Where is the US going to get the eight diesel-electric submarines they have offered Taiwan? Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden have all denied knowing anything about the deal. This increases the suspicion that the US is promising more than it can deliver.
But there are options beyond these three countries. Other options include: The French 1,230-tonne Agosta-class, with a crew of 54 and four 21-inch
(533 mm) torpedo tubes. Both France and Spain build the 1,668-tonne Scorpene class, with a crew of 31 and six 21-inch torpedo tubes. Italy builds the 1,476-tonne Improved Sauro-class, with a crew of 50 and six 21-inch torpedo tubes.
Japan builds the 2,700-tonne Oyashio-class, with a crew of 69 and six 21-inch torpedo tubes, and the 2,450-tonne Harushio-class, with a crew of 74 and six 21-inch torpedo tubes. Australia builds the 3,051-tonne Collins-class, with a crew of 42 and six 21-inch torpedo tubes. The last is the British 2,168-tonne Type 2400 with a crew of 48 and six 21-inch torpedo tubes.
We should not rule out the US. Though they have not built diesel-electric submarines since the 1950s, they do build submarines nonetheless. The US could acquire licensing and plans from another country and build the submarines in the US.
The US has plans to build Dutch-designed Moray submarines for Egypt. If the plan is finalized, the construction is scheduled to take place at Northrop Grumman's Ingall Shipyards in Pascagoula, Mississippi.
If Taiwan pursues the submarine purchase, other contenders are the naval shipyards at New-port News, Virginia and Electric Boat Corp, Groton, Connecticut.
Though rumors abound of secret German and Dutch plans to build the hulls and ship them to the US for outfitting, it would be a terrible waste of time and money. Though the US might be able to persuade Germany, the Netherlands or Sweden to issue licensing, it does not appear likely in the near future.
The next debate is what would Taiwan do with submarines? It would be highly unlikely that eight diesel-electric submarines could blockade Chinese ports like Shanghai or Hong Kong. China would unleash its abundant supply of anti-submarine planes and helicopters, which would quickly destroy the submarines. They could lay mines near Chinese coastal waters, but that would be an act of war and insanity. They could be used for covert spy missions along China's coast, but given Taiwan's excellent spy network that would probably prove unnecessary.
They could also be used for covert activities similar to US SEAL operations, but the only practical use of these operations would be in the waters surrounding Taiwan.
The lesson learned from Taiwan's present submarines, the Sea Lion, Sea Tiger, Sea Leopard and Sea Dragon, is that Taiwan's use of submarines has only been for patrolling areas exclusively within its territorial waters. The argument that they are old and dangerous is defeated by the fact that even the Guppy-class (World War II) vintage submarines can fire torpedoes. Forget the propaganda that the Guppy's are only now used for training and the torpedo tubes have been sealed shut. During the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis the Guppy's went to sea armed to the teeth.
In defensive terms, Taiwan's acquisition of eight new submarines could only be used to defeat a Chinese naval blockade or an amphibious assault on Taiwan, which are both primary sources of fears for the Taiwan military; the third being air and missile attacks. The bottom line is that Taiwan could only use the submarines to defend Taiwan and not in any offensive manner as Beijing suggests.



