The Bush administration won't sell Taiwan the most advanced weapons available, but it says it will defend Taipei from a Chinese attack. Instead of initiating a new military commitment, Washington should use increased weapons transfers to distance itself from any conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
The people of Taiwan have lived separately from China for a century. Nevertheless, China has been growing more insistent that Taiwan accept a subordinate role, planting the seeds of conflict.
Luckily, tensions have subsided from a year ago, when Chen Shui-bian (
In particular, an impending leadership transition in China, combined with the increased military influence evident in the delayed release of the US servicemen during the surveillance plane incident, could tempt one faction or another to use recovery of the "lost province" for political advantage. In either case a diplomatic confrontation could spiral toward military crisis. With Washington in the middle.
Today's debate is too limited. On one side are the China appeasers, who would essentially turn Taiwan over to Beijing's tender mercies. Such a policy would avoid needless confrontation, but should leave an unpleasant taste in the mouth of any advocate of liberty.
In sharp contrast are those who would offer a formal commitment to defend Taiwan, come what may. President George W. Bush's promise is only slightly less unequivocal. This policy puts the US on a collision course with a nuclear-armed power.
If Beijing acts rationally, it will be deterred. But nationalism all too often spawns irrational decisions.
The Bush administration, which struggled to defuse the confrontation over the US surveillance plane, should avoid both extremes by arming Taiwan to defend itself.
Taipei has requested a variety of weapons, most importantly Arleigh Burke-class destroyers armed with the AEGIS radar system and Tomahawk cruise missiles. The Taiwanese also asked for this system last year, but the US demurred, under pressure from Beijing. Although the Bush administration agreed to provide much of what Taipei requested, on this it, too, said no.
Indeed, the Clinton administration's assistant secretary of state for East Asia, Stanley Roth, complained: "Too much attention is paid to weapons." In his view, Taiwan will lose if the dispute is militarized. "This issue has to be on a political track," he argued.
But a satisfactory political resolution -- some modus vivendi that reflects the wishes of Taiwan's people -- requires that Taipei possess a robust military deterrent. Taiwan's current qualitative arms superiority is one of the most important factors in keeping peace in the Strait.
Today China has only limited ability to coerce Taiwan. However, China is modernizing its force, and the Pentagon warns that the military balance is likely to shift to China by around 2005 if Taiwan cannot augment its force. Then China would likely become more assertive, even threatening.
A recent staff report for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee contends that "Taiwan desperately needs more advanced, longer-range weapons." Particularly important are arms that would thwart any attempt by Beijing to stage a quick, knock-out blow.



