Is this a good time for some overdue policy adjustments in the US' relations with the PRC and with Taiwan? Conventional wisdom is that whatever the US does (including real changes in policy), we should never tag it as "change" in policy. It is an understatement to say this slows any progress toward needed accommodation to changing realities. Why have American policy-makers had this attitude? A great many reasons, among them a super-sensitivity to any action or statement that displeases Beijing; but my vote would point to the lack of flexibility in the PRC's concept of sovereignty, and the uncertainty of success in its reform program.
Among other things, these factors have posed increased difficulty on Taiwan in developing a consensus on cross-strait relations, and have frustrated efforts in fashioning a more manageable relationship with the US. I believe it is time to adjust policies more to our advantage and that it can be done without unduly disrupting the important relationship with the PRC.
It is not necessary here to review how the "one China" term has come to be used as a sobriquet for "no change." One can just list President George Bush's release of F-16 sales in 1992; P. K. Chiang's (江丙坤) statement (1993 in Seattle) of a separate, sovereign state; the Taiwan Policy Review and President Lee Teng-Hui's (李登輝) visit to Cornell in 1995; the new guidelines in the US-Japan alliance that followed, the three no's (1998); the "special state to state" term (1999) and others.
Each of these were followed by assurances that the actions or statements did not represent any change in policy. That is not true, or maybe only half true, but nonetheless the statements were considered necessary to placate the PRC.
For Beijing, this process is reversed. Statements sometimes are trumpeted as change but it quickly becomes apparent that it is disingenuous, or only half true, and the fundamental "principle" remains the same. A recent example is Vice Premier Qian Qichen's (錢其琛) statement that the mainland and Taiwan all belong to "one China," but adding that "China's sovereignty and territorial integrity are indivisible," which for Taiwan has another meaning.
But very fundamental changes continue to take place in both the PRC and Taiwan. Dodging policy changes that would adapt to
reality simply allows the gap between reality and stated policy to grow wider. The rationale for avoiding policy adjustments usually is that there are too many uncertainties at the present time. Best, then, to "kick the can" toward the future, and wait for a more stable environment.
We also often tend to justify this indecision by ambiguity or by pointing to current issues in China that policy adjustments might negatively effect. In many cases, however, these issues are much more in China's interest to maintain than they are America's. Some examples are: the decision on holding the Olympics in Beijing; conducting a successful APEC meeting in Shanghai in October; completing work on its WTO entry; and having a smooth political succession next year. The risks of possible social unrest are often cited in the media, but not in any public statements, to avoid Beijing's displeasure. These risks, however, are based on domestic actions largely connected to the economic reform program, not with foreign relationships.
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