The purpose of KMT Chairman Lien Chan's (
Independence fundamentalists see confederacy as the prelude to unification and are intensifying their attacks, while part of the KMT old guard vehemently op-poses it as a violation of the Na-tional Unification Guidelines (國家統一綱領) and a move towards independence. If the confederation model is held back by such a broad division between unificationists and independence advocates, I'm afraid that we will lose a good opportunity to integrate the ways in which the different parties view the cross-strait relationship.
If we look at the whole spectrum of definitions for the possible structure of cross-strait relations, the halfway point is the status quo. Moving to the right of that point, we go from "one China, two countries," passing through "one country, two governments," "one China with divided rule," "the divided rule of one China" and "federation" to "one country, two systems" on the extreme right. These are all mo-dels for "one China."
Moving to the left of the halfway point, we go from confederation, through "special state-to-state relations," "independent commonwealth," "EU," "British Commonwealth" and "state-to-state special relations" to the "Republic of Taiwan" on the extreme left. These are all models for the existence of two countries.
On the unification-independence spectrum, the confederation model is located just to the left of the halfway point. It is the model for the closest form of integration of countries in international law. The members of a confederation are all sovereign and independent states, but their political union is based on a common, confederate constitution (the British Common-wealth and the EU are all based on international agreements) that recognizes the existence of the central government's powers. The veto powers of each country, how-ever, often overturn the decision making powers of the central government, and in the end, the historical experience of the confederation has been that of an ineffective system.
It is due to the confederation's very ineffectiveness that diplomatic and national defense needs have tended to make the constituent states of confederations opt for the one-country solution provided by the federation: the US, Germany and Switzerland are all countries that have moved from confederation to federation.
On the surface, a confederation is a union of sovereign states, but, underneath, it holds the possibility of moving from independence to unification. This places confederation towards the strategic center of the unification-independence spectrum, something that may have a positive effect on domestic political competition and integration. If the KMT really writes the confederation model into its party charter, the immediate effect will be to eliminate the party's right wing (the unificationist faction).
Let's take a look at the three major parties. With the DPP sitting on the left and the KMT holding the middle ground with a slight leftward slant, how should the People First Party define its position? With the next presidential election in mind they cannot af-ford to be found to the right of the KMT (they should be slightly to the left or at the same spot). If that happens, then James Soong's (宋楚瑜) EU model could be accepted as his party's official standpoint.
With the three major parties on the left side of the spectrum say-ing no to any and all incarnations of "one China," Beijing will be-come frustrated and not know what to do. From this point of view, the confederate model will consolidate domestic solidarity and unity toward the outside world, and this of course carries positive significance. Confederacy as an option may bring balance to the recent rise in public support for one country, two systems.
Changes to party charters can often lead to changes in the whole political landscape. The DPP's pro-independence charter has had the same profound influence. The KMT's change to its party charter will mainly influence positional changes within the party, rather than outside it. With the elimination of the KMT's right-wing, there will be more room to find com-mon ground when pushing party factions to plan future cross-strait relations. At the same time, the political differences between unification and independence advocates will be blurred.
There are differences between all parties when it comes to the level of integration, organizational structure and power relationships, but whether it be independence, special state-to-state relations, commonwealth, EU or confederation, the common de-nominator can be summarized as follows.
One, the non-acceptance of the other side's unilateral declaration of one China, and of its unification method. Two, the insistence on Taiwan being an independent and sovereign country with no need to abandon that sovereignty. Three, Taiwan's status as a sovereign body is manifested on two levels -- the people decide the future of the country by the exercise of their own free will, and the state decides its own status by the exercise of its sovereignty.
Finding a common denominator implies a glimmer of hope and a cessation of arguments between the parties over cross-strait relations. The main significance of the confederation model, then, is not as a blueprint for political negotiations with China, but as its consolidating a basic understanding between the main parties. Such an understanding, amid the arguments over the pros and cons of the confederate system, may move the political situation from ideological standoff to the gradual unification of policies, and keep it moving smoothly forward.
Shen Fu-hsiung is a DPP legislator.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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