One of the key characteristics of the notion of the "Post-Cold War order" lies in the assumption that the US is the sole legitimate superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union, despite the fact that some regional hegemonies are emerging. The theory, however, is failing empirical analysis as regional conflicts endanger America's great power status.
Soon after he took the oath of office, US President George W. Bush adopted a relatively new approach toward Beijing, as manifested in his description of the Sino-US relationship as a competitive partnership. The fact that Washington and Beijing have major differences in the areas of trade, human rights and weapons proliferation illustrates the difficulties inherent in seeking to improve bilateral relations.
The collision of a US surveillance plane and a Chinese jet fighter over the South China Sea in April has not only resulted in increasing quarrels between Washington and Beijing but has also led to a potential confrontation between the American leadership and a hegemonic China.
The incident demonstrated a dilemma in US-China relations. Conflict with China is not inevitable but, in the absence of active efforts to manage contentious differences, minor incidents will quickly escalate into larger crises.
Moreover, while the Bush administration has been able to recruit some Asian specialists into the government, no tone has been officially set on the question of how to construct a new relationship with Beijing. This policy vacuum leaves a lot of room for China to test the administration's bottom line.
To break the current standoff and establish a feasible and systematic approach to Beijing in the long term, the Bush administration must first study Chinese negotiating techniques.
A key characteristic of Chinese negotiating behavior is the distinctive use of language in the political process and this is expressed in a number of ways by Chinese negotiators.
In politics, the Chinese are masters of the symbolic act and of the communicating power of a well-turned phrase. First, Chinese negotiators often quote their counterparts' own words to hold them to a position, or try to create a situation forcing their opponents to make concessions. In the spy plane incident, China refused a US offer of assistance in finding its lost airman but complained that the US was not concerned enough about the issue and that it was "unfeeling."
Second, the typical Chinese approach to negotiation starts with the deep-rooted culture of saving face. In this regard, the cultural and ideological gaps between Beijing and Washington remain wide. For example, Chinese officials questioned the motivation of the US Pacific Command in releasing information about the collision hours after it occurred. Deep down, however, Chinese leaders would have preferred that the incident remain secret until it had been resolved, because they cannot tolerate the risk of loosing face.
Third, Chinese negotiators often use a "take it or leave it" strategy. Beijing's insistence on a US apology to all Chinese people reflected this hard-line mentality and the bringing into play of Chinese nationalism.
Fourth, when China's negotiators wish to convey the impression that they are impervious to pressure or unwilling to compromise, they will assert -- often not very convincingly -- that they do not care about a given situation or objective. This rationale formed the basis of Beijing's insistence that the US was solely responsible for the plane incident.
Finally, Beijing's downplaying of the Bush administration's call for a quick release of the crew exposed its motive for controlling the pace of the negotiation. The idea is that its counterpart must make its decision under the pressure of a time deadline. Beijing knew perfectly well that Bush was under intense pressure from inside and preferred that Bush make concessions under pressure.
On the surface, the early base-touching between the Bush administration and Beijing was more of a series of accidents. It might have resulted in a deterioration in relations, however, if the two sides had not been able to find an appropriate way to deal with mutual differences.
The Bush administration's commitment to forging a national missile defense system has sparked fears that it is intent on denying Beijing its small nuclear deterrent. The PLA feels that US surveillance is designed to help Taiwan in some future military contingency. Continued US sales of high-tech weaponry to Taiwan, moreover, make the Chinese feel that only the US stands in the way of reuniting Taiwan with the "mother-land."
How should the Bush administration deal with China? In addition to understanding Chinese negotiating behavior, Washington must take a firm, consistent and cautious approach to tackling the problems between the two countries. International observers argue that the danger of war increases particularly when the challenger is an undemocratic state. Democracies are generally satisfied powers, unlikely to challenge the status quo. To put it simply, democracies do not fight democracies. An undemocratic challenger, however, is more threatening to this order, and hence more likely to induce a more belligerent response from a democratic leader and its allies.
This is the nature of Sino-US relations. Given that Beijing is already expanding its own political, military and economic influence, the international community must make a unified effort to educate China in the responsibilities of being a "great power." While no country in Asia, including Taiwan, can afford military confrontation between Washington and Beijing, all countries in the region must make clear to China the costs of being an ambitious hegemonic power.
Most importantly, Beijing must understand that the status of a great power is not illustrated by active expansion of military capabilities or threats against smaller countries. As a great power, China must understand its responsibilities from the perspective of a leader in the region. This is the lesson that the whole world must teach the Chinese people.
Liu Kuan-teh is a Taipei-based political commentator.
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