gemeinschaft -- a society or group characterized chiefly by a strong sense of common identity -- as well as identity, belonging, unity and cohesion within ethnic groups. When a nation becomes a gemeinschaft, it has attained the best condition for psychological defense.

Since Taiwan's political transition, local businesses have in-creased their investments in China; lawmakers and retired officials have gone on numerous visits to Beijing; retired military personnel have been keen on military exchanges; retired intelligence staff have damaged the national interest for their personal ends, and the number of people in favor of the "one country, two systems" model appears to be increasing daily. These developments highlight the vulnerability of Taiwan's psychological defense line, which gives Beijing the opportunity to divide and weaken Taiwan.

In early May, a visiting delegation from the US National War College discovered that some of Taiwan's generals are dissatisfied with the government. The delegation also doubted the capacity of Taiwan's society to withstand a cross-strait military conflict. Questions that arise from their findings include: for what and for whom do the armed forces fight? Does the military cooperate with or secretly oppose the government on national defense strategies? Is Taiwan a pawn or a player between the US and China? Is Taiwan acquiring weapons in order to launch an arms race with China, or to pursue a military balance to attain peace? Will acceptance of the one coun-try, two systems model maintain or destroy the status quo? Will the ROC disappear as a result?

These questions cannot be resolved by acquisition of the most advanced weapons. But if they are not settled, sophisticated weapons may become useless. Beijing doesn't need to attack cities when it can attack people's minds, let Taiwan divide itself and wear down the will to resist.